Decision-making: creativity, judgment, and systems by Brinkers, Henry S.
DECISION-MAKING


edited by 
Henry S. Brinkers 
DECISION-MAKING 
CREATIVITY. 
JUDGMENT, AND SYSTEMS 
Ohio State University Press 
Columbus 1972 
Copyright © 1972 by the Ohio State University Press
All Rights Reserved 
Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 71-188740
International Standard Book Number 0-8142-0165-2 
Manufactured in the United States of America 
To Harold A. Bolz 
Marion L. Smith 
Elliot L. Whitaker 
For their support and guidance 

CONTENTS 
Preface ix

Introduction 3

PART 1: Decision-Making Strategies 
Personalistic Decision Theory: Exposition and

Critique

Peter C. Fishburn 19

The Study of Collective Decisions

Bemhardt Lieberman 42

PART 2: Decision-Making Aids 
Information Science as an Aid to Decision-Making

Ronald L. Ernst and Marshall C. Yovits 69

Toward a Working Theory of Automated Design

The Generation of Form by Geometric Methods

Charles M. Eastman 85

Florencio G. Asenjo 112

PART 3: Decision Aid Applications 
Decision Aids for the Planning and Development of

University Facilities

Thomas E. Hoover 127

Contents viii 
Analytic Approaches to Facility Layout and Design 
Richard L. Francis
Development Action Sequencing under Highly 
Constrained Conditions 
Francis Hendricks
Adaptive Diagnosis of Problems 
John W. Dickey
 137 
 147 
 157 
PART 4: Human Creativity and Judgment 
Managing Visual Information 
Hoyt L. Sherman
Matching Decision Aids with Intuitive Styles 
William T. Morris
Conceptual Models in Design 
Donald Watson
 173 
 190 
 205 
PART 5: Implications 
Who Looks at the Whole System? 
Ian I. Mitroff
Decision Aids: Needs and Prospects 
John M. Allderige
 223 
 247 
Epilogue
Notes on the Contributors
Index
 261 
 265 
 267 
PREFACE 
The essays assembled in this volume were prepared by the authors 
for presentation on the campus of the Ohio State University at the 
Thomas A. Boyd interdisciplinary conference on decision-making 
aids. Through the financial support of the College of Engineering, 
the Thomas A. Boyd Lecture Fund, and the School of Architecture, 
the conference was established as a means for bringing together 
an interdisciplinary group of scientists and scholars for a wide-
ranging discussion of the many aspects of emerging decision-aid 
research and applications along with their implications for profes­
sional activities and professional education. Consonant with the 
excellence and achievement stimulated by Thomas A. Boyd's sup­
port for higher education, the conference and the papers presented 
in this volume are dedicated to the advancement of the use of 
scientific methods for decision-making within the several disciplines 
concerned with enhancing environment and the well-being of 
people. 
The stimulus for organizing the conference and commissioning 
the papers to be prepared is the growing interdisciplinary interest 
in the recent work in information science and cybernetics, decision 
theory and operations research, and mathematics as it relates to 
the study and analysis of the behavior of complex systems and the 
design of machines and processes for simulating the behavior of 
such systems. Decision-making, and the closely related matter of 
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system behavior, constitute one of the most significant, continually 
reappearing components of studies of complex systems, whether 
they be artificial systems or living beings. The concepts and theory 
emerging from these fields, and the growing number of applications 
based upon those concepts and theory, appear to be a small though 
important addition to the large body of theory and methods of the 
physical and social sciences presently in wide use in the study of 
large, complex systems. It is the promise that many see in this 
recent work for providing additional quantitative approaches for 
the study of such systems that suggest that it is worthwhile for 
professionals in a number of fields to become aware of and examine 
this area of work more thoroughly. It is to that end that the con­
ference papers have been assembled for publication. 
H.S.B. 
September, 1971 
DECISION-MAKING


Henry S. Brinkers 
INTRODUCTION 
This collection of essays is devoted to the topic of decision-making 
aids as a relationship between decision-makers of all types, the 
states of the real world that form the substance and context for 
decisions, and a variety of concepts and technologies used as 
decision aids that form extensions of the intellectual apparatus of 
decision-makers. The intention of the volume is to increase the 
general awareness of the quantative, and scientifically more precise, 
approaches to decision-making with respect to large, complex 
systems. 
The collection might well be termed a comprehensive treatment 
of the topic, but one that is strategically spotty in depth. Taken 
together, the essays develop in depth a limited number of impor­
tant aspects of decision-making and decision-making aids while 
achieving a comprehensive coverage by considering the nature of 
decision-making and decision-making strategies, the contributions 
of a variety of disciplines to the development of decision aids, the 
role of human creativity and judgment in decision-making, and 
finally, the implications and prospects for the future use of decision 
aids within academic and professional environments. 
Six highly related conditions form the practical setting for the 
collection. They are conditions that have crystallized relatively 
suddenly during recent decades. The six conditions have become 
apparent around the world, particularly in developed nations, and 
have generally affected the lives of people, both laymen and pro­
fessionals, and their perception of aspects of the world around 
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them. As such, these conditions have made it both necessary and 
possible to employ significant extensions of the human intellect 
as decision-making aids. 
The first of these conditions, the one that is basic to the other 
five, is the perceived apparent increase in the complexity of the 
affairs and processes of various aspects of the real world. Of all, 
this condition is the most pervasive, most recognized, as it has 
touched almost every facet of life around the world, even in de­
veloping nations where life, relatively speaking, is still uncom­
plicated. The second condition is the relative shift of the focus 
of interest away from "things," and the significance of "quantity" 
as a measure of achievement, toward the "relationships between 
things" and the "quality" of those relationships. This condition 
has become significant within those societies that have an 
abundance of things and are realizing more and more that the 
accumulation of things is not contributing to enhancing their 
quality of life. The blacks in the United States, for example, while 
aspiring to possess all of the things that whites enjoy, seem to 
understand the critical nature of the quality of relationships 
exemplified best, perhaps, by the idea of equal opportunity. 
The third condition, an apparent natural concomitant of the 
shift from "things" to the "quality of relationships," is the relative 
shift of interest away from technological problems toward vastly 
more complex social problems and the nature of complex systems 
in general. This shift has required changes in the way in which 
the real world is perceived and has, of necessity, been accompanied 
by the fourth condition: the increasing abandonment of the frag­
mentary ways of viewing the real-world that have been character­
istic of the modes of scientific thought for the past three centuries, 
and the embracing of integrative and holistic views. This shift is 
exemplified in the shift of attention from parts per se toward 
wholes and, as now frequently referred to, systems. These two 
conditions are intimately connected. The emphasis given to com­
plex social and system problems demands more than what can be 
provided by any single discipline. Accordingly, there have arisen 
such compensatory concepts as the "team approach" and the 
several sciences that cut across the disciplines, such as information 
science and general systems theory, to more adequately deal with 
these concerns. 
While the demands that these conditions have placed upon sci­
ence have been enormous—well beyond the present capability to 
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perform in many cases, although science adequately supported 
has responded well in meeting new demands—the demands placed 
upon human intellectual capacity have been equally as great. The 
resulting problem may be characterized in the following way. On 
the one hand, though the intellectual capacity of a human being 
is substantial, it is nonetheless limited in information-processing 
and storage capacity. On the other hand, the information content 
of even simple aspects of the real world exceeds the capacity of a 
single human mind by several orders of magnitude. Heretofore, 
notwithstanding the wide variety of mechanical and mathematical 
aids that have been available, the main means for establishing a 
balance between the information-processing capacity of the human 
mind and the information content of the aspect of the real world 
under study has been by reducing the information content of the 
matter under study by dividing it into parts, aggregation of vari­
ables, simplifying assumptions, and so on. However, the establish­
ment of the fifth condition, the general availability of low-cost, 
high-capacity, fast information-processing technology, has enabled 
men to extend and increase their intellectual capacity very con­
siderably. The effect of this condition has been that man can now 
deal more effectively with complex matters on his own complex 
terms as against the more simplistic terms of pre-information tech­
nology man. 
Similarly, science has been pressed to extend its capability for 
handling complexity for the purpose of moving ahead into the area 
of complex social and system problems. The challenge for science 
has been not only that of developing the means for handling wholes 
as against increasingly smaller parts, but also that of improved 
means for dealing with significantly large numbers of variables and 
the relationships among them. This has been accomplished, to a 
considerable extent, through the establishment of the sixth condi­
tion: a body of scientific knowledge, drawing from the work in 
several disciplines but broadly applicable to a large number of dis­
ciplines, that embodies holistic approaches and the capability for 
expressing in precise terms, and handling the relationships between, 
a large number of variables. Contributions from information 
science and a number of areas of mathematics have been important 
in this latter area. 
The broadest context for the apparent increase in the complexity 
of world processes and affairs and the other conditions that form 
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the setting for the collection is contained in what Harvey Cox refers 
to in The Secular City as the secularization of knowledge. The 
essence of Cox's argument is that only after knowledge of reality 
passes from the mystic realm of the philosopher and the priest, 
whether they be in the civil, professional, or academic sectors, to 
the realm of empirical science, the cultural and other restraints 
regulating the production of new knowledge of reality are relaxed. 
Through this transfer, knowledge of reality becomes less dominated 
by beliefs and may be subjected to the objectivity of science. The 
release of the objects of nature—the heavenly bodies, the plants 
and rocks, and so on—as objects of worship, for example, was an 
important precondition for the emergence of the sciences. The 
secularization of life, soul and intellect in more modern times is now 
manifest in organ transplants, birth control, molecular biology, in­
telligent machines, student revolutions, professional and academic 
reappraisals, and the like. But more importantly, it is manifest in 
the technology bearing upon what Marshall McLuhan refers to as 
media. In commenting upon the influence of media and its tech­
nological base, he summarizes it this way [4, p. 19]. 
After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and 
mechanical technologies, the Western world is imploding. During the 
mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more 
than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous 
system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far 
as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the 
extensions of man—technological simulation of consciousness, when the 
creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended 
to the whole of human society, much as we have already extended our 
senses and our nerves by the various media. 
The extended consciousness made possible by the electric tech­
nology has led men in all walks of life quite naturally to the dis­
covery of patterns of relationships that were previously unobserva­
ble. Certainly, the new technology itself has been instrumental in 
establishing many new patterns of relationships. However, the 
emergence of the means for identifying these new relationships 
along with the many long-standing complex relations among living 
and physical systems appears to be the basic factor underlying the 
perceived apparent increase in the complexity of the modern world. 
As Stafford Beer observes in Decision and Control, complexity is 
not substantially increased by additions to the number of things; 
really high levels of complexity arise from the increased number of 
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relations among things. His point is illustrated by the observation 
that things increase normally at arithmetic rates, and occasionally 
at geometric rates, whereas relations can and do increase at geo­
metric rates of the rates of increase of things. 
It is not only that the world has become more complex, but that 
the electric technology enables us to be more aware of the actual 
levels of complexity. The effect of this awareness has led to the pro­
gressive enlargement of the scope of concern for most matters of im­
portance today, by virtue of the newly perceived relationships, to 
levels of complexity well beyond the information-processing capac­
ity of the human mind; and in many cases, well beyond the prac­
tical capacity of today's fastest computers. Indeed, as W. Ross 
Ashby notes [1] in connection with Bremermann's computation of 
the total information capacity of the universe, there are many 
seemingly simple well-defined problems that cannot be solved. De­
termining the best first move in a chess game is one such problem; 
the order of magnitude of the information contained in the problem 
exceeds greatly that of the information capacity of the entire 
universe. 
Awareness of increasing complexity arising out of newly per­
ceived relations, and man's increasing inability to deal with it, has 
led naturally to seeking means of coping with this condition. The 
search is apparent not only with respect to personal lives but also 
with respect to the lives of societies, nations, corporations, science, 
and other social systems. This collection is a partial description of 
the means that are being developed and used today for dealing with 
modern complexity. Although the appearance of the computer— 
which has made generally available for the first time in history 
sophisticated, low-cost information-processing systems suitable for 
substantially increasing the intellectual capabilities of man in the 
McLuhan sense—underlies the topics of the several essays, it is not 
discussed per se. Rather, the focus of the collection is upon the 
implications of information-processing technology for dealing with 
complexity, approaches, and specific methods that are in develop­
ment and use, and the kinds of insights that are stimulated by the 
availability of such systems. 
As such, the collection serves to illustrate and discuss the means 
by which the significant relationships in a variety of problems may 
be considered. The emphasis given to relationships is consistent 
with the growing general awareness that the quality of relation­
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ships among things, as against the mere number of things, is a 
better measure of the suitability and appropriateness of a problem 
solution. With respect to the quality of life a society can support, 
for example, it is becomming increasingly clear that the number 
of things available for use—automobiles, Hula-Hoops, and so on— 
may not be a suitable measure of achievement. Indeed, in developed 
nations the increase of things has, in some respects, led to a decline 
in the quality of life. This awareness is clearly evident in the pro­
fusion of articles on environmental pollution of all types, the ques­
tioning of whether continued growth is desirable and whether the 
priority normally given to growth per se will ultimately lead to dis­
aster, the efforts of the zero population growth and family-planning 
movements, and the like. Interestingly, the emphasis given to the 
quality of relations, appearing first in the developed nations, is now 
being seen as important in many parts of the rest of the world even 
though the focus of attention in the developing nations is of neces­
sity still primarily upon the production of things due to the relative 
scarcity of most, even common things. 
From its own point of view, each of the essays in the collection 
deals with the question of relationships and the means by which 
they may be considered. Several of the essays discuss the means 
for handling the many relationships involved in the solution of com­
plex physical problems, particularly in programming, scheduling, 
and layout and design. Aspects of the relationship between the 
decision-maker, his intuition and creativity, and the decision aid, 
along with the relation between the choice of decision aid and the 
probable nature of the resulting decision or outcome, are discussed 
by several authors. Appearing here and there throughout the col­
lection, the authors consider the relationship between the kinds of 
opportunities made available by technology and the kinds of prob­
lems we seek to solve in relation to several practical and natural 
limits on information storage and processing. The relationship, 
now seen as critical to the solution of highly complex problems, 
particularly social problems, between information and decision-
making is considered from a number of viewpoints. 
In this connection, attention has been slowly shifting recently in 
developed countries away from the solution of primarily techno­
logical problems such as the design of a better washing machine, a 
more economical automobile, a faster airplane, and the like. In­
stead, high priority is being given to the solution of large-scale com­
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plex physical problems having extensive relationships with social 
processes such as environmental pollution and regional develop­
ment, and pressing social problems such as poverty and housing. 
These problems are being seen as ones in which the matter of re­
lationships, and adjustments in relationships to produce a more 
satisfactory state of affairs, is the critical issue. 
These types of problems continue to be the most challenging, 
and yet, in many ways, their solution appears as remote as ever 
despite a wide variety of concerted efforts. Those involved in seek­
ing solutions to such problems quickly realize their enormous com­
plexity, not only of the problem but also of viable solutions. These 
classes of complex problems are being seen as difficult ones to evalu­
ate and meaningfully solve in parts or out of their dynamic con­
text of interrelations with other aspects of the real world due to the 
large number of difficult to define relationships they embody. The 
history of federal government programs in this country aimed at 
providing housing for the needy is an excellent case in point. 
Several essays in the collection discuss a number of approaches 
and models of significance in handling complex physical and social 
problems. Aside from the several essays concerned with the social 
process of design of physical systems for human use, adaptive ap­
proaches to problem-solving, effective use of conceptual models, 
philosophical, social and other requirements for managing the 
whole system, and models of social choice, the models treating de­
cision-making as an information flow and processing problem ap­
pear to have some of the richness required for dealing with complex 
social problems. The promise for this approach lies in the observa­
tion that models of this type are inherently capable of handling sub­
stantial complexity and that the flow and distribution of informa­
tion within a social system is the most important factor influencing 
system behavior. 
Closely associated with the development of electric and informa­
tion-processing technology has been the increased interest in the 
behavior of whole systems, animate and inanimate. In the scien­
tific, business, and professional worlds, the concern for the behavior 
of whole systems has centered around the questions of system con­
trol—or, more properly, self-regulation, information flow and dis­
tribution as the basis for system guidance and control, and the use 
of information for system decision-making. McLuhan suggests that 
this is a natural outgrowth of the embrace of the "cool" electric 
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technology and its implosive effect. He characterizes the implosive 
effect as one that provides total field awareness, social conscious­
ness and involvement, interrelation of knowledge, decentralization 
with participation, consciousness of the unconscious, and so on. [4, 
chaps. 3, 4] Thus, by embracing new technological forms, he argues, 
they become extensions of ourselves, and we become, henceforth, 
modified automatically by them. This process, in turn, provides 
the basis for finding new ways of modifying and applying tech­
nology. 
As the science base, particularly as it had developed in a frag­
mentary way with a fragmentary world view over the past three 
centuries, was not completely able to serve these new needs with 
theory and methods for understanding the behavior of whole sys­
tems—complex living systems of all types and self-controlling, 
mechanical-electrical systems—there have proliferated significant 
scientific developments beginning during the 1940s that have con­
tributed greatly not only to the understanding of the behavior of 
complex whole systems but, also, to their design and construction. 
This new system science, tending toward unifying the traditionally 
fragmented disciplines, is providing the scientific base for dealing 
with complex wholes so essential for tackling the high priority prob­
lems of today. The essays of this collection build upon the base 
provided by the new system science. 
Although electric technology has served to extend man's central 
nervous system, particularly with respect to the flow of informa­
tion, and enable the conditions to be established for the emergence 
of system science, it was system science that took up the task of 
extending the information storage and processing capabilities of 
man's central nervous system through the development of the com­
puter. 
In the early phase of the development of electric technology, 
from the electric light through radio and television, there were 
opened up many more channels of communication. In that sense, 
man's central nervous system was extended. However, as noted 
earlier in the quotation from McLuhan, in today's advanced phase 
of electric technology—the computer and automation phase— 
man's information storage and processing capabilities are extended. 
(As McLuhan projects, the ultimate extension will be the tech­
nological simulation of consciousness and the corporate extension 
of knowledge to the whole of human society.) Clearly, the exten­
sion of man's capabilities in these two ways is an essential precon • 
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dition for successfully coping with the enormous complexity in 
today's high priority problems. This point is an important one— 
one that is not specifically discussed in any of the essays, but one 
that is intimately threaded through the entire collection. 
What has been, for convenience's sake, characterized above as 
system science consists of the further development of a large num­
ber of scientific contributions made over a relatively long period of 
time. However, these developments tended to come together in a 
variety of ways in recent decades as conditions, increasingly, be­
came ripe for them to do so. Accordingly, the idea of system science 
encompasses today three main areas of scientific thought upon 
which the study of complex systems is based; viz., computer and 
information science, operations research and general systems 
theory, and the abstract fields in mathematics of symbolic logic 
and boolean algebra, topology, and set and graph theory. 
From the branches of mathematics are derived the essential tools 
for dealing with relationships in a quantative and precise fashion. 
General systems theory, and its application in operations research, 
provides the applied conceptual insights required to deal with the 
multitude of relationships inherent in real-world problems and com­
plex systems. Information science, and its application in the design 
of complex systems in computer science, provides not merely the 
means by which the understanding of complex systems can be ac­
quired, the computer, but it provides also the essential scientific 
theory for explaining the behavior of complex systems, a scientific 
basis for dealing with information. 
Besides providing the theory and quantitative methods for deal­
ing with information as the physical sciences have provided the 
theory and methods for dealing with matter-energy, a number of 
important concepts have been generated within information science 
that are having an influence on how problems are viewed and 
solved. Error-controlled negative feedback, for example, is an im­
portant concept because it has demonstrated that systems can be 
designed that are inherently capable of responses not envisioned in 
detail by the designer. The rigorous mathematical proof that in 
order to remain viable it is necessary for viable systems, both liv­
ing and nonliving, to change based upon interaction with their en­
vironment has undergirded the highly useful concept of open sys­
tems. These and other concepts drawn from system science per­
vade the several parts of the collection. They are most apparent 
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in those parts that deal with decision-making as an information 
flow and processing problem. 
This collection of essays consists of five parts. Part one serves 
the purpose of introducing the topic by setting forth some of the 
major issues imbedded in the descriptive and normative models of 
decision-making. The very fine essay by Peter C. Fishburn pre­
sents, through several illustrations of decision models and a tightly 
constructed commentary on the decision theory literature, what 
might be termed the anatomy of a personal decision. His thought­
ful critique of personalistic decision theory sets forth several of the 
central difficulties involved in the formulation and use of models of 
decision processes and decision aids. As such, it provides a highly 
useful evaluative framework for decision aids and processes in gen­
eral. The second essay in part one, by Bernhardt Lieberman, pre­
sents a comprehensive commentary on descriptive and normative 
social choice models, the central problems associated with them, 
and the implications for their use. The Lieberman essay is an ex­
cellent companion to Fishburn's as, together, they cover the 
breadth of issues involved in both individual and group decision-
making. 
Part two of the collection serves to acquaint the reader with the 
current basic efforts in the development of aids to decision-making. 
The three essays are an extension of the presentation of normative 
and descriptive decision models in part one. As a group they cover 
the basic work on decision models in three important areas from 
which the main contributions have been made, namely, information 
science, operations research, and mathematics. The essay by Ron­
ald L. Ernst and Marshall C. Yovits casts decision-making as an 
information flow and processing problem, showing through varia­
tions of their basic model of a generalized information system that 
decision-making is the dominant function of information systems. 
The nature of their model is such that it goes beyond the descrip­
tive and normative models presented earlier and includes such 
features as feedback and learning. It serves well to explain the 
relationship between information and decision-making. The essay 
by Charles M. Eastman further develops the relationship between 
information and decision-making in the area of problem-solving and 
architectural design. His essay presents several models used in 
problem-solving and the means for developing them. Presented also 
is a comprehensive commentary on automated design methods in 
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architecture and where current efforts might lead. The final essay 
in this part is a fascinating one by Florencio G. Asenjo that ex­
tends Eastman's commentary on automated architectural design 
into the realm of mathematical methods for form generation in the 
arts. Although Asenjo's essay focuses on the use of mathematics 
by the artist, his underlying themes are the widely applicable ones 
of mathematics as models for exact thinking and for expressing and 
dealing with relationships. 
Part three of the collection is devoted entirely to the discussion 
of applications of specific decision aids to particular situations. 
The four essays in this part are concerned with applications nor­
mally considered to be a part of operations research. The first three 
essays are concerned with a class of decision aid similar to the ones 
discussed by Eastman, but are distinctly different from those dis­
cussed by Fishburn, Lieberman, and Ernst and Yovits. The dif­
ference arises in the setting of the problem wherein there exists 
one or more measurable optimum outcomes that bear a specified 
relationship to inputs. 
The first essay, by Thomas E. Hoover, discusses the problem of 
development planning and budgeting at universities and proposes 
a model for forecasting future demand for higher education and 
projecting the space needs for a large number of highly variable 
academic programs having different requirements. The second 
essay, by Richard L. Francis, presents two models for use in deter­
mining the optimum layout and design of facilities. The two models 
are illustrated by applications to the layout of theater seating and 
the location of plant sites. Because the solution of even simple 
facility layout problems can involve enormous amounts of computer 
time, he discusses the application of heuristic approaches for identi­
fying reasonably good suboptimal solutions at a considerable sav­
ing in computation time. In the third essay, by Francis Hendricks, 
there is presented a model for solving directly for solutions to the 
problem of scheduling under highly constrained conditions. The 
final essay of this part, by John W. Dickey, is closely related to the 
models discussed by Fishburn. In this essay, Dickey presents an 
application of Bayes Theorem to problem identification in the field 
of architecture, but the model is easily generalizable for many other 
applications. 
The purpose of the fourth part of the collection is to indicate 
that the use of decision aids normally places increased demands 
upon human creativity and judgment rather than relieving the 
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decision-maker of the need to exercise them, as might be expected. 
This condition arises because the availability and use of decision 
aids which serve as an extension of the decision-maker's intellect 
provide new and interesting opportunities for utilizing his intellect. 
The essays in this part consider this matter in three ways. The 
first essay, by Hoyt L. Sherman, is a companion piece to Asenjo's 
essay in that they deal with the two primary bases for form genera­
tion in the arts, the geometric and the perceptual bases. Sherman 
sets forth a descriptive model of the perceptual process in terms 
very similar to those of the model of the general information system 
set forth by Ernest and Yovits. Useful models treating the per­
ceptual process as a problem in the flow and processing of informa­
tion are not yet at hand owing to what Sherman describes as the 
lack of knowledge of what is actually going on and the inability to 
define exactly the relationships among the large number of varia­
bles involved. An associated problem is the enormous information 
content of physical environments and the lack of means to ap­
propriately describe it. However, when models of the perceptual 
process are perfected, the artist or the architect will be faced with 
the need to generate large numbers of creative solution possibil­
ities for evaluation by the model and to render judgments concern­
ing the suitability and quality of form possibilities generated by 
the model—demanding tasks, indeed. The second essay, by Wil­
liam T. Morris, is a brilliant commentary on the relationship be­
tween the decision-maker and decision aids and the new obligations 
that the decision-maker must assume to utilize decision aids effec­
tively. The last essay, by Donald Watson, sets forth descriptive 
models with which the architect as a decision-maker may enhance 
his creativity and judgment. 
The final part of the collection is an attempt on the part of two 
authors to stand back and objectively view the history and trends 
in the use of decision aids as extensions of human intellectual ca­
pacity and project the professional and academic implications. The 
first essay, by Ian I. Mitroff, is a truly thoughtful exposition on 
four questions: what are the philosophical presupppositions con­
cerning reality that are shared by science and engineering, and 
how is the practice of these professions related to them; and how 
does the present philosophical base inhibit scientific inquiry and 
engineering design, and what will or should scientists and engineers 
of the future be like? The second essay, by John M. Allderige, con­
cerns itself with the past difficulties and future aspirations for de­
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cision aids from the viewpoint of a practicing management con­
sultant. His point is: the time is ripe, the need is clear, the oppor­
tunties are available; let's get operational! 
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part 1

DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES 

Peter C. Fishburn 
PERSONALISTIC 
DECISION THEORY 
EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE 
In recent years interest in the ways in which decisions are made has 
increased sharply. "Personalistic decision theory" has been set 
forth as a means by which decision situations may be described and 
analyzed. The present purpose is to define the meaning of "per­
sonalistic decision theory" and to discuss some of the many diffi­
culties that pervade both the theory and any attempt to use it as 
an aid in making decisions. 
First, consider the nature of decision. What is a decision? For­
tunately, a common phrase is close to an answer. It is simply: 
"Make up your mind." To decide is to make up one's mind. Or, as 
Beer [8, p. 1] suggests, "the taking of a decision is best described 
as the fixing of a belief." 
A somewhat deeper analysis suggests that a decision is a de­
liberate act of selection, by the mind, of an alternative from a set 
of competing alternatives in the hope, expectation, or belief that 
the actions envisioned in carrying out the selected alternative will 
accomplish certain goals. Decision is the selection of a mental 
state: it is a commitment to certain actions or inactions. Other 
people may observe our actions but they do not directly observe 
our decisions. 
Such a commitment to action is not necessarily irreversible. 
Along with "make up one's mind" there is another familiar phrase: 
"change one's mind." Decisions often have escape clauses, which 
can be a healthy thing. Many decisions, before they are fully im­
plemented, are replaced by subsequent decisions in response to 
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ever-changing circumstances and desires. Of course, we also make 
subsequent decisions that reinforce the commitment to action of a 
prior and as yet unconsumated decision. 
Perhaps the first step in the decision process is an awareness of 
a dissatisfaction with the way things are or might be at some future 
time. Subsequently, we seek alternatives by which we might exert 
some control over our environment so that the future will be more 
to our liking than might otherwise be the case. 
As is frequently pointed out, it is of the utmost importance 
(especially in those situations that most concern us) to understand 
the sources of, and reasons for, our dissatisfaction. The better able 
we are to do this the better position we will be in to understand our 
own objectives and to develop alternatives in response to these ob­
jectives in the situation at hand. 
The process of developing alternatives or strategies occurs over 
a period of time and is (or should be) evaluative as well as creative. 
In searching for and constructing alternatives we bear in mind (or 
should bear in mind) the purpose of the inquiry and are constantly 
evaluating, often subjectively, the extent to which a course of 
action may be able to accomplish these purposes. As we proceed, 
some alternatives will be modified: others, judged infeasible or in­
ferior, will be discarded. 
The judgments of ability to accomplish purposes will, of course, 
depend on the beliefs, whether myopic or otherwise, that the deci­
sion-maker (and/or his staff) has about the nature of his environ­
ment and how it might respond to his actions. 
As indicated here the processes of alternative creation and alter­
native evaluation are inseparable. Nevertheless, writers often sep­
arate out the evaluative aspect and analyze a "given" set of alterna­
tives. Although there are dangers in this, it is difficult to discuss 
certain evaluative procedures without such a separation. 
A decision is often considered successful if the actions made in 
response to it help to bring about a desired future. Beer [8, p. 21 l j 
says that "decision is effective to the extent that it is competent to 
modify future states of the system in a way which meets the pre­
established criteria of success." 
Now when an alternative is decided upon, we will rarely know 
before the fact how things will turn out. There are simply too many 
uncertainties. Despite this, the decision-maker may have faith that 
the alternative he selects for implementation will be as effective as 
any of the others in pursuing his objectives. The strength of this 
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belief may of course depend on the effort devoted to predecision 
research and analysis and the involvement of the decision-maker 
in this analysis. 
This ties in closely with the personalistic decision theory notion 
of evaluating alternatives on the basis of beliefs and expectations 
of the decision-maker. Based on whatever evidence he has avail­
able to him, he identifies his beliefs in the relative abilities of the 
alternatives to attain his objectives. The theory suggests ways to 
check the coherence and internal consistency of such beliefs. Keep­
ing in mind that the decision-maker's objectives have been (or 
should be) instrumental in the development of alternatives and 
that they will influence his value judgments, we shall suppress them 
in the following presentation. In their place we shall talk about 
consequences of decision and the decision-maker's utilities for 
these. Coupled with this, belief enters in the form of his personal 
or subjective) probabilities for consequences as conditioned on 
strategies. Expected utilities for strategies are formed from the 
consequence utilities and the probabilities. 
Expected Utility 
Personalistic decision theories can be based on one fundamental 
concept, the notion of individual preference. The assumptions of 
the theories use the idea of the decision-maker's preference relation 
to the set of strategies (or acts or alternatives). For any two strat­
egies it is generally assumed that either one is preferred to the 
other or else that neither is preferred to the other. The latter case 
is usually known as indifference. From sufficiently powerful as­
sumptions on the decision-maker's preferences it is possible to de­
fine well-behaved subsidiary relations, namely, preferences between 
consequences and a relation of qualitative probability between 
propositions that reflect the aspects of the situation about which 
the decision-maker is uncertain. It can then be shown that num­
bers, called utilities, can be assigned to the consequences so that 
one consequence is preferred to a second consequence if, and only 
if, the utility of the first exceeds the utility of the second. In addi­
tion, numerical probabilities can be assigned to the uncertainty-
based propositions in such a way that one proposition is qualita­
tively more probable to the decision-maker than a second if, and 
only if, the numerical probability of the first exceeds the numerical 
probability of the second. The expected utility of a strategy is then 
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defined as the sum of the consequence utilities weighted by their 
respective probabilities of occurrence under that strategy. Finally, 
the consequence utilities and the probabilities can be defined in 
such a way that one strategy is preferred to another if, and only if, 
the expected utility of the first exceeds the expected utility of the 
second. 
Using obviously simplified examples we shall now look at two 
expected utility models. 
Using the phrase adopted by Luce and Krantz [27] in their 
derivation of our first model from basic preference assumptions, 
we shall call it the conditional expected utility model. This form 
of the expected utility model has been used before [16], but the 
Luce-Krantz theory is the first that I know of that derives the gen­
eral model from basic preference assumptions. 
To consider the structure of this model, we shall consider the 
following situation. A young man, classified IV-F by his draft 
board, is in his last year of college. He has applied to two univer­
sities, A and B, for graduate school and has been unconditionally 
accepted by both; however, he is not sure that he wants to go to 
graduate school. If he does not enter graduate school, he plans to 
accept a job offer from company Z and enter their one-year train­
ing program. If he does this, his year will terminate with one of 
three responses from the company: 
1. "Get lost." 
2. "Stay on as an assistant junior engineer." 
3. "Stay on as a junior engineer." 
By referring to Figure 1 you will see how a decision tree for his 
situation is starting to take shape from the information given thus 
far. A solid square on the tree represents a decision point. His first 
decision, at the left, is among A, B, and Z. If he takes Z, then one 
of the three responses noted above will occur and this is shown on 
the tree. 
If he goes to work for Z and either 2 or 3 occurs, he must then 
decide whether to quit and 
a. enter University A, or 
b. enter University B, or 
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c. look for a job with another company, or 
d. stay on with Z. 
On the other hand, if 1 occurs, he must choose a, b, or c. These 
three potential decision points are shown midway through the tree. 
Ph.D. 
M.S. 
M.S. I Ph.D. 
Fig. 1—Decision Tree for College Student 
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If he enters either graduate school at any point, he plans to work 
for a master's degree. If he succeeds in this he will either 
I. try to earn his Ph.D. at the same school, or 
II. look for a job with some company. 
If he is unsuccessful at either the M.S. or Ph.D. level (shown by a 
bar above these letters in the tree), he will do II. If he earns his 
Ph.D. he will either 
x. embark on an academic career, or 
y. take a job with some company. 
Insofar as a situation is projected into the future, a strategy is a 
complete program for action. It sets forth what to do at the initial 
decision point and at each succeeding decision point that could 
possibly be reached under the prior directions indicated by the 
strategy. Figure 2 codifies several of the 454 strategies that arise 
from Figure 1. For example, the first one shown on Figure 2 is 
"Go to A; if you get an M.S. degree, then look for a job with some 
company." The last one shown is "Take Z's job; if 1 occurs, then 
look for a job with another company; if 2 occurs, then enter Uni­
versity A and look for a job with some company if an M.S. degree 
is earned; if 3 occurs, then enter University B and if you earn an 
M.S. degree go on for your Ph.D.; if you earn your Ph.D., then 
begin an academic career." 
Consequences 
Strategies (A, M.S., I (A, M.S.,II) . . . (Z,3,b,M.S. , l ,Ph.D. ,y) 
(A; M.S. - II) 
(A; M.S.- I ; Ph.D.-x) Each entry in th IS matrix is for the 
probability of occurrence of a con­
sequence given a strategy. E.g., (B; M.S.-I; Ph.D.-.y) P(A, M.S., 1 1 A; M. S.-ll) is the 
probability he w II earn a masters 
(Z; 1 - c ; 2 - a (M.S. - I I ); degree if he goes to Univ. A next year. 
3-»b (M.S.- I ; Ph.D.-y)) 
Fig. 2—Conditional Probability Matrix 
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A consequence is, in the ideal, a complete description of the 
future insofar as it is affected by, or concerned with, the decision 
situation at hand. In terms of our decision tree we can represent 
a consequence as a complete path through the tree, from the initial 
decision point to a terminal point. Three of the 45 consequences 
for Figure 1 are shown at the top of Figure 2. The last of these is, 
"You go to Company Z, and at the end of one year they invite you 
to stay on as a junior engineer, whereupon you enter University B, 
earn your M.S., and embark on an academic career." 
Figure 2 illustrates the probability matrix for the 454x45 = 
20,430 propositions of the form, 'if strategy j is followed, then con­
sequence k will result." Many of these conditional probabilities will 
equal zero since some consequences are impossible under certain 
strategies. The sum of the probabilities in any row will equal one 
since the consequences are (ideally) exhaustive and mutually ex­
clusive. 
Each conditional probability is a personal or subjective probabil­
ity representing the decision-maker's degree of belief in the truth 
of the corresponding proposition or event. This interpretation of 
the meaning of probability has been discussed at length elsewhere 
[13, 16, 25, 42, 43, 44, 45], and I shall not go into it in detail here. 
Along with the conditional probabilities, the theory assumes that 
it is possible for the decision-maker to assign a numerical utility to 
each consequence so that the expected utilities of the strategies re­
flect the decision-maker's preferences among them. For Figure 2, 
the expected utility of a strategy is computed by multiplying each 
consequence utility by its corresponding probability under that 
strategy and taking the sum of these products. 
Probably the best-known derivation of our second expected util­
ity model from preference assumptions is the one given by Savage 
[42] although, as Savage points out, Frank P. Ramsey [37] out­
lined a similar derivation about twenty-five years before Savage's 
book was published. A number of other publications [2, 4, 10, 17, 
21, 34, 40, 48] present alternative derivations of the Ramsey-Sav­
age model. 
This model differs from the preceding one by the use of states 
of the world. In Savage's words the world is "the object about 
which the person is concerned" and a state of the world is "a 
description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed." 
The decision-maker is presumed to be uncertain only about which 
state of the world obtains (or is the "true" state). The assump­
26 Decision-Making 
tions imply that his beliefs about which state might obtain do not 
depend on the strategy he might select. Thus, in this model, there 
are personal probabilities on the different states and these are 
independent of the strategies. 
The interdependence between strategies and states lies in their 
joint determination of consequences. This is shown in the 
example of Figure 3, where we suppose that a judge must either 
States 
A murdered X A didn't murder X 
b = set innocent man Free A a = set murderer free free 
c = sentence murderer d = sentence inno-Condemn A 
to die cent man to die 
Fig. 3—Consequence Matrix for States Model 
free or condemn to death an accused murderer. The judge's two 
strategies are shown on the left of the matrix, and the two states 
of the world are along the top. Note that the strategy that is used 
will have absolutely no effect on which of the two states is the 
"true" state. The consequences for each strategy-state pair are 
shown in the matrix. 
The expected utility for a strategy in the states models is ob­
tained by multiplying each state probability by the utility of its 
associated consequence for the given strategy and then summing 
these products. 
As indicated elsewhere [16] on a suggestion from Russell Ackoff, 
the two models presented above are potentially isomorphic. For 
example, given the states model, we can write a conditional prob­
ability matrix as in Figure 2 by placing all the distinct conse­
quences along the top of the matrix and entering in position (j, k) 
of the matrix the sum of the probabilities for those states and yield 
the kth consequence when the jth strategy is used. On the other 
hand, if we start with the conditional expected utility formulation, 
states can be defined as functions on strategies to consequences. 
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For example, one state might be: (if strategy 1 is used, then con­
sequence kx will result; if strategy 2 is used, then consequence k2 
will result; . . . ). Defined in this way, the state that obtains will 
not depend on the particular strategy that is used. But in this 
case, the state probabilities will generally not be computable from 
the conditional probabilities for consequences given strategies. 
Suppose George, a bachelor, is dating two girls, Ann and Sue, 
who apparently are good friends. He plans to propose marriage 
to one of the girls. Whether she accepts or rejects, the other girl 
will learn of the proposal. If his initial proposal is rejected, he 
could then propose to the other girl or else forget about marriage 
for the time being. George's decision tree is shown in Figure 4, 
where his four strategies are indicated by the circled numbers. 
George's probabilities for the girls' responses are shown on the tree. 
He figures that if he proposes to Ann first, then there is a 70 per­
cent chance that she will accept; but if he proposes to Ann after 
Sue has rejected his initial proposal, he figures only a 50 percent 
chance for an acceptance from Ann. 
Sue rejects 
Propose 
to Sue 
Stay single 
Fig. 4—Decision Tree for Marriage Example 
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The conditional expected utility formulation for this example is 
shown at the top of Figure 5. The probabilities in the matrix are 
obtained from those given in Figure 4. For simplicity only the 
three terminal consequences are used. 
A states-of-the-world formulation is shown in the lower part of 
Figure 5. Using terminal consequences, there are 81 = 34 potential 
Terminal Consequences 
A = Marry Ann S = Marry Sue B = Stay Single Sums 
.70 .06 .24 1.00 
.70 0 .30 1.00 
.25 .50 .25 1.00 
0 .50 .50 1.00 
Conditional Probability Matrix 
Nine States and State Probabilit ies: 
0 = wi l l reject any proposal 
1 = wi l l accept only if asked f irst 
2 = wi l l accept any proposal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Ann: 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Sue: 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
p l P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P 9 
B B S A A A A A A 
B B B A A A A A A 
B S S B S S A S S 
B S S B S S B S S 
Terminal Consequence Matrix 
Fig. 5—Marriage Example with Both Models 
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states of the kind described above (functions on strategies to 
consequences), but if we assume that it is never true that a girl 
will accept only if she is proposed to after her friend has rejected 
a previous proposal, the situation reduces to the nine possible states 
described on Figure 5. The probabilities for these nine states 
cannot be determined completely from the probabilities in Figure 
4, although it is possible to conclude that p:< = .06, p,+p^ = .24, 
p7 = .25, and p! + p4 = .25. 
Critique 
A multitude of criticisms have been leveled at both the funda­
mental theory of personalistic decisions and its potential useful­
ness. Perhaps the best way of describing some of these criticisms 
lies in the formulation of a decision situation. 
In the first place, the reader may question whether it is ever 
possible to formulate a decision situation in the manner outlined 
above because our world and our lives are in continual flux and our 
experience and perhaps even our goals are subject to constant 
change. It might be argued that if sufficient time is set aside to 
attempt to spell out strategies, consequences, and perhaps states 
of the world, by the time that process is completed the decision 
is obsolete or no longer necessary. Time and experience simply 
do not stand still, and any theory of decision that pretends that 
they do is bound to be of little practical use. 
In addition, it should be noted that, in practice, it is generally 
impossible to formulate strategies, consequences, and states with 
anything like the exactness suggested in our previous definitions. 
In the states model there will always be some residual uncertainty 
in the consequences, and our states will necessarily be imperfectly 
formulated due to our limited foresight. Strategies, although they 
may look ahead at a sequence of future decisions, are always 
subject to implementation difficulties and unforeseen or unfore­
seeable events that may indicate the need for new formulation 
and evaluation before any particular strategy has been pursued 
very far. Because of such things one may wonder when, if ever, 
it is worthwhile to attempt to formulate and evaluate a situation 
in the manner described above. 
Suppose, however, some potential can be seen in formulating a 
decision situation in the manner here described. It is then neces­
sary to decide on the extent of this formulation. How far into the 
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future should strategies be projected? How much of the universe 
should we include and in how much detail? Is it in fact possible 
to isolate a decision situation in a satisfactory way? 
Many writers have commented on such questions. In speaking 
of his basic theory, Savage [42] conceives of it as completely 
holistic, relevant in one bold stroke to the entire future, whatever 
it might be, of the person to whom the preference assumptions are 
directed. He is very much concerned, however, with how his 
general "look before you leap" principle might apply to manage­
able segments of one's future, for which he uses the phrase "small 
worlds." In direct connection with the preceding questions, Sav­
age [42, p. 16] confesses at one point, "I am unable to formulate 
criteria for selecting these small worlds and indeed believe that 
their selection may be a matter of judgment and experience about 
which it is impossible to enunciate complete and sharply defined 
general principles. . .  . On the other hand, it is an operation in 
which we all necessarily have much experience, and one in which 
there is in practice considerable agreement." Later in his book, in 
a further analysis of small worlds (pp. 82-91), he says that "any 
claim to realism made by this book—or indeed by any theory of 
personal decision of which I know—is predicated on the idea that 
some of the individual decision situations into which actual people 
tend to subdivide the single grand decision do recapitulate in 
microcosm the mechanism of the idealized grand decision. . . . 
The problem of this section is to say as clearly as possible what 
constitutes a satisfactory isolated decision situation." 
De Jouvenel [14] also is concerned with the "look before you 
leap" idea, and he cites numerous historical examples in which the 
failure to look sufficiently far ahead or to consider with sufficient 
seriousness a spectrum of possible reactions by nature and other 
people has led to disastrous consequences. Future writers will no 
doubt say similar things about some of the major problems we 
face today, such as pollution, population control, racial injustice, 
and the arms race. 
The potential dangers inherent in not adopting a sufficiently 
broad outlook in decisions involving large-scale systems have been 
discussed by Churchman [11], who realistically recognizes th? 
tremendous difficulties in understanding large-scale systems. 
To many readers, remarks such as these indicate a need for what 
so-called objective approaches to predecision analysis have been 
trying to provide in recent years: namely, ways to identify the 
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more important and relevant factors in decision situations and to 
understand how these interact with the environment at large. 
According to my understanding of personalistic decision theory, 
there is nothing in it that denies this need. Indeed, I would sug­
gest that much of the efforts of operations research, cybernetics, 
systems analysis, and related activities are conducted to provide 
decision makers with potentially valuable information inputs to 
their decisions. Although some people would disagree on this point, 
there does not seem to be any compelling reasons to suppose that 
personalistic decision theory and these other activities are not 
compatible. 
Having considered some of the difficulties in the formulation 
suggested by personalistic decision theory, we shall now turn our 
attention to some of its ethical aspects. 
To the extent that the preference assumptions are viewed as 
criteria that an individual's preferences ought to satisfy and that 
maximization of expected utility be used as a guide for decision, 
the theory is normative. Insofar as some other principle for deci­
sion is in conflict with this, the sponsor of the alternative will surely 
take issue with personalistic decision theory. There are, of course, 
several points at which such conflict can arise. For example, one 
might take issue with one or more of the assumptions of the theory 
(more about this later) or he might dislike its general personal­
istic orientation. 
It might be argued that people frequently do not know what is 
good for them. Most parents act this way toward their children, 
and we find a similar attitude reflected by various organizations 
and governments. Other people frequently attempt to impose their 
preferences on our decisions. When this is the case, we might sus­
pect that people will still behave in a manner reminiscent of per­
sonalistic decision theory with due cognizance taken of (or in spite 
of) others' "impositions." 
Personalistic decision theory is sometimes accused of being 
narrowly self-centered, but that is not true. An individual may be 
concerned only for his own welfare, but the theory itself is "eth­
ically neutraL" This means that the theory passes no judgments 
on the goodness or rightness of a person's objectives (although it 
generally recognizes Singer's universal objective or desire [46, 47], 
which is the desire to obtain a greater ability to attain one's ob­
jectives). Because of this, some advocates of particular ethical 
systems [41] are bound to dislike the theory. 
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Nevertheless, because it is ethically neutral in the sense indi­
cated, the theory can accommodate any of a large number of ethical 
systems. One person may be highly motivated to increase his 
material wealth; another may try to follow the Christian love ethic; 
another may like Jeremy Bentham's "principle of utility" [9, 31]. 
Whatever the motivation, the theory remains open as a potential 
guide for decision. 
In considering how the theory might be of use, it might be 
useful to note first that the very process of formulating a decision 
situation can be helpful to a decision-maker. It may uncover fac­
tors and possibilities for action that might otherwise be overlooked, 
and it may lead to a deeper examination of objectives. A knowledge 
of the theory's approach may help decision-makers to structure 
their situations more efficiently and thereby lead to better under­
standing. 
If a formulation leads to a manageable decision tree, or at least 
to a manageable skeleton of a decision tree, this can be used for 
analysis even when no explicit attempt is made to measure utilities 
or probabilities. To do this, the decision-maker begins with the 
final decision points and asks, for each one, what he would do if he 
should arrive at that point. The branches from these points that 
are not chosen are then deleted and the decision-maker moves back 
to the penultimate decision points, asking the same question for 
each of these. Thus he works his way back through the tree, de­
ciding as he proceeds and crossing off those branches that he would 
not choose. This eventually brings him to the initial point, where 
he will only have to consider a greatly reduced part of the original 
tree. This procedure might be referred to as introspective dynamic 
programming. Minus explicit utilities and probabilities, it is similar 
to what Raiffa [36] refers to as "averaging out and folding back." 
If utilities are assigned to the consequences (entire paths) and 
listed at the terminal points in the tree, and if conditional prob­
abilities are specified at each non-decision branch point in the tree 
for the branches that proceed from that point (as in Fig. 4), then 
one can work backward through the tree as before, using condi­
tional expectations as the guide for selection. 
As already noted, the theory leads to a definition of expected 
utility that preserves the decision-maker's preference order on the 
strategies. If this is so, why bother to use an expected utility 
model or the backward approach discussed above? Why not simply 
select a most preferred strategy and be done with it? Anatol 
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Rapoport [38, 39] feels that the assumed correspondence between 
preferences and expected utilities makes the models useless. 
This criticism seems to exclude the idea of viewing the assump­
tions as criteria of consistency and coherence that a person's 
preferences ought to satisfy, a viewpoint held by most personalistic 
theorists. Savage [42. 43, 44, 45] for example, suggests that the 
theory may be used to check a decision-maker's supposed prefer­
ences. If an assumption is violated by the supposed preferences, 
the decision-maker may wish to "correct" his "inconsistency" 
before proceeding further. An expected utility model can aid this 
examination, as Savage demonstrates [42, pp. 101-3] on an 
example from Allais [1]. 
Other writers [16, 18, 19, 34, 51] suggest the use of the model 
for uncovering or "discovering" preferences between complex alter­
natives on the basis of judgments between simple (and probably 
hypothetical) alternatives. To do this, procedures for estimating 
utilities [18, 34, 51] and personal probabilities [54, 55] are applied 
to simplified alternatives. The data thus obtained are used to 
compare expected utilities of more complex alternatives. 
However, the sheer size and complexity of many situations often 
causes enormous difficulties in estimating utilities and personal 
probabilities. I have discussed these difficulties elsewhere [16] 
and will not pursue them here. Let it suffice to note that the 
models can be used effectively in many situations only if major 
and often unwarranted simplifying assumptions are first made. 
No critique of a theory would be complete without some discus­
sion of its central core, that is, its assumptions or axioms. Since a 
thorough analysis cannot be made in the space available here, only 
an outline will be presented. 
For discussion purposes the axioms of the theory may be divided 
into our general categories: 
Structural axioms 
Preference order axioms 
Sure-thing and independence axioms 
Archimedean axioms 
Most of the axioms in the final three categories are defended either 
as realistic preference assumptions and/or as reasonable criteria 
of consistency and coherence. 
On the other hand, the two types of structural axioms, those 
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that say nothing about preferences and those that include the 
preference relation, are seldom defended as "reasonable criteria." 
Their purpose is to provide a sort of internal cohesiveness among 
the basic sets used in the formulation (strategies, consequences, 
states, events, and so on). In many cases they are not required 
by the expected utility model, but help greatly in deriving the 
model from themselves and the other axioms. 
It is interesting to note that, of all the axioms in personalistic 
decision theories, many theorists are most troubled by the struc­
tural ones. For example, Savage's theory supposes that there is a 
strategy or act for each consequence such that that consequence 
will occur regardless of which state obtains. Such "constant acts" 
are seldom present in real situations [17, 27, 48, 49]. Moreover, 
his axioms require the set of states to be infinite. In a structural-
preference axiom, Ramsey [37] and Suppes [48] require the set 
of consequences to be infinite and, for any two nonindifferent con­
sequences, there must be a third consequence "midway" in prefer­
ence between the two. The Luce-Krantz theory [27] uses several 
structural assumptions that may present difficult problems of 
interpretation with respect to the basic situation. 
In essence, no extant theory of any generality is free from 
troublesome structural conditions. In some cases [2, 5, 10, 17, 21, 
28, 34, 40] part of the trouble is avoided by embedding the actual 
situation in a larger structure that introduces "known" prob­
abilities and/or random events that can be associated with chance 
devices. Whether such augmented theories are thought to be more 
realistic than unaugmented theories seems open to personal judg­
ment. 
Several things are included in the second category of axioms, 
the preference order axioms. One of these is the assumption of 
completeness, which says that of any two strategies, one will be 
preferred to the other or else they are indifferent. This is usually 
extended to the consequences where, so long as "indifference" is 
interpreted as "of approximately equal value," problems may arise. 
Many people would think that the following two consequences are 
not directly comparable: 
1.	 Take your umbrella with you to the office tomorrow, which 
turns out to be a very rainy day, and stay safely dry 
beneath your umbrella. 
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2.	 Leave your umbrella at home tomorrow, which turns out 
to be a beautiful sunny day. 
Some work has been done with incompleteness (or incompar­
ability) [6, 7, 24], but this is only partially related to the situations 
considered in this paper. Models that do not assume comparability 
of consequences for different states are presented in [12, 20]. 
A second order assumption is transitivity: if one strategy is 
preferred to a second that in turn is preferred to a third, then the 
first is (should be) preferred to the third. Some question has been 
raised about the reasonableness of this axiom [29, 30, 53]. It has 
been defended with the "money-pump" argument: if you are 
intransitive, preferring A to B, B to C, and C to A, then you will 
surely pay something to have the opportunity of doing C instead 
of A. But given C you would surely pay to be able to switch from 
C to B, and likewise from B to A, so that you end up where you 
started (with A) minus some cash. 
Indifference also is assumed to be transitive, and a number of 
people [3, 4, 22, 26, 29, 50] suggest that this is an untenable 
assumption. To use an example suggested by May [29], can one 
see anything unreasonable about an individual who, in looking for 
a new car, prefers (Buick at $3,195) to (Buick at $3,200) but finds 
that he is indifferent about (Buick at $3,195) and (Chrysler at 
$3,300) and about (Chrysler at $3,300) and (Buick at $3,200)? 
If the possibility of intransitive indifference is accepted, the 
foregoing models are not applicable in the form stated. A 
"weaker" theory might be developed to accommodate intransitive 
indifference. An alternative to this is to accept the original model 
as an idealization and to use only strict preference judgments in 
its analysis, so that strict equality of expected utilities is never 
employed when an indifference judgment arises. To some extent, 
I have used this approach in comparing expected utilities of 
strategies in [16]. 
There are a number of axioms in the third category. In the 
states model the sure-thing axioms' principle effect is to permit 
the derivation of numerical probabilities for the states. If someone 
does not like the idea of personal probability (and many people 
do not) and if he feels generally favorable toward most of the 
axioms of the theory, then it is likely that he will direct his criticism 
at axioms in the third category. 
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An example of a sure-thing axiom is: if, for each state, an 
individual likes the consequence that arises under strategy A as 
much as the consequence that arises under strategy B, then he will 
like A as much as B. A more subtle independence axiom is: if you 
prefer A to B when they give the same consequence under one 
particular state and if C and D are respectively obtained from A 
and B by changing the common consequence under the particular 
state, then C will be preferred to D. Allais [1] and Ellsberg [15] 
criticize the latter axiom, and Savage [42] and Raiffa [35] re­
spectively answer these criticisms. 
Figure 6 presents one of Ellsberg's examples. An urn contains 
30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls, the latter in an unknown 
30 ball 60 ball 
Red Black Yellow

A $100 $ 0 $ 0

B $ 0 $100 $ 0

C $100 $ 0 $100

D $ 0 $100 $100

Fig. 6—Amounts You Might Win 
proportion. One ball is to be drawn at random from the urn after 
you make your choice. If you had to select A or B, which would 
you choose? If you had to select C or D, which would you choose? 
Ellsberg says that a frequent response pattern is (A,D). Is it 
yours? If so, and if these choices reflect strict preference, then you 
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violate the second axiom for this situation in the preceding para­
graph. 
In responce to this, Raiffa [35] notes that if you prefer A and 
D, then you would surely prefer a composite gamble that gives you 
A if a flipped coin lands heads up or D if the coin lands tails up in 
preference to the composite that yields B with heads (H) or C with 
tails (T). Since the order in which the coin is flipped and the ball 
is drawn should not make any difference, we can represent this 
situation as in Figure 7. Assuming that you regard H and T as 
equally likely, Figure 7 shows that, regardless of which composite 
Red Black Yellow

H T H T H T 
(A, D) $100 $ o $ 0 $100 $0 $100 
(B, C) $ 0 $100 $100 $ 0 $0 $100 
Fig. 7—Composite Gambles 
you choose and regardless of which color ball is drawn, you will 
be equally likely to get $100 or $0. Hence it seems reasonable to 
suppose that, in fact, you will be indifferent between (A,D) and 
(B,C) in violation of the strict preference noted above. 
The general purpose of the axioms in the final category is to 
ensure that the numerical utility model is one-dimensional. With­
out such axioms it may be necessary to characterize a utility by a 
sequence of numbers rather than by a single number with the 
understanding that one consequence or strategy is preferred to a 
second if, and only if, the first position in the two utility sequences 
for which the two position numbers are not equal has the larger of 
the two position numbers in the first sequence. The classic paper in 
expected utility that does not use an Archimedean axiom is Haus­
ner's paper [23] on multidimensional utility. In a companion 
paper Thrall [52] presents some situations where one-dimensional 
utility may seem unrealistic. 
An example that would violate a typical Archimedean assump­
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tion is the following. A newly minted penny will be flipped n times. 
You are offered a choice between A and B: 
A.	 Receive $1 regardless of the results of the n flips, 
B.	 Be executed if every flip results in a head, and otherwise 
receive $2. 
If, no matter how large n is taken to be, you prefer A to B, then 
you will violate the axiom, assuming of course that you prefer $2 
to $1 to execution. If the coin is flipped 100 times, then under B 
there is only one sequence of the more than 1,000,000,000,000,000, 
000,000,000,000,000 possible sequences under which you would be 
executed. In view of such numbers many people might find a satis­
factorily large value of n for which they would choose B. It is often 
claimed that the willingness that many people show toward small 
risks such as crossing the street or driving a car is sufficiently con­
vincing evidence in favor of the axiom. 
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Bernhardt Lieberman 
THE STUDY OF 
COLLECTIVE DECISIONS 
In the past thirty to fifty years, here in the United States, society's 
pressing problems have changed from being technological ones to 
social ones. It is certainly not necessary to catalog those of current 
concern; they are obvious to all, and to some degree, all social prob­
lems are decision problems. Society is concerned with which of two 
general approaches to the alleviation of poverty it should adopt; 
which of many specific programs designed to increase minority 
group employment should be funded; which of several plans for the 
improvement of urban housing should be pursued; which of a num­
ber of weapons systems should be developed; and which program 
for the solution of air pollution problems should be advocated? Al­
though there are technological problems involved in all of these 
decisions, it is generally believed that the technical problems can 
be solved; the social problems and the questions of value are the 
perplexing ones. 
Decision-makers, the men charged with the responsibility for 
making these choices, usually have insufficient evidence, differing 
values, a variety of personal, regional, and differing interests, and 
external pressures—all of which serve to make them very uncertain 
at decision time. Given these weighty, and apparently unsolvable, 
problems, decision-makers frequently turn to others for help with 
the solution of the problems, hoping that a detached, more objec­
tive observer with special or unusual training may offer assistance 
that the decision-maker's own staff cannot give. With the prece­
dents of the physical and biological sciences, the accomplishments 
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of medicine and engineering obvious to all, the decision-maker calls 
for analogous help from the social scientist. When he does call for 
help, he is faced with the array of social science traditions and ap­
proaches that have all the outward appearances of objective in­
quiry: journals, mathematics, monographs, laboratories, and com­
puters—artifacts that in the past have solved so many problems. 
It is no surprise that the practical man of affairs comes to believe, 
and is led to believe, that the social sciences are able to solve his 
problems, much as the natural and biological sciences solved prob­
lems in earlier years. And fortuitously, and perhaps surprisingly, 
the decision-maker, the man plagued by doubts and difficulties, dis­
covers that a body of knowledge exists specifically designed to 
understand how one should make proper decisions, and another 
body of knowledge exists describing how people actually do make 
decisions. This knowledge appears to be particularly impressive— 
it is mathematical; some of the most able and distinguished mathe­
maticians, statisticians, psychologists, sociologists, and economists 
have contributed to it. It must appear to be interdisciplinary, mys­
terious, and wondrous. 
When the decision-maker seeks help, much is offered to him. 
Most frequently he gets his aid from applied social scientists, either 
working for him or whose services he employs in either a contrac­
tual or consulting arrangement. He presents these men with a 
specific problem, and they either offer him a solution to the prob­
lem he originally raised or demonstrate to him that his definition 
of the problem is defective and that the problem must be redefined. 
They then proceed to offer solutions to the new, redefined problem. 
Sometimes the decision-maker is satisfied with the solutions 
offered; other times he is not. The current urban-racial situation 
provides examples of problems that have been studied by social 
scientists for many years, but contributions to the solution of such 
problems have not been strikingly successful. And the disorders 
in American universities and colleges, the home of social scientific 
expertise, seem to have been solved most effectively by the use of 
force and administrative intuition rather than by the use of the 
social scientific knowledge resident in the universities. 
It seems to be agreed that the behavioral sciences have not been 
as successful in solving social problems as the natural sciences have 
been in solving technical problems—though it should be asserted 
that the social sciences have had many dramatic successes. Various 
reasons have been offered for this relative failure; among them are 
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that the groups that set out to solve the problems are too small, 
that large teams of workers are necessary for the solution of large 
social problems, and that too much time and effort is spent on use­
less basic research. Others hold the view that too much time and 
effort is spent on useless applied research done by groups of in­
vestigators, when we do not have an adequate knowledge base of 
fundamental theory and empirical findings. These questions will 
not be argued here. 
Recently, some very sophisticated persons have begun to suggest 
that social scientists should proceed directly to solve urban prob­
lems just as the biological and natural sciences solved the problems 
of agricultural and rural America in the past century. Social scien­
tists should do for urban society, it is said, what biologists, genet­
icists, and agricultural scientists did for rural soicety in an earlier 
day. The problems of air pollution, substandard housing, inade­
quate education, unemployment, and inadequate income should be 
solved just as it was possible to increase the yield of wheat, corn, 
and barley and to improve the quality of cattle and hogs. This 
admonition does not specify what the balance of basic and applied 
research work should be; it calls for both in some proper balance 
and a concerted effort to help decision-makers solve urban prob­
lems, using the power of objective, scientific inquiry. 
Who can oppose a request to become involved even when it is 
offered as an admonition—it is virtue itself. What behavioral scien­
tist is so mean that he will not attempt to solve the problems of air 
pollution, unemployment, housing, education, and poverty, partic­
ularly when his contribution may be in the acquisition of the basic 
knowledge that will enable others to solve the practical problems. 
There seems to be employment for all; handsome support can be 
offered to those with a taste for abstract work, and there are numer­
ous challenging questions for those who wish to solve applied prob­
lems. The solution, then, is simple; let us begin the task. 
This belief in the efficacy of social science, if held and offered 
naively, is at least erroneous and is perhaps dangerous. It is danger­
ous because the decision-makers whose problems are to be solved, 
may react with displeasure and mild vengeance when the more 
stubborn urban problems are not solved quickly. And more and 
more behavioral scientists are becoming dependent upon decision-
makers for their support, men who quite naturally want to under­
stand the relationship of social science work to social problems. It 
is dangerous at this point—when scientists, including social scien­
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tists, are beginning to justify their efforts and support by showing 
the relationship of scientific effort to the public benefit—to offer 
the questionable hope that the problems of urban society can be 
solved in the future just as the technical problems of rural society 
were solved in the past. 
This naive view of the efficacy of social science is erroneous be­
cause it confuses technological problems and collective decision 
problems. The problem of increasing agricultural productivity was 
primarily a problem of understanding and manipulating a passive, 
neutral nature. When the scientist tries to solve technological prob­
lems, nature is not his opponent. She may be indifferent, enigmatic, 
or reluctant; but if the scientist is ingenious, he can understand 
her and solve his problem. This is not the case with our current 
social problems. They are to some extent technical problems. The 
antecedents of behavior must be understood; but even when this 
is done, a successful solution is not guaranteed, for current social 
problems are more political than they are technical. They are prob­
lems whose solutions involve conflicts of interests among different 
groups. A potentially successful solution may be satisfactory to one 
group and disadvantageous to some other very influential group, 
and so it is no surprise that such a solution is not adopted. In the 
language of decision theory it can be said that technical, techno­
logical problems are one-person games against nature, whereas 
most social problems are rc-person, non-zero-sum games or collec­
tive decision problems. 
Analyses of the structure and properties of one-person games 
against nature and of collective decision problems indicate clearly 
that the former are far simpler than the latter. Mathematical prob­
ability theory tells us much that is valid about one-person games, 
but the rc-person game and collective decision problems present 
much more stubborn and intractable problems, both practically and 
mathematically. 
Some examples may help to clarify these remarks. Consider the 
successful attempt to reduce air pollution in Pittsburgh after World 
War II and the unsuccessful attempt to implement Daniel Moyni­
han's plan to strengthen the structure of the Negro family. For 
the sake of this discussion the former can be considered a successful 
resolution of a collective decision problem, and the latter an un­
successful resolution of such a problem, though some will want to 
disagree with this statement. 
After World War II, Pittsburgh was still plagued by an air pol­
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lution problem so severe that on the very worst days the sky over 
the city became so dark in the middle of the day that street lights 
were frequently turned on at noon. Pittsburgh, for better or worse, 
has a rather centralized power structure. When that power struc­
ture became determined to eliminate the grossest aspects of the air 
pollution problem, they were remarkably successful: Pittsburgh 
was transformed in a relatively short time from a city with a unique 
and severe pollution problem to a city no sootier than many Amer­
ican cities. This was accomplished, not as the result of any startling 
research program that developed unusual, new technical knowl­
edge, but by using the available technology and solving the col­
lective decision problem. An analysis of power is essential to the 
understanding of social choice processes. 
This example of ridding the Pittsburgh air of much of its pollu­
tion is an unusual one because in most social choice situations 
power is not so centralized; more usually it is unevenly spread 
among a number of participants, and many conflcting interests 
operate to prevent the solution of societal problems. Whatever the 
technical difficulties involved in the solution of air pollution prob­
lems are, it appears to be quite obvious that some of the difficulty 
in solving these problems can be traced to the interests of automo­
bile companies and other industries located in or near our cities. 
These remarks are not meant to be condemnatory; they are offered 
in a descriptive spirit, pointing out the importance of considering 
the material interests and power relations when one is concerned 
about the solution of societal, social choice problems. 
The controversy over the Moynihan Report, which resulted in 
the rejection of his suggestions, is an example of a social choice 
problem that was not solved because it was seen to be contrary to 
the interests of groups that could and did wield a veto power. 
Moynihan's report called for attempts to alter the family structure 
of underclass Negroes who have disorganized, or unconventionally 
organized, patterns of family life. 
The report was not adopted for many reasons. Some argue that 
its arguments were based on propositions about behavior, and 
propositions about the economy, that were and are invalid. This 
may be true, but it is very difficult to know; it is far more clear 
that the proposal was defeated because a number of groups saw 
that the plan was contrary to their interests. Government officials 
administering other welfare programs saw that it was clearly con­
trary to their interests. Some of the most vociferous opponents of 
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the plan were civil rights leaders who saw the plan as being con­
trary to their strategy of stressing the value of the customs of 
blacks—even if these customs might be disfunctional. These black 
politicians may have perceived that although the report, if imple­
mented, might have led to short-run benefit, it would have been 
contrary to their own interests, and the interests of their constitu­
encies, in the long run. Specific proposals that might have been 
developed from the logic of the Moynihan Report were not adopted. 
The controversy over the Moynihan Report illustrates that the 
solution of societal decision problems is a twofold process. First, 
valid propositions that describe and explain human behavior must 
be discovered, and then programs based on these propositions must 
be implemented. This latter task requires that political, collective 
decision processes be understood. Thus, valid propositions that 
describe and explain behavior in social choice or collective decision 
situations must be discovered. 
Since many believe this latter task to be a central question, a 
number of investigators have been studying the collective decision 
problem, trying to understand both how such decisions are actually 
made and how they should be made. Investigators have been ex­
amining the question of how persons combine their individual pref­
erence patterns into a social choice. It is a fundamental question 
about which there has been much speculation and an amount of 
mathematical work; but there have been few, if any, empirical 
studies dealing directly with the question. The problem is ubiquit­
ous, and examples abound. The members of the Security Council 
of the United Nations must decide to take or not take some action; 
a president of the United States must be selected from the millions 
of eligible citizens, but particularly from the dozen or so likely pos­
sibilities; a university research institute must plan a research pro­
gram that will interest its members who have diverse preferences 
and satisfy its sources of support; consumer goods must be pro­
duced and distributed to satisfy the preferences of millions of con­
sumers; Congress must apportion the defense budget among the 
army, navy, air force, and marines; and a family must decide 
whether to live in the city or a suburb. All of these diverse decisions 
have something in common; in some way the preferences of differ­
ent individuals or groups must be summed or amalgamated into a 
social or group choice. 
Societies, groups, and organizations have produced a variety of 
decision-making procedures: the majority vote with veto power; 
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the majority vote without veto power; the economic market mecha­
nisms; the dictatorial father who decides unilaterally where the 
family will live; bargaining and persuasion among the joint chiefs 
of staff; the advisors to the secretary of defense who use techniques 
of modern mathematical economics; the executive committee or 
governing board that reaches a consensus and imposes its decisions 
on a larger group; and the system of primary elections and con­
ventions for the selection of the presidential candidates. Group 
decisions are made in these and many other ways. 
Some Brief Historical Remarks 
Mathematical work dealing with these election and social choice 
problems appears to have had its origins in the second half of the 
eighteenth century in the work of Borda and Condorcet. An 
anomalous situation that has been termed variously the paradox 
of voting or the Condorcet effect has intrigued thinkers for almost 
two hundred years. Its fascination stems from the fact that it illus­
trates that the very structure of a social choice situation can pro­
duce a perplexing or disturbing result. Consider the following situ­
ation. 
Let 1, 2, 3 be three alternatives; let A, B, C be three individuals 
and let (A,B,C) be the community. Let 1 > 2 mean 1 is preferred 
to 2. If for A, 1 > 2, 2 > 3, and we assume transitivity, then 1 > 3. 
Similarly for B, if 2 > 3, 3 > 1, then 2 > 1. For C, if 3 > 1, 1 > 2 
then 3 > 2. Since a majority, A and C, prefer 1 to 2, and a major­
ity, A and B, prefer 2 to 3, we would hope that a majority also pre­
fers 1 to 3. But this is not the case, B and C prefer 3 to 1. 
This perplexing situation becomes more vivid if we consider an 
analog of it, the following game, where side payments, payoffs 
among players, are not allowed. The game is described by the pay­
off matrix shown in Table 1. 
In this situation the three players, A, B and C, must select a 
single alternative among 1, 2, and 3. If they choose 1, A receives 30 
dollars (or jobs if the payoff is patronage in a political situation), 
B receives 10, and C receives 20. If alternative 2 is chosen, A re­
ceives 20, B receives 30, and C receives 10. If they choose 3, A 
receives 10, B receives 20, and C receives 30. Examining this situ­
ation, we can see that A prefers 1, B prefers 2, and C prefers 3. 
Since side payments are not allowed, there is nothing in the struc­
ture of the situation that will enable the three participants to come 
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TABLE 1 
PAYOFF TO: 
ALTERNATIVE A B C 
1 30 10 20 
2 20 30 10 
3 10 20 30 
to some agreement about the selection of the alternative. If side 
payments were permitted, the three could agree on alternative 1, for 
example, and A could give B a payment of 10; there would then 
be an equal division of the rewards, one possible and common out­
come. The situation is indeed perplexing; nothing in its structure 
gives a clue to its solution. As we have defined the situation, even 
the decision rule is not specified; we have not said whether a ma­
jority vote or a unanimous choice is required to select the alterna­
tive. 
Another possible way of obtaining a group choice in this situa­
tion would be to present two of the three alternatives, have the 
three players choose the one they prefer, and then have them com­
pare the third alternative with the alternative they preferred from 
the first pair. However, if this is done, the order of presentation of 
alternatives will affect the outcome. For example, if 2 and 3 are 
compared first, 2 will be preferred by a majority. Then, if 2 is com­
pared with 1, 1 will be preferred by the majority and will be the 
group choice. If, however, the first pair considered is 1, 3 and then 
2 is compared with the survivor, the group choice will be 2. For 
theorists seeking a rational, universal social choice procedure, the 
fact that the order of presentation of alternatives affects the out­
come is highly unsatisfactory. 
Situations such as this one and similar aberrant ones helped 
to stimulate mathematicians to investigate the formal properties 
of election processes. The general problems the theorists attempted 
to solve can be stated as, "How can we design an election procedure 
that will produce a result consistent with the preference patterns 
of the participants? How can we design an election procedure so 
that the order of the presentation of alternatives does not spuri­
ously determine the outcome? How can we assure ourselves that 
the 'wrong' candidate is not selected?" Borda, Condorcet, Laplace, 
Frances Galton, the Reverend C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), and 
others have considered the problem [3]. 
Decision-Making SO 
In the late nineteenth century and in this century, economists 
set themselves the task of discovering a social welfare function, a 
general rule or process by which any given set of individual prefer­
ence patterns could be merged into a social choice. 
For the purpose of this discussion, we define the social welfare 
functions as [1] 
a rule or process which produces a group or social choice from the in­
dividual orderings of alternatives, or from the preferences of the individ­
uals involved. The rule must produce a satisfactory social choice, in every 
case no matter how contradictory the preferences of the individuals in­
volved. 
In a work that has since become a classic, Arrow demonstrated 
that given a number of reasonable conditions about the choice 
structure—where there are at least two persons involved and three 
or more alternatives to choose from—it is not possible to construct 
a general social welfare function. He also demonstrated that where 
the alternatives are limited to two, no matter how many persons 
are involved, the majority decision rule is a satisfactory social wel­
fare function. Arrow's work served as a stimulus to a variety of 
theoretical studies of the normative question. 
The Normative and the Descriptive Problems 
The problem of combining individual preferences into a social 
choice has both normative and descriptive aspects. The normative 
question is, briefly, how should we combine individual preferences 
to obtain sensible, consistent, or rational results? The descriptive 
question is, essentially, how do individuals, groups, and economists 
actually amalgamate their preferences? 
For two reasons it seems appropriate to raise the descriptive 
question. First, Arrow has shown that, if we allow only ordinal 
measurement, or ranking, it is not possible to obtain a general social 
welfare function. But the fact that Arrow has demonstrated the 
impossibility of the abstract task does not prevent individuals from 
actually merging their preferences. Each day innumerable deci­
sions of this kind are arrived at. In fact, attempts to circumvent 
the Arrow paradox raise behavioral or descriptive questions. Luce 
and Raiffa discuss a number of ways of overcoming the difficulties 
presented by Arrow. These include obtaining more data about the 
values or preferences of the participants. This process involves 
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utilizing behavioral scaling methods and also gives some informa­
tion about the strengths of preferences of the participants. Where 
we can obtain measures of the strengths of preferences by utilizing 
risky alternatives, lotteries, and also by utilizing well-established 
behavioral scaling techniques, we can often obtain a satisfactory 
resolution of a difficult social decision question [16]. 
Consider the following example of two persons, A and B, and 
two alternatives, 1 and 2. A ranks the alternatives 1, 2, and B 
ranks the alternatives 2, 1. If we assume that neither party has 
sufficient power to determine the outcome, the preference struc­
tures lead to a stalemate, an irreconcilable conflict. However, if we 
can take into consideration the strengths of preferences of the par­
ticipants, the following example makes it clear how trivial the case 
can be. Consider the case of a husband and wife who are consider­
ing going to a movie (1) or a concert (2). The husband prefers 2, 
the wife prefers 1. If the husband's preference of 2 to 1 is only 
slight, but the wife's preference is very great—she actively dislikes 
the music being performed on that night—in all likelihood, the 
conflict will be resolved in favor of going to the movie, and with 
relatively little effort and little ill feeling. 
Even this brief example reveals that people in actual social deci­
sion situations have a variety of techniques for resolving difficult 
problems of social choice. These resolutions may or may not be 
optimal or particularly rational, however, it is of considerable in­
terest to examine these techniques carefully. 
How Decisions Are Actually Made 
In the discussion above we saw that Arrow demonstrated that, 
given certain reasonable conditions, it is not possible to obtain a 
general social welfare function; but we also saw an example of a 
husband and wife who, with little effort, were able to make a satis­
factory social choice, although they had contradictory preference 
patterns, by taking into account each other's strengths of prefer­
ence. 
Difficulties arise when preference patterns are contradictory; 
often, but not always, persons involved in making a choice have 
consistent preference patterns that enable them to make a large 
number of group choices with little difficulty. In addition, persons 
who cluster together often have similar preference patterns over a 
wide range of choice domains prior to their interaction in a group; 
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and as they function together and interact, their preference pat­
terns become more similar, resulting in a large number of social 
choices that are concluded with little difficulty. However, many 
situations yield a constellation of preference patterns that lead to 
disagreement about social choice, and it is these perplexing situa­
tions that present the intellectual and practical challenges. 
The conduct of international affairs provides us with situations 
in which numerous anomalous and paradoxical preference patterns 
exist; often, in international affairs, it is difficult to make side pay­
ments. Husbands and wives, political leaders in a legislature, fac­
ulty members in a university department, and the employees of 
complex organizations often have many ways in which they can 
bargain, negotiate, and effect side payments to enable them to 
effect satisfactory social choices in difficult situations. But in the 
conduct of international affairs the fundamental interests of the 
participants are often in intractable conflict, and internal con­
straints—national politics, for instance—may operate on the leaders 
to prevent them from striking what might be desirable bargains. 
If we examine just how group decisions are arrived at, we may 
note that a variety of behavioral processes or factors influence the 
outcome; these vary from the power of the various members—a 
single member of the group may have sufficient power to determine 
the group choice—to the strength of preferences of the participants, 
and the personality and intellectual characteristics of those in­
volved. We will discuss the various determining behavioral proc­
esses under the following headings: 
1.	 The distribution of power 
2.	 The joint welfare function 
3.	 Bargaining and coalition formation processes 
4.	 Individual differences of the participants 
5.	 Group processes and phenomena 
6.	 Previous experiences and commitments of the group mem­
bers, and the possibility of future social choices 
The Distribution of Power 
In many situations the social choice is effected rather simply 
and directly; a single person has the power to determine the deci­
sion, and where the preference patterns of those involved are con­
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tradictory or anomalous, he exercises that power. The dictatorial 
father who decides where the family will live; the president of a 
small college who makes an appointment when his deans and fac­
ulty cannot agree; the president of a small company holding 51 
percent of the stock of the company, who makes a decision by him­
self when his employees are in hopeless disagreement—all of these 
are examples of the exercise of dictatorial power. 
At the opposite extreme from the situation of dictatorial power 
is a situation in which power is equally distributed among all par­
ticipants involved in the decision process. Perhaps the most vivid 
and detailed example of such a situation is the election described 
in C. P. Snow's novel The Master. In this piece of fiction Snow 
describes in detail the bargaining, personal preferences, unconsci­
ous processes, and other considerations that exist when a group of 
eleven men, all with equal power and the desire to exercise it, pro­
duce a social choice. 
However, in most decision situations the power is not so simply 
distributed among the participants in the decision; in the large 
number of social choice situations power is neither equally dvided 
among all participants nor does a single person hold sufficient power 
to determine the decision. More often power is diffused among 
participants, with some having a great deal, others having very 
little, and some having a moderate amount. Often the exact dis­
tribution of power among those involved is not known even to the 
participants. Each has some approximate estimation of the power 
distribution, but the distribution of power may be only imprecisely 
defined, and judgments about relative power may differ. 
To obtain an understanding of how social choices are made, it is 
necessary to clarify the role of power in the decision process. Al­
though there have been many interesting, speculative analyses of 
power in the sociological literature, little of it sheds useful light 
on the social choice problem [2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 17]. Recently, how­
ever, the literature of game theory has produced some insightful 
notions that bear directly on the processes of social choice. The 
discussion in this paper will deal with the distribution and the role 
of power among a group of persons who must effect a social choice. 
The ideas of Shapley, and Shapley and Shubik will be discussed; 
their notion of power is termed tr-power here [22, 23]. A notion 
of power, termed 8-power, will be introduced that will emphasize 
the participants' perception of their own power to influence the 
decision process. 
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Shapley and Shubik have offered a method for evaluating the 
distribution of power in social choice situations where a specific 
decision must be made and the voting power of each participant is 
known. A committee in which each member has a single vote, the 
Security Council of the United Nations where the major powers 
have a veto, and a corporation where the power is distributed ac­
cording to the ownership of stock are examples of such situations. 
The notion of power (a-power) attempts to solve the problem 
that is raised by the fact that power is not always distributed 
exactly as votes are distributed. When one man holds 51 percent 
of the stock in a corporation, for many purposes he holds complete 
power, and the decision processes of such a group usually reflect 
this reality; the persons involved usually defer to the power holder. 
They attempt to influence decisions by influencing the majority 
stockholder. In the situation in which each person has a single 
vote the a-power distribution is identical to the distribution of 
votes. In a group of four persons, where the votes are distributed 
10-5-5-1, the person holding the ten has more than fifty percent 
of the power, though his votes total to fewer than fifty percent of 
the total. 
Shapley and Shubik offer a definition of power in which the 
power of each member of a decision-making group depends on the 
chance he has of being critical to the success of a winning coalition; 
the chance he has of effecting a winning coalition. Hence, where 
one man is a winning coalition he has complete power; where each 
person has a single vote they each have equal a-power. In situations 
between these extremes, the power distribution is not so clear and 
the calculation of a-power is more subtle. 
The Shapley and Shubik definition of power does not take into 
consideration the many personal, political, and sociological factors 
that affect any analysis of power in an actual social choice, but as 
they point out, their scheme is a very useful first approximation 
of the actual power distribution in a committee or group situation. 
They explain the general rationale for their definitions of power 
as follows. 
Consider a group of individuals all voting on some issue. They 
vote in order, and as soon as a majority has voted for a resolution, 
it is declared passed. The voting order of the members is chosen 
randomly and it is possible to compute the frequency with which 
an individual belongs to the group whose votes are used to effect 
the decisions; and more importantly, it is possible to compute how 
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often the person is pivotal. This number, the number of times 
the person is pivotal, yields the index of a-power. This index yields 
a measure of the number of times the action of an individual affects 
the decision, changes the state of affairs of the group. The Shapley 
and Shubik scheme credits an individual with 1/nth power where 
there are n persons each holding one vote. If votes are weighted 
unequally, the resulting power distribution is complicated; gen­
erally more votes mean more power, but <r-power does not increase 
in direct proportion to an increase in votes. 
Considering the passage of a bill in our executive-congressional 
system, the o--power of the House of Representatives, the Senate, 
and the president are in the proportion of 5:5:2; and the a-power 
indices for a single congressman, single senator, and the president 
are in the proportion 2:9:350. In the Security Council, which con­
sists of eleven members, five of whom have vetoes, the a-power 
measure gives 98.7 percent to the Big Five and 1.3 percent to the 
six small powers. Each major nation has a power ratio greater 
than 90 to 1 over a single smaller nation. A share owner in a 
corporation holding 40 percent of the stock with the remaining 
60 percent distributed equally among 600 small shareowners has 
a power index of 66.6 percent. The 400:1 ratio in share holdings 
yields a power advantage greater than 1,000 to 1 [23]. 
It is quite clear that this very precise measure of power in a 
committee system is only an approximation of the realities of the 
decision process in social choice situations. As a result, it is 
necessary to introduce another concept, 8-power, which is designed 
to describe the power distribution the participants in a decision 
process actually act upon. 
In some committees or social decision situations, where the 
decision rules and voting weights are explicitly formulated, the 
a-power index can serve as an excellent first approximation of the 
actual distribution of power among the participants. When the 
appropriate historical, sociological, and psychological analysis is 
done, it is possible to obtain a realistic picture of the role power 
plays in effecting the social choice. However, in a large number 
of social choice situations decision mechanisms are not explicitly 
defined, and the participants behave on the basis of their own 
beliefs about, or perceptions of, their power. Understanding these 
phenomena is essentially the understanding of a set of beliefs, a 
social-psychological process. Any analysis of a complex social 
choice process, where the power mechanisms are not explicitly de­
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fined, requires this analysis of the 8-power distribution, an analysis 
of the participants's beliefs about their own power to influence the 
decision. 
The a-power and 8-power analyses are not unrelated, for in the 
dictatorship situation and in the situation of equal or near equal 
distribution of power, the participants ordinarily have reasonably 
accurate perceptions of their power. In the former situation the 
persons involved usually attempt to affect the decision by influenc­
ing the powerful person; in the latter situation the persons involved 
are usually aware that their power is 1/nth of the total. In the 
situations between these two extremes, where it takes some effort 
to compute the a-power distribution even when we know the 
Shapley formula, the most confusion occurs; and the participants 
may be confused or uncertain about their power. 
In complex organizations, this complex and indefinite power 
situation is often present. Two, three, ten, or even more people 
may share the power to determine a decision. A detailed analysis 
of the facts of the situation and the perceptions and beliefs of the 
participants is necessary to untangle the threads of the power 
relations. 
The Joint Welfare Function 
In the example discussed above, of the husband and wife who 
had contradictory preference patterns, we saw that the conflict 
was solved simply and directly. This simple resolution was made 
possible because the husband perceived that his wife had a strong 
distaste for alternative B and a strong preference for alternative 
A, whereas he had only a slight preference for B over A. Difficult 
social choices may be resolved by taking into account the strengths 
of preferences of the participants. A decision process that allows 
a single group member to veto a proposal makes explicit use of 
the belief that a single, strong, negative preference should be 
allowed to outweigh all other positive preferences. The veto pro­
visions of the Security Council voting procedures and the ability 
to veto entrance into membership in college fraternities and adult 
social clubs are examples of this process. 
When this technique is used, when persons involved in the social 
choice process take into account the strength of preferences of 
other participants, it becomes clear that some intuitive process 
involving interpersonal comparison of utility is involved. We may 
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hypothesize that the decision process is one in which some Joint 
Welfare Total is maximized; where a difficult social choice decision 
is made, we hypothesize that intuitive interpersonal comparisons 
of utilities are made [11, 12, 13, 16, 21, 24]. 
If we examine the husband-wife decision to go to the movie— 
select alternative 1—in these terms, the following analysis may 
shed light on the decision. We assign the utilities to the situation 
as shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
JOINT PAYOFF TO: ALTERNATIVE PAYOFF 
H W Sum 
1 8 10 18 
2 10 -30 -20 
If the couple goes to the movie (selects alternative 1), the pay­
off to the group is 18, whereas if they go to the concert (select 
alternative 2), the payoff to the group is -20. 
It is possible to develop a more sophisticated line of reasoning 
using a simple algebraic model suggested by Sawyer [19]. We have 
hypothesized that a group tends to select the outcome that offers 
the highest Joint Welfare Total (JWT) to it; the JWT may be 
computed as follows: 
Let individuals be designated A, B, . . . , Z. 
The payoffs to the individuals are Pa, Pb, . . . , Pz. 
The alternatives to be chosen are designated 1, 2, . . . , n. 
The payoff to the set of individuals for the various alternatives 
are designed Pfli, Pa2, . . . , P*». 
A payoff to another person may not have the same value to one's 
self as an equal payment to one's self. This may be expressed in 
the model by assuming that a payoff to another person is some 
fraction or multiple of the payoff to one's self. Then, the param­
eters that reduce a payment to another to a payment to one's self 
may be designated 
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where xab is the fraction that transforms a payment to B to a pay­
ment to A. 
The members of a group faced with a decision communicate 
among themselves, and in this process they are able to communi­
cate to each other—in some intuitive or perhaps explicit way—the 
utilities of the various alternatives to each other. Once these com­
munications are possessed by the members of the group, some 
intuitive multiperson, interpersonal comparison of utilities process 
occurs. Discussions, bargaining, clarifications, and the like occur, 
and then the group choice is made. 
We are now in a position to examine how a group of individuals 
may determine the Joint Welfare Total of the various alternatives 
from which they must select a group choice. Consider the example 
of Table 1. The JWTs may be computed once the parameters are 
hypothesized [19, pp. 3-9]. If, for person A, a payoff to another 
person is worth one half of a payment to himself, then xab = xac = 0.5; 
and if for person B, a payoff to another is worth just as much as 
a payoff to himself, then xba = xbc = l; and if for C, a payoff to 
another is worth only 1/100 of a payment to himself, then 
Xca= xCb= 0.01. The Joint Welfare Totals can be computed using 
the following formulae: 
JWT (Alt. l)=Pai+(xab Pbx + Xac Pci)+Pbi+(xba Pai 
JWT (Alt. 2)=PQ2+(Xab Pb2 + Xac P02) +Pb2+ 
+ \XCa Pa2~^Xcb 
JWT (Alt. 3)=Pfl3+(Xa6 Pbs + Xac Pcs) +Pbz+(xba Pa3 
+  X b c 1 c 3 / + L  C 3 ' \ X C a i a , 3 ' X c b 1 b s ) 
Substituting the values of Table 1 and the values of xaby xac, 
. . . , xcb we can compute the value of JWT (Alt. 1): 
JWT (Alt. l ) - 3 0 + [ . 5 (10 + 20)] +10+[1 (30+20)] 
+ 20+[.01 (30 + 10)] =125.4 
The Joint Welfare Totals of Alternatives 2 and 3 can be com­
puted similarly: 
JWT (Alt. 2) = 110.5; JWT (Alt. 3) = 125.3 
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Since the Joint Welfare Totals of Alternative 1 and Alternative 
3 are approximately equal and larger than that of Alternative 2, we 
hypothesize that it is unlikely that Alternative 2 will be chosen. 
The probabilities of choosing Alternatives 1 and 3 are approx­
imately equal. However, the arguments concerning the Joint Wel­
fare Total are but one factor of the many that determine a social 
choice. For the simple example of the husband and wife who had 
to choose between the concert and the movie, maximization of 
the Joint Welfare Total appears to be an adequate hypothesis. 
In other more complex decision situations, the many factors dealt 
with in this paper may modify the decision. For example, where 
one person has the power to determine the decision he may select 
the alternative that maximizes the payoff to himself, though 
another alternative might have a higher Joint Welfare Total. Some 
other relevant factors will be discussed below. 
Bargaining and Coalition Formation Processes 
When persons must combine contradictory preferences into a 
social choice in situations in which the power distribution does not 
permit a single individual to determine the outcome, the process 
is completed successfully usually because the participants are able 
to bargain, negotiate, form coalitions, compromise, and make side 
payments among themselves. The usual social choice situation in 
a realistic setting is complex enough so that the persons involved 
may effect a satisfactory social choice by producing an outcome 
that yields some rewards to each participant who holds some power. 
This procedure of dividing the rewards of the social choice situation 
is analogous to the payoff function—and the phenomenon of mak­
ing side payments—of game theory. In fact, in the earlier explica­
tion of the Condorcet effect the ordinal statements of the original 
paradox were transformed into a game-like statement, assuming 
cardinal measures of the utilities. 
Thus, the theory of games of strategy may be seen to be a theory 
for the production of social choices among individuals with differ­
ent preference patterns. Payoff functions are the ways of express­
ing the preference patterns of the persons involved; the person 
prefers the outcome with the largest payoff to himself, or in the 
case of the non-zero sum game, the alternative with the highest 
Joint Welfare Total. 
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Game theory has been seen to have both descriptive and norma­
tive aspects. The entire corpus of solution theory may be seen to 
be prescriptions for the production of reasonable social choices. 
Two-person, zero-sum theory prescribes a reasonable value of a 
game when the parties involved are in direct conflict. In two-
person, non-zero sum and ^-person theory, solutions, to the extent 
they are successful, prescribe the social choices the parties should 
make when there are elements of both conflict and cooperation 
present. 
In a series of papers Thomas Schelling has offered a series of 
hypotheses concerning bargaining processes and has related them 
to choices, decisions, and strategies in the conduct of international 
affairs. Schelling is primarily responsible for an entire reorienta­
tion of game theory, from zero-sum, non-zero-sum orientation to 
one in which social choices are conceived of as being on a continuum 
from pure coordination, through mixed motive games, to pure con­
flict games. Schelling has offered a variety of provocative hypoth­
eses about the role of communication, bargaining, threat, promises, 
and a variety of other behavioral phenomena. Schelling's work too 
can be interpreted to offer hypotheses about certain social choice 
problems [20]. 
Since most social choices can be effected only if coalitions are 
formed, processes of coalition formation must be understood, if an 
understanding of social choice mechanisms is to be obtained. Gam-
son recently reviewed experimental studies of coalition formation 
and found "an encouraging convergence of theoretical explanations 
of coalition formation" [8]. He discusses four "theories" of coali­
tion: a minimum resource theory, a minimum power theory, an 
anticompetitive theory, and an utter confusion theory. 
The minimum resource theory "emphasizes the initial resources 
to effect a decision which the players bring to the situation, rather 
than their strategic bargaining position." The central hypothesis 
states that a coalition will form in which the total resources 
(weights or votes) are as small as possible, while still being suffi­
cient to effect a decision favorable to the coalition that has formed 
[8, p. 86]. 
The minimum power theory is a modification of the minimum 
resource theory. It makes use of the Shapley value and states that 
all participants will demand a share of the payoff proportional to 
their pivotal power (a-power in terms of this paper). This pivotal 
power hypothesis is again a minimum resource hypothesis, but in 
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this case the power of the winning coalition is defined by the Shap­
ley values, a-power [8, p. 88]. 
Gamson describes a hypothesis about the formation of coalitions 
derived from the work of Vinacke and his associates. Players whose 
behavior supports the anticompetitive hypothesis are focused on 
maintaining the social relationships in the group. An anticom­
petitive norm exists against efforts to strike the most advantageous 
deal possible. Coalitions will form along the lines of least resistance 
[8, p. 90]. 
Gamson offers an "Utter Confusion Theory"; he states: "Many 
coalition situations are conducted under conditions which are not 
at all conductive to rational calculation and analysis. It is well 
known that political conventions, for example, are frequently scenes 
of bedlam. Thus, according to this theory, coalition formation is 
best understood as an essentially random choice process. The coali­
tion which forms will be the result of such fortuitous events as a 
chance encounter or a missed telephone call" [8, p. 92]. 
Individual Differences 
When individuals actually are attempting to merge their prefer­
ences into a social choice, undoubtedly characteristics of the in­
dividual—certain individual differences—play some role. It is 
possible to hypothesize that certain cognitive intellective factors 
such as intelligence, bargaining ability, and persuasiveness do have 
an effect. Some people may be particularly skillful bargainers, or 
particularly skillful in the task of persuasion, and they may effect 
a social choice in their favor. Also, certain personality factors may 
affect outcomes; a more aggressive person may be more effective 
in having the outcome be favorable to himself. Even though at this 
time it is not possible to specify what particular factors or indi­
vidual characteristics do affect outcomes, there is every reason to 
believe, a priori, that individual characteristics do affect outcomes. 
The few studies that have been done that have attempted to ex­
amine the effect of individual differences on bargaining and nego­
tiation behavior have been rather disappointing [6, 7]. Undoubt­
edly, individual differences do affect the outcomes of bargaining 
processes; however, until now it has been difficult to specify pre­
cisely what individual characteristics do affect outcomes in a par­
ticular way. This is probably because our studies of individual dif­
ferences, though there are many of them, have not isolated sig­
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niflcant factors that affect bargaining behavior. It may also be that 
the part that individual differences play may be small and may be 
masked by the formal, structural properties of the bargaining situ­
ations. 
Group Processes 
The present analysis deals with the summation of individual 
preferences of members of a small group. The extensive literature 
of the field of small groups then can be seen to bear upon the pres­
ent analysis. However, the small group literature is an extensive, 
uncoordinated body of knowledge with few, if any, general princi­
ples that can aid in the understanding of the processes of social 
choice. There are, however, numerous studies that yield isolated 
results that are relevant to the present problem. Vinacke and Lie­
berman, in separate studies, found that in cases of three-person in­
teraction two individuals may unite against a third whom they per­
ceive to be stronger; they will form a coalition and gain rewards 
from the stronger-appearing person [15, 25]. Schelling, too, has 
argued that in a bargaining situation the weaker member may gain 
concessions from the stronger because the two have coordinate in­
terests and the stronger must yield concessions to the weaker [20]. 
Careful review of the small group literature would undoubtedly 
reveal other studies that describe phenomena—characteristics of 
individuals functioning in a group situation—that will shed light 
on social choice processes. These many phenomena considered to­
gether may detail a picture that is not particularly elegant or sim­
ple; but then, it is likely that an understanding of the processes of 
social choice, when we obtain it, will not be elegant or simple either. 
Previous Experiences and Future Social Choice Possibilities 
One set of processes that undoubtedly have great influence on 
the social choice problem, but have been virtually unstudied, are 
the processes involving the effect of past commitments and deci­
sions, and anticipations of the effect of future social choice situa­
tion and commitments on the present problem. Difficult social 
choice situations, where preference patterns are hopelessly con­
tradictory, may be resolved because of the past experience of the 
group, or because those members of the group who have their pref­
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erences satisfied can make commitments about future social choices, 
making concessions or promises in advance. 
The group in an actual social choice situation is usually one 
with a significant past history, and also the prospect of continued 
lengthy existence in the future. This feature often enables the 
participants to make a difficult social choice; but this feature is 
particularly difficult to study experimentally, and even empirically. 
However, a thorough treatment of the question of social choice 
must deal with such questions. 
Concluding Discussion 
Now that we have examined the normative and descriptive 
aspects of the social choice question, we are in a better position 
to understand why our social problems are so difficult to solve, 
what some genuine contributions to the solution of these problems 
the behavioral sciences might make, and also what the limitations 
of these contributions might be. The rigorous study of collective 
decisions has shown us that conflicting preference patterns can 
transform a seemingly simple problem into one that is exceedingly 
difficult to solve. The Condorcet paradox shows us that when only 
three persons must choose from as few as three alternatives a hope­
less situation can arise. It should be no surprise, then, that when 
many people must choose from many alternatives we will frequently 
have intractable conflcts. 
The behavioral sciences can make a variety of contributions to 
the solution of social problems. They have made in the past, and 
they can continue to make in the future, the conventional contri­
bution of generating valid propositions about behavior: they can 
tell us how we can change attitudes, what the mechanisms of prej­
udice are, what we have to do to understand and change complex 
organizations, how we can educate more efficiently, and how we 
can motivate and reward people to elicit behavior we think de­
sirable. 
But valid propositions about behavior do not automatically lead 
to the adoption of programs designed to solve social problems based 
on these valid propositions. Our studies of decision-making, includ­
ing the study of collective decisions, have a number of unique con­
tributions to make to the solution of social problems beyond merely 
clarifying why we have difficulty in finding such solutions. 
Studies of collective decision-making, including game theory, 
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provide the decision-maker with a set of concepts and a way of 
thinking that can be most valuable. The decision-maker whose 
analyses of his problems include an explicit consideration of the 
notions of rational solution, the utilities of the actors involved, 
bargaining and coalition formation, power, and the fair division of 
payoffs will have a clearer picture of his problems. In particular, 
collective decision-making analyses offer very sophisticated notions 
of a fair or rational solution of a conflict. The naive decision-maker 
usually has only vague notions of what a fair or rational solution 
to his problem is; the student of game theory and social choice can, 
in some instances, give rather mathematically precise definitions of 
the notions of rationality and solution. Even where our solution 
notions are inadequate, our analyses make explicit the precise na­
ture of the inadequacy. The analyses of rationality in the game 
theory literature accomplish a similar task: they make precise what 
the criteria of rationality are. Thus, we may know quite precisely 
in what sense our behavior is, and is not, rational. 
The analyses of solutions found in the literature of game theory 
and Arrow's impossibility theorem tell much about the difficulty of 
finding convincing, desirable outcomes in difficult conflict situa­
tions. The difficulties in finding solutions to ^-person games illumi­
nate the reasons for the difficulties of the resolution of conflicts that 
exist in real life. And Arrow's theorem makes it clear that it is un­
likely that a general social welfare function will be found. 
These shortcomings and limitations of the normative aspects of 
the study of collective decision-making helped to stimulate the 
study of the descriptive aspects of the problem—how people actu­
ally do make decisions. Such studies have yielded knowledge of 
bargaining and negotiation processes, insight into the phenomena 
of trust and threat, and information about how closely actual be­
havior conforms to the prescriptions of the rational models. Not 
all of these studies have something to tell about actual decisions 
taken in real life, but there have been few attempts to apply the 
descriptive findings to actual problems. In one attempt, a notion 
of trust was discovered in a study of behavior in a three-person 
game that shed light on the processes of coalition formation and 
trust as they exist in the conduct of international affairs. Until 
more such work is done it will be difficult to know precisely how 
useful descriptive work can be. 
In conclusion, it can be said that our studies of collective deci­
sion-making processes can be of some help to those persons who 
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must make the decisions involved in the solution of social problems, 
either because our current normative and descriptive work can at 
present yield benefits, or because we can construct models of deci­
sion processes that more closely approximate reality. However, 
this assertion should not be interpreted to mean that social scien­
tists can proceed in rapid order to solve collective decision problems 
as, in earlier days, technological problems were solved. However, 
the juxtaposition of abstract work with the press of reality will make 
it more likely that studies of collective decisions will contribute to 
the solution of social problems. 
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DECISION-MAKING AIDS 

Ronald L. Ernst 
Marshall C. Yovits 
INFORMATION SCIENCE 
AS AN AID TO 
DECISION-MAKING 
The interconnections between information science and decision-
making, as two areas of study and research, are becoming increas­
ingly clear. The discussion that follows seeks to describe these in­
terconnections and relationships through the use of a generalized 
model of an information system.* The model is believed to have 
general applicability to a wide variety of real-world decision-mak­
ing situations and provides opportunities for quantification of 
aspects of decision processes. The utility of the model may be 
measured in terms of how well it satisfies these conditions. 
Generalized Information Systems 
Previously [12, 13], it has been proposed that the flow as well 
as the science of information may most conveniently be viewed and 
understood with the use of information systems. Such systems are 
abstractions of the essential components of command and control 
systems, management systems, document systems, biological and 
human information processing systems, and so on. A generalized 
information system consists of four interconnected components as 
depicted in Figure 1. 
The components are an information source that acquires and 
*The authors wish to acknowledge the partial support of the National 
Science Foundation through the Computer and Information Science Research
Center at the Ohio State University in the development of the material 
presented. 
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disseminates information (IAD), a decision-maker that accepts 
the information from the source and disseminates courses of action 
(DM), an execution function (E) that takes the courses of action 
and converts them into observables (the resultant of the courses or 
plan of action), a transformation function (T) that accepts the 
observables and transforms them into data that are fed to the 
IAD. Each component thus accepts and disseminates measurable 
quantities, is capable of performing operations on the quantities, 
and further has storage or memory capability. With respect to the 
latter, the IAD contains data obtained from the environment, from 
the transformation already discussed, and basic reference data; the 
DM stores information about the system, environment, and as will 
be noted later, may store information about the system operation; 
E stores methods of transforming courses of action to observables, 
and likewise T stores the conversion function of observables to 
data. 
From this brief description it should be obvious that the gen­
eralized information system possesses the characteristics originally 
stated as being desirable. It is an organization that has generality, 
applicability, utility, reality, and is quantifiiable. 
In this model the decision-maker plays a dominant role. From 
the generalized information systems point of view, the decision-
maker must satisfy the conditions of accepting, storing, and oper­
ating on information to generate courses of action [13]. However, 
the suggestion that the decision-maker may have stored informa­
tion about the environment and system operation and the fact that 
the decision-maker generates courses of action or plans indicates 
that decision-making is a central and dominant function of infor­
mation systems, and hence a focal point of information science. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the implications of 
decision-making as a major function within information science. 
Decision-Making 
Decision-making has been approached from at least three dis­
tinct points of view. One approach is descriptive: it attempts to 
describe how a decision is made, not only in terms of the antecedent 
conditions, but the decision-making process, the state of the deci­
sion-maker at the time of the decision, and the consequences of 
the decision. Another approach is formal and prescriptive or nor­
mative in nature. This approach is exemplified by game theory 
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[e.g., 7], statistical decision theory [e.g., 2], and Bayesian decision 
theory [e.g., 10]. The third approach is somewhat nebulous: it 
implies that decision-making cannot really be understood. 
The first two of these approaches are well known. For this 
reason, little note will be made of them other than to point out 
that their impact has been substantial, particularly in manage­
ment science and in the design of military command and control 
systems. The third, however, presents an entirely different prob­
lem for our approach. 
The origin of the problem stems from the feeling that decisions 
may be influenced by a number of factors, many of which have no 
apparent bearing on the information provided. That is, for all in­
tents and purposes, an independent observer either sees no directly 
relevant information or may presume that extraneous information 
has been used in making a decision. The former case is sometimes 
called a "shadow" decision. The latter is commonly referred to as 
an irrational decision. It usually involves political, social, or per­
sonal considerations. 
Analysis of the problem posed by this approach reveals a rela­
tively simple solution. The analysis is common among all decision-
making theories and is resolved in the following way: consider the 
decision-maker—either man or machine—as a black box receiving 
information, processing it, and emitting courses of action. Formally, 
this constitutes a mapping of the courses of action onto the input 
information. In this approach, this mapping is unknown or little 
understood. For the other two theories, the mapping is either 
known or may be calculated. 
More formally, the decision-maker may be treated as a machine 
in an algebraic sense, that is, as a finite state machine. A finite 
state machine possesses an initial, a transitional, and terminal state 
[e.g., 3]. For present purposes, the initial state is the information 
input. There are two major sources of sets of information associ­
ated with the initial state. These are from the information source, 
or IAD, as we have termed it, which includes information about 
the environment as sampled by the IAD, and whatever is stored 
in the decision-maker's memory. The terminal state is the 
courses of action generated. There are three major classifications 
of terminal states. These are (a) the courses of action either a 
priori adequate—known to result in a single course of action or 
set of courses of action given the input state, (b) a posteriori 
adequate—found to result in a single course of action or set of 
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courses of action after the process of decision-making has taken 
place (c) or indeterminate, that is, no singular mapping may be 
found. 
To better illustrate the nature of the terminal states, Figure 2 
shows a typical form of each given a known or fixed information 
input state. In this figure, an arbitrary information input of four 
states (/i, j= l , . . . , 4), an arbitrary set of four possible courses 
of action (Aj, j = l , . . . , 4), and four unique terminal states, 
(Efc, k-lt . . . , 4) representing the input to the E function are 
used. The figure shows how (by noting whether or not the rows or 
columns are uniquely filled) the initial state I progresses through 
the transitional state A to the terminal state E, and whether or not 
E is unique. 
The purpose of this discussion is to clarify the nature of a deci­
sion. In summary, there are relatively few distinct states that exist 
in decision-making. Moreover, this discussion also suggests ways 
of making decisions within the context of the general model pro­
posed at the outset of the paper. That is, how can the decision-
maker utilize information from the IAD and select courses of ac­
tion? The abstract structure provides a means for handling this 
and related questions. 
All of the initial and terminal states of the model, with the ex­
ception of one, have been defined. The exception consists of what 
may be stored in the decision-maker's memory. One possibility 
includes prior experience (political, economical, social, historical, 
and so on) related to the decision-maker's frame of reference. An­
other includes his knowledge of system operation. The latter case 
is treated in detail, mainly because it may be formalized more 
rigorously than the former. Essentially, we are proposing that the 
decision-maker has knoweldge of system operation, how the system 
should operate, and what should constitute "good" system opera­
tion. Although this may be experiential to a large extent, many of 
the aspects of the decision-maker's knowledge of system operation 
have been or are capable of being identified. 
The point is that the decision-maker must have some overall 
model of the performance of the total system that results in he 
generation of some set of observable actions. This model need not 
be—and for more complex situations will probably not be—an 
analytical or even explicable model. It need not even be a rational 
model. It is a frame of reference that the decision-maker uses to 
relate the information to which he has access to some sot of ob­
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servables. As indicated, this model will probably be heavily in­
fluenced by the background, experience, and outlook of the deci­
sion-maker. Indeed, when it is sometimes said that a particular 
type of decision-making is an art, it is meant that the model can 
be learned only by experience and cannot be described in analytical 
terms. "Common Sense" would also fall into this category. 
When additional information is received by the decision-maker, 
he then establishes some courses of action that will result in ob­
servable actions. Information about these observables is eventually 
fed back to the decision-maker so that he can decide whether his 
model and his decisions were accurate and satisfactory. If the in­
formation fed back is not the expected information, then the deci­
sion-maker can either change his decisions, resulting in new courses 
of action or he can change his model of the process. These ideas 
have already been developed in detail [12, 13]. 
Knowledge of system operation, including environmental factors, 
may be represented as in Figure 3. In this figure, the decision-
making function is represented as the IAD, E, and T functions, 
each of which, rather than a real entity as in the generalized model, 
is a perceived or inferred characteristic of system function. The 
flow, indicated by the numbers 1, 2, and 3, constitute the mapping 
of A onto I, anticipated observable actions, and anticipated data 
respectively. That is, it is assumed that the decision-maker is 
aware of, and effectively uses characteristics of, the environment of 
the system, and that he has knowledge of environmental factors 
influencing his own behavior. In the same sense, it is further as­
sumed that he has knowledge of the operation of the IAD—how it 
collects, stores, disseminates information, and how data from T are 
returned to it and processed through it—and of pertinent sources 
of perturbation. The same is held for the other functions—namely 
E and T. It is assumed that the decision-maker infers how execu­
tion is accomplished, what the necessary inputs and probable out­
puts are, and what factors influence the E function. For T, both 
observables and data are presumed known as is the processing func­
tion and environmental inputs. Quite generally, this is a delinea­
tion of what is held in store in the DM, with the additional quali­
fication that the decision-maker may have knowledge of what per­
turbs or influences his decision and how this influence occurs. 
Knowledge of this kind is frequently referred to as "know how," 
"executive capability," or simply a description of the model of sys­
tem operation. The internalization of the system is superficially 
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similar to a concept proposed by Churchman [4]. This concept is 
of a world view or Weltanschauung held by the decision-maker rela­
tive to the system he is regulating or managing. Our point of view 
differs to the extent that the world view is a structure internal to 
the decision-maker, and hence part of his processing capability. 
From our point of view, the primary function of the decision-
maker is to establish that mapping of information into courses of 
action which best regulate the system given the constraints of the 
system already delineated. Since this may be accomplished in a 
variety of ways depending upon the system constraints, further 
formalization is profitable. The formalization is realized by return­
ing to the model of the decision-maker as a finite state machine. 
The underlying assumptions, namely initial, transitional, and 
terminal states along with several instances of each have already 
been given. The present discussion is limited to these instances 
and, in a sense, is a recasting of the problem. 
For the recasting, consider the decision-making subsystem out­
lined in Figure 4. This subsystem consists of the IAD feeding in­
formation as the subsystem input. The subsytem output is courses 
of action to E and T as a combined subsystem. Within this sub­
system, the principal components are I, the information input set, 
D, the decision which includes the internalized total systems model 
as stored information, and A, the courses of action generated. The 
behavior of the subsystem is governed by the I, D, and A functions, 
and these transformations within the subsystem. These trans­
formations may be represented in detail by the arrow-associated 
numbers 1, 2, and 3, in Figure 4. 
Number 1 represents the link of the perceived information to 
the decision-maker. Number 2 indicates stored information within 
the decision function. This information can be compared with the 
input set of information. The result of this comparison is a set of 
projected courses of action designated by number 3. 
Each of these states and their transitions should be thought of 
in terms of expected values, that is, as anticipated events or oc­
currences. In this respect they are "hypothetical." Given an in­
formation set, however, they are fully capable of being estimated. 
The flow and possible routes of flow, denoted by the arrows, gen­
erate a number of models of decision-making. For illustrative pur­
poses, four possible types of models are shown in Figure 5. 
The model at the top of the figure represents decision-making 
where there is little a priori uncertainty regarding the execution of 
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a decision and its influence on system behavior. Each component 
and numbered arrow flow are identical to that of Figure 4 except 
that an additional flow, designated by the number 4, is included. 
This represents the case of a fixed and known decision for one set 
of input information. This model is appropriate for decision-mak­
ing systems for which specific, well-understood, unique courses of 
action are associated with each set of input information. It is 
analogous to the a priori adequate class of terminal states. 
The second model shown is exceedingly more complex. In addi­
tion to the components and flow of Figure 4, A feeds back the 
expected action to the information input for a check on its suit­
ability. (This is indicated by number 4 in the diagram.) In such 
a situation multiple courses of action that may be generated are 
considered, and the resulting output data are compared with the 
input information. Thus, a best course of action may be decided 
upon through further processing. From the comparison the in­
formation must again be inputted to D through 5. This input is a 
modified information input. A new mapping function indicated 
by number 6 is produced. This model arises from the necessity 
of the decision-maker to compare the results or anticipated results 
of his decision with the original information. In order for courses 
of action to be generated, the original input information must be 
revised, re-inputted, and remapped. The model is analogous to 
one of the a posteriori adequate class; the feedback is required to 
obtain proper system activity. 
A special case of this model is given in the third example. For 
this model, feedback to D takes place through number 4, and a new 
mapping function to A through 5 is generated. This model revises 
a decision on the basis of expected outcomes of courses of action. 
It is the widely known Bayesian model. 
Finally, the fourth example indicates a decision model of a form 
such that no singular course of action or consistent set of courses 
of action may be made. This model indicates a situation in which 
two distinct sets of information and courses of action could result 
in the same execution or an execution irrelevant to the information. 
Although this could imply that the information or courses of action 
were equivalent or redundant, it could also imply that the mapping 
function could not lead to a unique terminal state A. Such a model 
could arise under a variety of circumstances. The fourth model 
represented in Figure 5 illustrates an anticipated course of action 
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that loops back on itself through number 4. The loop obviously 
could lead to an inconsistent set of courses of action transmitted 
to the E function, a reserved decision, or no decision at all. 
As previously noted, with these simple considerations many 
models of decision-making could be constructed. They could differ 
not only in structure and flow but in content. The formal struc­
ture, however, is highly significant in that it provides the basic 
features of decision-making. Moreover, when applied to an actual 
decision-making situation, the structure is quantifiable. Criterion 
measures—times, errors, and probabilities, for example—could be 
substituted for any of the numbered transitions in the flow di­
agrams. Finally, it should be pointed out that the emphasis 
throughout has been on anticipation. That is, how does the 
decision-maker expect his decision to be processed? 
Information and Decision-making Aids 
We have now established a close relationship between informa­
tion and decision-making by establishing the role of decision-
making within generalized information systems. However, we have 
spoken of information loosely. At this point it is important to 
establish a rigorous definition of information. 
Information has many distinct meanings. One meaning involves 
the exchange of a communication with linguistic or semantic con­
tent [e.g., 1]. Another meaning is quantitative, involving the 
measurement of numbers of available choices [e.g., 11] or precision 
of measurement [e.g., 5, 6]. Yet another meaning refers to printed 
matter, verbal communications, visual communications, and similar 
kinds of sources. 
Within a generalized framework, each is too restrictive to pro­
vide the necessary criteria, utility, and analytical expressions for 
application to realistic situations, such as may be treated by in­
formation science. For this reason, we have chosen to define in­
formation as "data of value in decision-making." The definition 
is not new, having been proposed earlier by McDonough and Gar­
rett [8]. Moreover, Payne [9] has extended the notion by sug­
gesting that the value and use of information is the principal 
factor for the existence of information systems. The point to be 
stressed is that information is not raw data or isolated facts but a 
structure that can be used by the decision-maker in regulating the 
system. The structure is obviously dependent not only on the 
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particular system but on the decision-maker. To this extent, in­
formation is highly "context" sensitive." 
Context sensitivity is in part system and environment dependent 
and in part decision-maker dependent. The extent of context 
sensitivity can be illustrated by considering what is required of 
operating information systems. 
Operating information systems should have several desirable 
informational characteristics. A partial listing of such character­
istics includes accuracy, relevance, timeliness, sufficiency, lack of 
bias, and adequacy. Accuracy refers to the "truthfulness" or 
fidelity of the information. Relevance refers to the bearing the 
information has on the control or regulation of the system. Time­
liness refers to the time of the arrival of the information. Suffi­
ciency is concerned with whether or not the content of the infor­
mation, though accurate, has distortion. Adequacy refers to the 
amounts of information that the decision-maker needs; typically 
he receives too little or too much. 
If these criteria are not met, the difficulty of making a decision 
is compounded greatly. Generally, the decision-maker is forced 
into a situation of relying on his own judgment or stored informa­
tion, attempting to make a good guess, delaying his decision, or 
reserving his decision entirely. From a systems point of view, 
information generated under these conditions has little value. The 
consequences for system operation could easily be catastrophic. 
This follows not only from the desirability of the characteristics 
but from casual observation. Yet, somehow the system usually 
seems to survive. 
We believe that the model we have proposed suggests not only 
ways in which these criteria may be achieved but also how, in their 
absence, the system continues to function. For the former, the 
issue is resolved by systems design; for the latter, the issue is re­
solved by systems analysis. 
A partial solution can be found within our model by considering 
what is contained within the information acquisition/dissemination 
function, the decision-making function, and the interface of the 
two. Initially, because we have defined information as data of value 
in decision-making, the IAD must contain data that in part satisfy 
the criteria listed. Such data may be viewed as a set of elements 
generally, although in fact the precise content will depend on the 
system itself. The elements of the data set must be capable of being 
structured. It is the structuring that exerts a profound influence 
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over decision-making. The form of the data elements is not of great 
importance: they may be independent, dependent, or, by some 
rule, implicative of some other element. The structure may be 
either contained in the data set or inferred from the set by the 
decision-maker. 
Inferences by the decision-maker regarding the processing of the 
information may be made. The types of inference possible we have 
previously identified as conversation, reduction, or translation 
[13]. In conservation the decision-maker preserves the informa­
tion content as his information input. In reduction he reduces 
the set of data as his informative input; and in translation he 
changes the form or the structure of the data as his informative 
input. The interface, then, must be capable of transmitting the 
information. Because passive dissemination of information is not 
likely to possess the degree of desirability of any of the criteria 
mentioned, it may be more fruitful to allow an interrogative or 
interactive interface in which the decision-maker may ask ques­
tions of his data base. 
Reconsideration of the models of decision-making developed here 
reveals some of the motivation for their application. The models 
were anticipatory in the sense that the decision-maker was assumed 
to be expecting the system to behave in a certain way. System 
teedback, then, is important in the sense that the decision-maker 
needs to compare the output of the system with his own expecta­
tions. It was also for this reason that the models were developed 
as internalizations of the system. From a systems design point 
of view, the information acquisition/dissemination function should 
contain data highly relevant to the decision-maker's needs. He 
may then, by appropriate interrogation, obtain information about 
the system behavior before executing a course of action by examin­
ing the likely system outputs. Moreover, the actual feedback pro­
vides him with a check on both the accuracy and the adequacy 
of his model or mapping function. 
We believe that this systems approach is not only fruitful for 
the future design of information systems but for the understanding 
of information science. Information science is the study of infor­
mation systems of this general form. Information systems may be 
dichotomized as artificial or natural, depending upon whether or 
not they were constructed by man. It is also possible to have mixed 
systems, resulting either from the evolution of an artificial system 
to a system containing natural properties or the evolution of a 
natural system to a system containing artificial properties. 
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The criticality of the decision-making function in information 
systems has been shown. The future or fruitfulness of our approach 
remains to be seen, since it relies heavily on the application and 
potential modification of the generalized information systems 
model to specific information systems. 
For decision-making aids the implications are fairly straight­
forward. The information contained within the source must serve 
the needs and uses of the decision-maker. To a large extent it 
must be capable of responding to intelligent questions asked of it, 
particularly when the initial set of information is not sufficient to 
provide the decision-maker with a potential set of courses of action. 
Thus the source should be interactive with the decision-maker in 
some degree. Because the information must serve the needs and 
uses of the decision-maker, it must naturally be system relevant. 
Without relevance, execution and transformation are impossible. 
Finally, the entire system, defined by its components, must provide 
feedback to the decision-maker. It is only in this way that the 
decision-maker can evaluate the adequacy of his model and sub­
sequent actions. We have indicated that this closure is through 
the Information Acquisition/Dissemination function. In the 
absence of the closure, the decision-maker remains in a state of 
uncertainty. To aid him in the reduction of his uncertainty, feed­
back through his source is obviously required. 
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Charfes M. Eastman 
TOWARD A THEORY OF 
AUTOMATED DESIGN 
Ongoing studies at Carnegie-Mellon University and elsewhere are 
attempting to specify the information-processing mechanisms by 
which people design. Being studied is how information given in 
a typical design problem is added to and modified so as to result 
in a finished design solution. Proposed specifications of design 
processes are being tested by modeling them on a computer. 
Specifically, these studies are moving toward the development of 
computer programs that will accept as input the typical informa­
tion available to a designer, apply the same or more elaborate 
considerations and processes, and output a finished design solution. 
Currently, principal efforts involve architectural design. 
One motive behind these efforts is to gain a better understanding 
of what intuitively seems to be intelligent and "creative" design. 
Such understanding may allow design to be better taught. This 
work also leads toward computer aids that may significantly aug­
ment human design capabilities. These efforts can be viewed as 
part of a larger effort concerned with computer augmentation of 
human intellect. 
Human Problem-solving Processes 
The psychological foundations of a theory of design have been 
well developed in the information-processing model of human 
problem-solving. Design is considered as a specific kind of problem-
solving. 
 86 Decision-Making
The premises of current problem-solving theory may be sum­
marized as follows. It assumes that man's nervous system trans­
forms and integrates information from the environment, from the 
individual's physiological feedback systems, and from his memory. 
"Thinking" is considered as the process that brings information 
from these various sources together to produce new information. 
All results from the processing of information is the product of the 
information content that is processed, the sequence in which it is 
brought together, and the means of processing used. 
Most generally, human information-processing is a mode of 
decision-making. But it differs from traditional decision theory 
models in that the evaluation of individual decisions cannot be 
made directly. The issue is best understood by considering the 
classic example of chess. The goal of chess is to capture your 
opponent's king before he captures yours. Decision theory would 
require a player to identify and evaluate all move combinations 
in a decision tree so as to find the combination that leads to the 
goal. It is estimated that 1012n move combinations would require 
evaluation before any objective decision could be made for the 
first move. The issue is that no intermediate objective functions 
exist. Thus evaluation of chess moves according to a decision tree 
is in reality impossible. Many interesting tasks similarly lack 
means for direct evaluation. Other forms of decision-making are 
necessary. Problem-solving theory deals with indirect means for 
generating and evaluating decisions. 
The information-processing approach to studying mental pro­
cesses leads to several implications. All known modes of processing 
require the input information to be organized in a specific 
representation or language [4]. The elements represented in the 
language (the equivalent of words in verbal language and variables 
in mathematical languages) can only be combined or transformed 
according to specific rules, known as the syntax of the language. 
Thus, given some information requiring processing, it seems 
necessary that a person transform it into some sort of language, 
then process the information according to appropriate syntactical 
rules applied to the information elements. A syntax is not deter­
ministic, but only partially puts bounds on how information can 
be related. Thus, appropriate secondary rules of processing must 
also be applied to allow the desired information to be efficiently 
generated. 
Two examples of syntactic models of thinking are shown in 
SYNTAX: 
SENTENCE _* NP + VP 
NP -> FNP/(DET + N) 
VP -* (VI + ADJ)/(V + NP) 
FNP -> FN/(FN + ', who' + VP + V) 
ELEMENTS: 
DET 'a(n)'/'the' 
N 'store'/'house'/'bicycle' 
FN 'John'/'Grandfather'/'Larry' 
VI 'is' 
V 'hif/'bought'/'needs' 
ADJ 'old'/'tired'/'sorry' 
EXAMPLES: 
SENTENCE 
/ \ SENTENCE 
NP VP 
NP VP FN V NP w r
/ \ADE) T N FNP V NP 
John hit the bicycle. F  N VP l\

SENTENCE NP 
NP VP 
FNP 
FN 
/ \  / \ 
DET N VI ADJ , . .
 L . M 
John who hit Mary, is tired 
The store is old. 
Fig. 1. A subset of the syntax of English is applied to a few of its possible 
elements. In the syntax and elements a "/" stands for the disjunctive or 
and the elements between quotation marks are literals. In the examples 
replacements are made from the top down. Lines from a node define the 
specific replacements made. 
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Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 presents a very limited and simplified 
subset of the syntax for English and a few of its elements. Some 
of the sentences that can be generated with this system are 
presented. Notice in Figure 1 that some syntactic rules are 
recursive—they indirectly call themselves. Specifically, a noun 
phrase (NP) may be replaced by a formal noun phrase (FNP), 
which may be replaced by a verb phrase (VP). The verb phrase 
may consist of a verb and a noun phrase. Thus, a noun phrase may 
be a component of its own replacement. Recursive systems are 
theoretically capable of generating an infinite number of legal 
SYNTAX: 
Formula f = f 
Rl f = l • c+ f=c+ f 
R2 f = f • c — c = c — f 
R3 f = f 
R4 f = f -^>cxf = cx f 
R5 f + f —• add operation 
R6 f - f—» subtract operation

R7 f •*•f —» divide operation

R8 f x  f —» multiply operation

ELEMENTS: 
c —> any numerical constant 
f —» any numerical function 
EXAMPLE: 
"If a certain number is multiplied by six and the product increased 
by forty-four, the result is sixty-eight. Find the number." 
R 3 ^ 
-44 = 68-44 
Xx6 + 44 = 68 
Xx6 = 24 
R6 X = 4 
Fig. 2. The syntax of arithmetic and its application to a simple problem. 
In school, each of us spends a good amount of time memorizing HI. R6, R7, 
and R8. 
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GIVEN: 
1. An initial information state A; 
2. A set of operators; 
3. A set of goals X . 
FIND: 
An information state that satisfies X. 
Fig. 3. Problem-solving may be conceptualized as a problem space, a set 
of operators, and a goal specification. 
statements. Thus, finite processing rules can generate infinitely 
varied statements. Figure 2 shows the elements and syntax for a 
sheet of arithmetic. In this case, an initial input is provided. The 
task is to determine the appropriate syntactic rules to apply and 
their sequence in order to reach the desired result [see 9, 10, 20]. 
An alternative but functionally equivalent formulation of the 
syntactic model of information-processing is that of a problem 
space (Fig. 3). A problem space is defined by the given problem 
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state and all permutations of operations that can transform this 
state into new states. Thus, the problem space is the set of all states 
possibly generated by a given formulation to a well-defined prob­
lem. Productive thinking involves the application of operators to 
knowledge states so as to achieve a state that meets given criteria 
L29]. In this formulation, a solution space is equivalent to a 
representation; operators are equivalent to syntactic rules. 
In both formulations, secondary rules are needed to generate the 
desired information state. The conceptual attractiveness of the 
second formulation of problem-solving has encouraged the use of 
the terms search (of the problem space) and search strategies as 
the name for these secondary rules. Problem-solving studies have 
been especially interested in search strategies of large and com­
plex problem spaces. 
An issue only beginning to be studied is the means by which a 
task statement is translated into a workable problem specification. 
In most real problems, all the information needed is not given. The 
representation in which to solve the problem, the information 
elements operated on, the operators that can be utilized, or the 
goals to be achieved through processing—one or more may be 
missing. A subtask of problem-solving is the organization, expan­
sion, and translation of the information given about the problem 
into a complete problem statement allowing processing. Figure 2 
provides an example of the translating of the word problem into 
its arithmetic form. 
This task recently has been formulated in an information 
retrieval paradigm where information from a problem-solver's ex­
perience and learning is accessed and translated into a language 
that facilitates processing [17]. A few programs have been written 
that automatically carry out this translation. For instance, Bobrow 
has written a program that translates a verbal description of a 
problem into its algebraic formulation [8]. Another program has 
been written that translates between English and geometric 
figures [12]. 
In summary, problem-solving processes seem to be made up of 
two classes of activities. One is a retrieval process that takes as 
input general information about a problem, organizes it, and aug­
ments it with information from a large storage bank. This process 
specifies the problem. The other is the search for an appropriate 
knowledge state within a particular problem formulation and 
language. 
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The usual means for studying problem-solving is to give a subject 
a complex task to solve. By carefully recording the external mani­
festations of changes in his knowledge state, much can be learned 
about the information brought to bear on any decision, the 
sequence of operators applied, the representations used, and his 
general strategy of problem-solving. All behavior—verbal, written, 
sketched, facial expressions, and so on—is recorded in a protocol. 
By analyzing the protocol, it is possible to determine the sequence 
of operations applied and the corresponding changes in the problem 
state. By analyzing the structure of different problem-solving 
protocols, and exploring the implications of alternative processing 
sequences, the theory of problem-solving is being elaborated [see 
29, and 33, 26]. 
The Design Process 
Generally, when the term design is used, it refers to the spatial 
arranging of physical entities. Although structural, mechanical, 
visual, and other forms of analyses are certainly a component of 
design, its central and integrating aspect seems to be the search 
for a physically realizable configuration that, when analyzed, sat­
isfies the goals identified for the situation. Thus, design can be 
defined as the selection and arrangement of physical components 
in a two- or three-dimensional space subject to constraints and/or 
evaluation criteria. The constraints and evaluation criteria are 
derived from performance and qualitative requirements that the 
element being designed must satisfy [17]. 
Design clearly is an example of problem-solving. It is initiated 
when a task, normally explicated as the generation of construction 
specifications for some type of physical entity, is assigned. The 
entity to be produced must be realizable within a specific environ­
mental and economic context. It also may be required to perform 
in a particular fashion or to possess particular attributes. Thus, 
there are acceptability or goal criteria. The specification required 
to complete the task assignment is not initially known. Informa­
tion-processing must be initiated to determine its specific form. 
Over thirty detailed protocols dealing with design problem-
solving have been collected and analyzed by researchers at 
Carnegie-Mellon University. Some of these have involved realistic, 
though small, architectural, product, or engineering design prob­
lems. Others were abstract exercises whose purpose was to elab­
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orate different aspects of the total design process. Several of these 
studies have already been presented in the literature [14, 17]. 
It is not possible to cover in detail here all of the insights and 
hypotheses that have come from these studies. Thus, only an 
overview is presented of what currently seems to be the necessary 
aspects of an intelligent and creative design process. The overview 
consists of insights gained both from theoretical work that applies 
information-processing theories of problem-solving to the task of 
design and from empirical studies of collected protocols of intuitive 
design. 
PROBLEM SPECIFICATION 
Upon receiving a design problem, a designer must interpret it 
according to available information. The relevant information may 
be available in his own memory and/or from external sources. 
In memory, the general class of problems being considered seems 
to have associated with it a wide variety of information that has 
been relevant in the past. A set of physical elements that are the 
intrinsic components of the thing being designed is one kind of 
information associated with most problem classes. In architecture, 
these may include room types, attributes of those rooms, mechan­
ical, structural site, and all the other .types of physical elements 
normally available for consideration. In the Carnegie-Mellon 
University studies these components have been called Design Units 
(DUs). Also associated with the problem class are a variety of 
constraints and goals that usually seem to be necessary for the 
successful performance of the class of element being designed. 
Some of this information is directly associated with the problem 
class and is immediately retrieved. It is directly available to 
consciousness once the problem has been described. But other 
information is only indirectly associated and may require extensive 
processing before it can be accessed. 
This general view of human memory is based on assumptions 
that information is both directly stored and regenerated from its 
elements. Its specific form is only a secondary issue. But to en­
able regeneration or retrieval from memory, cues must be provided 
that distinguish the desired information from all other that is 
potentially available or is to be uniquely regenerated. These cues 
seem to be associative in nature. That is, if the name of an object 
is provided, we can directly retrieve its attributes and function. 
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Conversely, if a list of attributes or functions are available, we may 
be able to directly retrieve the object. Information is stored 
according to content relationships. Associations relate verbal, 
visual, tactual, and all other kinds of information [see 13, 32]. 
Retrieval does not take place entirely at the outset of the prob­
lem. The initial problem inputs simply do not offer enough of the 
necessary access cues to distinguish all the information required 
to completely define the problem space. Instead, the designer 
utilizes the information immediately retrievable to begin searching 
his incomplete problem space. That is, he generates and evaluates 
possible solutions or aspects of solutions. In doing so, he generates 
new arrangement and spatial information that can be used as cues 
for new accesses to memory. These new cues allow further in­
formation to be retrieved about the problem. Designers are found 
to cycle between retrieval and search processes. The inference-
making capabilities of this dual strategy seem extremely powerful. 
The detail strategies that are applied to identify when search or 
retrieval is appropriate have not yet been studied. The details of 
the control process directing this cycling may eventually explain 
many of the strengths and the weakness of human design capabil­
ities [17]. 
REPRESENTATIONS IN DESIGN 
Evidence suggests that man, like other information processors, 
is limited by the processing languages he has available. Each 
language extends his processing capabilities to new types of in­
formation and transformations. Thus, mathematics allows process­
ing and information generation that is not possible without it. 
Orthographic projection allows spatial relations to be considered in 
more detail than would be possible otherwise [see 6]. 
In order to gain significant implications from or to integrate 
diverse information, it must be put into a form allowing processing. 
The processing languages that designers have been found to rely on 
include orthographic projection, algebra and calculus, and syllogis­
tic logic. Processing sequentially takes place in these and other 
representations in order to deal with the diverse information re­
trieved. For example, a mathematical representation may be used 
to carry out structural analysis, a non-directed graph used to 
analyze circulation layouts, perspectives used for spatial massing, 
and vertical and horizontal sections used for acoustic considera­
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tions. The implications derived from one representation are trans­
lated into another for further processing. 
HIERARCHICAL DECOMPOSITION OF DESIGN PROBLEMS 
Within this sequential use of different representations, a general 
direction of development is also evident. Scale grows smaller, 
detail greater. Initially, only large aggregations of DUs are 
manipulated and only major constraints are applied to the informa­
tion states that are generated. Later, these are subdivided into 
more detailed DUs. For instance, an office building may be initially 
considered with its mechanical tower as a single entity. Later, the 
elements of the tower are identified, e.g., stairs, elevators, rest-
rooms, and so on, and each given general dimensions. Later, each 
of these components is fully developed. At each change of detail, 
the representation may change. As detail changes, constraints and 
goals are also redefined in more detailed form. 
Thus a total design problem, with its many thousands of detailed 
DUs, is hardly ever processed as a single problem. Rather, it is 
broken down into subproblems that can be independently treated. 
Each subproblem is first considered in isolation, then later inte­
grated with other subproblems. Successful integration of sub­
problems usually requires some of them to be iteratively solved. 
Minsky in his review of artificial intelligence [27] pointed out 
the value of subdividing any large search problem into multiple 
subproblems. If a problem requires the selection of ten elements, 
where each element has ten possible alternatives and constraints 
delimit the acceptable combinations to only one, the number of 
possible combinations of elements is 1O10. This is the size of the 
problem space that must be searched. But if this problem is sub­
divided into only two subproblems of equal size (each with five 
elements), then the size of each subproblem space is only 510 or 
about 107. Two subproblems thus involve only 2 by 10:, a 1,500­
fold decrease over the original problem size. The saving is gained 
from the assumption that each subproblem is independent. But 
even if complete independence does not exist, iterations of the 
subproblems are practical. In fact, anything less than 1,500 iter­
ations is still a saving. Each subproblem is defined by its own 
elements and problem space, and its own subgoals. 
Alexander has criticized the assumptions designers make as to 
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what are relevant subproblems in the design of a complex system 
[1]. He argues that reliance on traditional problem subdivisions 
eliminates from the solution space many valuable alternatives that 
are worthy of exploration. Evidence from our studies suggests that 
the different subproblems utilized by a designer are in large part 
determined circumstantially by what has been retrieved from 
memory. It also seems true that the style of many designers is an 
outgrowth of the subproblems they identify and the sequence in 
which they are processed. Thus, if a structural module is chosen 
as a subproblem for early resolution, its influence in the final result 
often is readily perceived. If patterns of activities are abstractly 
considered early in the process and fairly directly translated into 
a solution, then this too has a direct stylistic result. 
SEARCH 
The processing strategies applied to generate new information 
states in any problem-solving representation have been found to 
be essentially similar [30]. Detailing of these strategies as they 
are used in design is only beginning to be explored. One simple 
strategy that has been expressed in design protocols is shown in 
Figure 4. It consists of a depth-first exhaustive search and utilizes 
stacked DUs and operators. That is, DUs and operators are 
sequenced in successful operations in one direction. When failures 
are encouraged, backtracking takes the opposite sequence. This 
strategy has been given the name generate-and-test. 
Another strategy used by designers is heuristic search. It is best 
understood, in terms of its application to design, by following 
through the process shown in the schematic flow chart of Figure 5. 
As applied to a space planning, the basic operation in heuristic 
search is the application of a DU and an operator to an existing 
problem state. That is, a DU is selected and an operator is chosen 
to locate it or move it. If the location chosen by the operator can 
hold the DU, it is tested in that location against the relevant prob­
lem constraints. If it does not satisfy the constraints, then the 
failure is evaluated. If any information is available that outlines 
a course of action that often works in the existing "failed" situa­
tion, it is utilized to determine another location or to select another 
DU; otherwise, a more general selection procedure is used to select 
another location. If no location for a particular DU is currently 
BEGIN

ANY MORE

CONSTRAINTS TO

IDENTIFY?
YES 
IDENTIFY NEXT SET OF

CONSTRAINTS.

\i 
SET MANIPULATIONS TO 1 
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NO 
\l 
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\l 
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NO 
CAN CURRENT YES MANIPULATION
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NO 
\l 
ANY MORE 
MANIPULATIONS? 
YES 
REPLACE

CURRENT MANIPULATION

BY NEXT ONE

\l 
APPLY MANIPULATION 
NO 
YES 
NO 
SOLUTION 
LOCATE M +  l DU NEXT

TO EXISTING. STORE

CURRENT MANIPULATOR.

YES 
NO ANY MORE DUS?

REPLACE MANIPULATOR

WITH ONE STORED

WITH M-l DU

REMOVE MTH DU

YES

IS THERE AN M-l DU? )

NO

CANT SOLVE PROBLEM' 
Fig. 4. Flow chart of heuristic search procedure. 
/ set of \ / set of failure 
\operations/ \ DUs 
/ set of \ 
- *  * select _-_ all b \ heuristies / 
bn tried? 
•t 
_ all d _ +
 UiS 
*=— K . .--*-match?tried? 
_t 
apply • located -^>test —^complete? ^-^solution 
/ set of \ 
GIVEN: \ constraints / 
(a) a space 
[bu b2, bn) -> a set of DUs to locate in that space 
(ci, c2, cn) —» a set of constraint delimiting acceptable solu­
tion, plus possibly evaluation functions to be 
optimized 
(d1f d2,_dn) -> a set of operators for manipulating DUs within 
the space 
(er) the current design state 
FIND: 
a set of operators of the form

(er, bn,dp)-»er + 1

that will generate a state es such that it fulfills

(ci,c2, cn) .

Fig. 5. A heuristic search formulation of the space-planning problem. 
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possible, then a backup procedure selects another DU to be re­
located to make enough room. When one DU is satisfactorily 
located, another is selected and the process repeated. 
Various analyses are used to select DUs for processing. For 
instance, one commonly found rule is that the DU having the most 
constraints or goals attached between it and those already arranged 
should be located next. Size also may be considered a constraint 
and may be one parameter of a polynomial used in selecting the 
next DU. Details of selection procedures vary greatly between in­
dividual designers. They vary from simple stacks to complex 
polynomials and sequential decision processes. Detail examination 
of three search strategies used in design is made elsewhere [19]. 
Many other details certainly exist in the processes humans use 
to "creatively" solve design problems. It may be possible that a 
few individuals have evolved design processes significantly different 
from those described here. If so, it is expected that future studies 
will enable us to identify them. From our studies thus far, indi­
vidual differences have been shown to come not from different 
processes than those we have described but from variations in the 
details of the processes of information retrieval, search, and prob­
lem decomposition. Design processes seem to be specifiable in 
these terms. 
Progress in Automated Design 
The previous discussion has considered what is now known 
about the structure and content of problem-solving processes in 
design. Let us now turn to a short review of current capabilities 
in modeling aspects of design problem-solving on a computer. 
SPACEPLANNING REPRESENTATIONS 
Any extensive application of computers to augment design re­
quires machine data structures that are operationally isomorphic 
with the natural problem-solving languages used in design. Per­
spectives, syllogistic logic, plans, elevations and sections, and 
mathematics all seem needed. Many of these capabilities already 
are available, but significantly lacking currently are computer 
languages capable of handling space planning. By a space-planning 
language is meant all forms of orthographic projection, of which 
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plans, sections, and elevations are examples. To the outsider, it 
would seem that the existence of computer graphics and the ability 
to draw figures on a compueter-driven "scope" would be sufficient 
for handling space-planning tasks. But the lack is not one of hard­
ware—the apropriate computer machinery—but software. Current 
computer graphic languages generally have been found deficient 
for handling space planning in at least three ways: 
1.	 Only objects are represented in the data structure; the 
voids between objects are not. Determining if enough 
empty space exists to hold a new object now requires that 
the total representation be processed in order to compute 
the size of an empty space. Major processing inefficiencies 
are the result. 
2.	 Each element in the data structure is ordered according 
to a programmer-defined topological relation. This h 
needed for analyzing circuits and other kinds of flow. Yet 
needed for space planning is an ordering by spatial 
adjacency. Only this allows the dimensions of adjacent 
spatial domains to be directly processed for determination 
of distances. Otherwise, complex analyses are required. 
3.	 In existing computer graphics, the boundaries of each filled 
space are now defined by a closed set of line segments. In 
order to check for overlaps of domains, intersections be­
tween all line combinations must be searched for. This is 
an expensive operation for one that will be used often. 
Other methods for checking line overlaps need to be 
developed [see 18]. 
Though computer graphics do not facilitate space planning, other 
representations do. The simplest representation useful for space 
planning, and the only one used to any extent currently, is the 
array (Fig. 6). Essentially, space in this representation is sub­
divided into a grid. The state of each domain in the grid is defined 
by the value of the corresponding array variable. The location of 
any domain is identified by its subscripted variable. Adjacent 
domains are identified through the sequential numbering of the 
subscripts. Empty space and filled space are both represented. 
Several significant space-planning programs have been written that 
utilize arrays for representing space [5, 24]. 
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Array representations of space are simple to use and are easily 
implemented in general-purpose programming languages. But they 
make highly inefficient use of computer memory and processing 
times if details must be represented. Big, homogeneous spaces 
consume as much memory as intricate details. 
Alternative representations have been developed that resolve 
many of the problems inherent in the array. Two of them are 
shown in Figures 7 and 8. The first representation is used by the 
Stanford Research Institute to model space in their robot project 
[31, 34]. It consists of a modified array that begins with a space 
being subdivided into four equally sized domains. If there are 
details in a domain, it is subdivided into four more equivalent 
domains. Subdividing can be applied recursively until the desired 
detail is achieved. In this way large homogeneous spaces are 
represented by large domains, details by small domains. 
HIERARCHICAL ARRAY 
six inch minimum grid 
411 domains 
maximum error = 8.5 inches 
Fig. 7. Domain representation of spaces. 
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Fig. 8. Row-domain representation of spaces. 
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Figure 8 shows an alternative way of subdividing space. It 
groups space into horizontal rows, scanning a figure horizontally 
much like a television camera. Similar types of spaces within a 
horizontal scan are grouped into single domains, then all like rows 
are grouped. This representation allows more detail to be expressed 
in less memory than any other representation yet conceived. It has 
been implemented in the SNOBOL 4 programming language [23] 
and used by the author for limited exploration of various search 
strategies. Operating on this representation is more complex than 
the others. Scanning a wall horizontally requires a different 
operation than scanning one vertically. The resulting complexity 
of processing negates some of its other efficiencies. 
Several other representations have been implemented that 
successfully allow space planning. Like those above, they all only 
approximate irregular shapes [see 18]. Work is now proceeding at 
Carnegie-Mellon University on the programming of a representa­
tion that should accurately represent any regular geometric shape. 
Thus radii and skewed figures should be accurately handled. The 
cost of gaining this extra detail seems to be a highly complex 
representation and large memory requirements. 
All of the representations described here allow object manipula­
tion, easy checking of overlaps, and easy calculation of the distance 
between objects. Each also allows the appending of other non-
spatial and attribute information to any of the represented ob­
jects. Thus, they should prove useful for many space-planning 
applications. 
The space-planning representations described above allow 
evaluation of specific arrangements in as much detail as desired. 
But protocols show that more general representations are used in 
the early stages of design to explore the feasibility of different 
general classes of arrangements. These representations have tra­
ditionally been called schematics, pattern studies, or "bubble di­
agrams." A significant study now being completed by Grason 
formalizes a set of general goals often considered in schematics. 
Grason used a dual graph representation and theorems from graph 
theory to determine the realizability of adjacency and access rela­
tions prior to committing any parts of the design to actual loca­
tions. This appears to be the first time that theorem-proving 
techniques have been used to abstractly evaluate spatial con­
straints [see 21]. 
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SEARCH 
Only simple search strategies for space planning have thus far 
been explored in implemented programs. An algorithm for generat­
ing a spatial arrangement using the degree of interaction between 
elements as the major evaluation criterion has been programmed; 
it employs the array of circulation costs between spaces using the 
given exterior bounds and planarity as constraints [5]. It also uses 
the array. Only one known operational program includes a gen­
eralized search strategy and can incorporate any kind of spatial 
constraint [15]. It utilizes the generate-and-test search strategy 
shown in Figure 5, an array representation, and was programmed 
in ALGOL on Carnegie-Mellon's G-20 computer. It showed itself 
capable of space planning and solved simple arrangement problems. 
But its exhaustive search approach made it too slow for all but the 
simplest of practical problems. It was several times slower than 
a human being. 
Two projects are now underway at CMU that will explore more 
complex search techniques. One is an implementation of the 
heuristic search process shown in Figure 6. The inclusion of de­
composition procedures are planned for both studies. 
If an automated design system is to allocate its processing capa­
bilities to subproblems at different levels within a hierarchical 
decomposition, then a control procedure must be available to de­
termine when search should proceed with the current subproblem 
and when other subproblems at other levels in the hierarchy should 
be reexamined. The issue is an important one, affecting both the 
style and quality of the solution and the efficiency of search. 
Manheim [25] has proposed and programmed one method of 
sequencing search among alternative subproblems. His method is 
based on an evaluation of the likelihood of each course of action 
achieving different values of the problem's evaluation criterion and 
is applied to a transportation example. Though his program has 
the weakness of requiring the designer to manually input a set of 
probabilities for each alternative solution, it is an important first 
exploration of the control structure of a hierarchical automated 
design system. 
It is too early to tell how elaborate search procedures must be 
before they begin to compete with humans in finding satisfactory 
design solutions. In search, efficiency is clearly the major problem. 
Only by continuing to hypothesize and experiment, both with de­
signers and computers, will we be able to eventually identify the 
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search processes necessary to efficiently solve complex design 
problems. 
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS 
All the space-planning programs written thus far take as input 
a well-specified set of conjunctive DUs (some subsets may be dis­
junctive) and a set of constraints and attempt to find an arrange­
ment of those DUs that satisfies the constraints. A large data set 
is required to set up any problem. But it is our interest eventually 
to write programs that take as input not a well-defined problem 
specification but only a crude statement of a problem class with a 
short list of special considerations. We wish to implement programs 
that take as input the information usually given to a human 
designer. Such a program would include a large information 
retrieval system that would retrieve a set of means to deal with a 
specific example of a problem class through logical inferences made 
on a large store of information. The search program would explore 
the feasibility of different possible elements and constraints gen­
erated by the information retrieval system. 
Significant efforts are now under way at several institutions to 
develop large associatively structured memories that allow general 
information to be stored and retrieved. For instance, Quillian has 
programmed a semantic memory allowing derivation of the con­
textual meaning of most words or sentences [32]. Another effort 
is being undertaken by Greane and Rafael at Stanford Research 
Institute [22]. Their program aims at storing any kind of rela­
tional or attribute information and allowing retrieval of all 
significant inferences. Other significant efforts are underway at 
Stanford University [7, 11]. 
These efforts in large-store associative memories begin to model 
human long-term memory. They set the groundwork for future 
attempts to tie an information retrieval system to a search system 
for use in design. Those interested in an important first effort at 
making this union should refer to a paper by Moran [28]. 
PROBLEM SPECIFICATION 
An important effort obviously needed to realize automated 
design is the explication of constraints and objectives for different 
classes of design problems. Given the most sophisticated of 
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processes, a design solution is still only as good as the content of 
the problem specification. The information to be stored in an 
associative memory and retrieved for different problem classes must 
be identified. The specific criteria that allow satisfaction of general 
cost and performance criteria must be determined. 
Alexander and his group at Berkeley have initiated an important 
set of studies that attempt to explicate and validate the criteria 
that should be satisfied in solving different classes of design prob­
lems [1, 35]. These represent an important improvement of the 
more traditional building type studies published by F. W. Dodge 
and Rheinhold. Expansion of this sort of effort is a necessity if 
design is to become more objective, whether it is carried out by 
man or machines. 
REMAINING AUTOMATED DESIGN STUDIES 
Four different aspects of a theory of design have been reviewed: 
representations, search, hierarchical decomposition, and informa­
tion retrieval. The current state of design research in each has been 
outlined. But many other issues wait to be studied; a few are: 
1.	 The system integration of search and information retrieval 
processes is required so that both gain inputs from each 
other. The significance of a dual process has been expli­
cated in our protocols. But we know little of how they 
work or the control mechanism that directs them together. 
2.	 Space-planning search processes must be integrated 
eventually with more complex evaluations such as discrete 
flow simulations or total-heat-gain analyses. Current 
evaluation criteria are simplistic approximations of these 
kinds of evaluations. The value of automated design 
should be in facilitating these kinds of complex analyses. 
3.	 The extension must be made of machine representations 
to other domains, such as color, texture, and light reflec-. 
tance. The sophistication of automated design will depend 
on our ability to include these kinds of considerations and 
to generate and evaluate combinations of these attributes. 
Herbert Simon, in a more general review of design methodology, 
adds to this list several more significant theoretical issues that are 
basic to a science of design [36]. 
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The Future of Automated Design 
In a more speculative vein, this review can be completed by sug­
gesting where these current efforts may lead. If the processes now 
being studied are sufficient to allow reasonably economical genera­
tion of competent design solutions, then the future holds the 
possibility that prototypical design problems may be more 
efficiently solved by a computer than by man. Also, control of the 
quality of the resulting design will be greater than in current 
manual processes. As a result, it may be that there will begin to 
appear automated design programs applied to at least two areas of 
building design. The first is in those well-defined aspects of design 
problems where major innovation is not usually demanded. Many 
aspects of building design are currently solved routinely. They 
include mechanical systems, power distribution systems, restrooms, 
fire stairways, mechanical cores, and often structural systems. If 
prefabricated home-building ever catches on, it might be expected 
that computer-generated custom design of housing would provide 
a middle ground between monotonous tracts and the exorbitance 
of a handcraft building and design process. 
The second application of automated design is likely to be in 
those areas of space planning where functional performance is 
critical. Most architects already rely on research studies and proto­
typical solutions to design radiology and other kinds of laboratories 
and operating and intensive care suites in hospitals. In the future, 
instead of providing a set of design standards for these types of 
facilities, governmental agencies could provide computer programs 
that will design alternative solutions for these aspects of facilities. 
The solutions generated will fit within the space and material con­
straints imposed by the designer, but will always produce arrange­
ments that provide the required performance. 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER IN THE DESIGN PROFESSIONS 
Automated design is fundamentally different from traditional 
design in at least one respect. The traditional mode of design is 
intuitive. Each person who designs learns primarily from his own 
experience. Whether it is from case studies in school or professional 
experience, most insight in design is currently gained from direct 
contact with problems. The implication is that the knowledge that 
others have gained is largely untransferable. Each generation must 
first gain for itself what the previous one knew about design, then 
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possibly take a small forward step. Obviously, within this process 
of knowledge transmission the potential for growth is weak. 
Science currently offers one method for more productively trans­
ferring knowledge. By making ideas explicit, they are not only 
available for testing and refinement but also for direct transmission 
throughout the world. Today, a person can pick up a book and 
come to understand ideas that scientists in the past may have spent 
their whole lives developing. 
But the recorded word has until recently limited science to ex­
plicating information content. The explicating of process was 
limited to a few branches of mathematics. With the advent of the 
computer, processes too are explicated. Thus, not only the content 
of thought—a particular information state—but also the process 
of generation can be recorded and disseminated. 
This new situation offers a whole new mode of knowledge trans­
mission. By explicating the experience of a problem-solver in the 
form of a computer program that models his own capabilities, both 
the unique content and the power of his processes are available for 
correction and improvement by others. The knowledge of one de­
signer is also directly available to another. Furthermore, that 
knowledge is in a form allowing it to be utilized anywhere, solving 
problems on any computer on which it is run. Thus, the expertise 
of one problem-solver is multiplied as required. 
If current assumptions concerning the practicality and feasibil­
ity of automated design are valid, then at some time in the future, 
one would expect designers not to compete at all with the com­
petency of a computer. An automated design program will in­
corporate the combined expertise of hundreds of individuals and 
will surpass human design in all respects except idiosyncrasy. Once 
a program is completed, its use will be available anywhere it is de­
sired. Designers may still be concerned with nonprototypical de­
sign problems, but these will become increasingly rare as the com­
petence of automated design systems develops. 
At this point, the role of design becomes totally innovative. A 
designer's contribution is the improvement in a search strategy, in 
generating new constraints or goals to be applied to design prob­
lems, or a new retrieval technique. These are what produce real in­
novation even today. As innovations are made, they will be pro­
grammed so that all of society may benefit. If this is possible, it 
certainly is the maximum of knowledge amplification. Optimis­
tically, it is within the potential of automated design. 
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F/orenc/o G. Asenjo 
THE GENERATION OF FORM 
BY GEOMETRIC METHODS 
Mathematics is the great systematizer. It is the language of physics 
—the most scientific of sciences—and the primary model for exact 
thinking. For this very reason artists often shun it in their formal 
equipment, art theoretically being the realm of vague boundaries, 
deliberate imprecision, and whim. But since mathematics and art 
are both human creations, it is inevitable that they should reflect 
aspects of that same reality from which they each evolve. Indeed, 
even abstract mathematics and abstract art share a common wealth 
of perceptions, conceptualizations, and imagery that spring from 
the same sources; therefore, there is much in mathematics that the 
artist can use. Mathematics can help him to differentiate confused 
categories, to articulate vague ideas about form, to recombine and 
create from newly gained points of view. With this theme as the 
dominant note, this paper will consider three contrasting families 
of geometric ideas and outline their aesthetic applications, keep­
ing design especially in mind. These three families—symmetry, 
polarity, and association—are essential for any systematic analysis 
of form, whatever its domain. Each of the three adds an entirely 
new look—really a new dimension—to the others, and a judicious 
and controlled use of the three together can often determine the 
principal formal features of an artistic style. However, although 
the subjects selected are fundamental ones, they by no means ex­
haust the treasury of concepts that mathematics holds in store for 
the artist in search of new solutions to the eternal problems of 
aesthetic composition. 
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Symmetry 
When people speak of symmetry, they usually have bilateral 
symmetry in mind; that is, the kind of symmetry produced by 
mirror reflection in which the mirror surface lies at the halfway 
point between an object and its reflection. In early Greek archi­
tecture, for example, bilateral symmetry ruled supreme, and a 
facade with a left half that was not the exact mirror image of the 
right half would have been considered a wanton artistic sin. Bi­
lateral symmetry has provided artists of all periods with an especial 
sense of satisfaction, judging from its extensive use throughout the 
history of art. A typical sonata movement begins with a theme, A, 
continues with a second theme, B, and an elaboration of both, and 
ends with a repetition of A. When theme A is repeated, it is, of 
course, not a mirror image of its first presentation; however, the 
over-all ABA form of the sonata has bilateral symmetry. The 
fugue, although it lacks bilateral symmetry as a whole, often con­
tains themes reflected both vertically or horizontally—that is, 
either with respect to a given pitch or a given instant. Nature, too, 
seems to revel in bilateral symmetry. Man's body shows this, as do 
the bodies of most living creatures, which explains why bilateral 
symmetry appears in art forms as far back as prehistoric times. 
Although symmetry is in itself static, nevertheless it appears in 
dynamic situations, i.e., situations in which some distribution of 
forces is involved; electric charges are positive or negative, mag­
netic forces are directed to either north or south, and recent re­
search supports the existence of matter and antimatter. Some laws 
of atomic physics rely heavily on bilateral symmetry, and we find 
it again in chromosomes and spermatozoa. Clearly, the contrast of 
left and right pervades both nature and art. 
But bilateral symmetry is only one of the forms of mathematical 
symmetry, a fact not generally known by nonspecialists. Transla­
tion along a straight line—either in space or in time—and rotation 
around a fixed point generate translatory and rotational types of 
symmetry. An ornamental band, a line of equidistant columns, or 
any pattern in which the same figure is repeated side by side one-
dimensionally an indefinite number of times are examples of trans­
latory symmetry. Rotational symmetry, in turn, is the symmetry 
of a cell, a dome, a column, an octopus. Whereas bilateral and ro­
tational symmetries are both finite in the sense that they achieve 
completion in a limited portion of either space or time, translatory 
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symmetry is infinitistic in principle. An ornamental band and a 
line of columns are physically limited but suggest an unlimited 
continuation. On the other hand, since a circle can be divided 
variously into several equal parts, each possible division generates 
a different kind of rotational symmetry—pentagonal, hexagonal, 
and so on. 
Some figures possess more than one kind of symmetry. A daisy 
possesses it both bilaterally and rotationally. A leaf with bilateral 
symmetry can be translated indefinitely along a frieze. A band 
of stars displays in one single example all three of the symmetries 
referred to so far. But these combinations of symmetries can be 
produced in a more intimately related fashion. Consider a point in 
a plane that keeps translating away from a fixed point and rotating 
around it simultaneously. The composition of these two move­
ments generates a spiral, a centrifugal infinitistic figure whose oc­
currence in nature is fairly widespread; snails and nebulae are 
spiral-shaped, for example. Then think of a helix, the result of 
rotation and translation on the surface of a cylinder; this is ex­
emplified in architecture by the circular staircase. A well-known 
staircase of this type is in the Vatican Museum and is presumably 
the one from which Frank Lloyd Wright got his idea for the central 
ramp in the Guggenheim Museum, another famous example of a 
helix. 
Two- or three-dimensional translatory patterns open new sym­
metric possibilities. Consider a honeycomb, in which a rotational 
figure, a hexagon, is translated horizontally and vertically. Con­
sider, too, the modern prismatic buildings—those crystal, three-
dimensional rectangular honeycombs. Le Corbusier maintained 
that the rectangular prism is architecturally superior to the pyra­
midal model in vogue in the nineteen twenties—the Empire State 
Building, the Chrysler Building, and such. In this preference Le 
Corbusier was yielding to the pleasures of regularity and uninter­
rupted symmetry rather than exposing himself to the uneasiness 
and uncertainties of improvisation. However, it is improvisation 
added to symmetry that creates one of the greatest charms of 
Romanesque architecture. Remember all the capricious little fig*­
ures, never repeated, carved on the capitals and friezes of Roman­
esque churches, figures that mock at the rigorous symmetry of the 
buildings, providing a departure from strict order that in the end 
emphasizes that order through delightful contrast. 
Two- and three-dimensional translatory symmetries are also de­
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cidedly infinitistic, which is perhaps why they did not appeal to the 
ancient Greeks, overwhelmingly finitistic in their conception of the 
world. Not so other civilizations. When one visits the mosque in 
Cordoba, Spain, one cannot avoid a dizzy feeling of infinity while 
standing in the midst of that symmetrical sea of columns and arches 
that spreads in every direction as far as the eye can reach. A 
similar impression comes from the highly refined patterns on the 
walls and ceilings of the Alhambra in Granada, patterns that ex­
tend in seemingly endless succession from room to room. 
An ornamental pattern that is generated by translation of a given 
figure along two dimensions is in mathematics sometimes called a 
lattice. Lattices belong predominantly to the plastic arts, having 
little to do with literature and music. When the idea of a lattice is 
transferred to three dimensions (as in the example of the prismatic 
buildings mentioned earlier), we enter into an entirely new cat­
egory of psychological effects. Crystals, molecular structures, the 
stairs of a pyramid, all show that although from the standpoint of 
mathematics the addition of one dimension does not generally 
change the structure, this is not entirely the case in the eyes of the 
beholder. In general, two-dimensional forms seem lifeless, so that 
a painting's effectiveness depends on the illusion of three-dimen­
sionality it can create, a fact that even the abstractionist Piet Mon­
drian knew very well. But then, the space in which the human 
body grows, moves, and feels is three-dimensional, the reason that 
an artist strives for three-dimensional effects to gain impact. 
Identifying the above symmetries opens the door to new sys­
tematic combinations of them; through these, discovery becomes 
the by-product of careful planning rather than the result of an 
accident. All the kinds of symmetry discussed are variations of a 
single algebraic idea, the concept of group. With this mathematical 
concept one can see that these symmetries belong together in a 
single form-generating category despite their disparate superficial 
appearance. 
Polarity 
Theoretically, pure symmetry has no connection with force; 
therefore, in order to bring in the idea of force, we shall use the 
word "polarity" as a comprehensive term to cover all the phenom­
ena of attraction or repulsion of entities. These phenomena occur 
both in art and nature, and have their mathematical expression 
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in the ideas of vector, vector space, and field of forces. We have 
already mentioned the polarity of electric charges. Other examples 
of polarity are the contrast between masculine and feminine or be­
tween a tall building and a flat one. These last two use gravita­
tional forces differently, one defying them and the other completely 
yielding. The dynamically neutral distinction between left and 
right easily acquires polar connotations by making a few additions 
Fig. 1. Here, literally, is a face with two looks. Notice the intense and 
dizzying effect produced by a concentration of polarity; then make a mental 
comparison with the expressionless face of a blind man. 
—stained glass and gargoyles to a Gothic cathedral, a Calder-type 
mobile to the center ceiling of a perfectly regular hall. Clearly, it is 
not difficult to add polarity to a static structure. 
A vector is a directed magnitude representing the intensity and 
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direction of a local attraction or repulsion. The vector assigned to 
a point in a given space indicates the polar effect of all the attrac­
tions and repulsions to which the neighborhood of that point is sub­
jected. Each vector measures the potential change of position of a 
reacting entity when placed at that point. The factors that make 
an entity susceptible are, of course, the nature of the entity and the 
field of forces in which it is imbedded; an electrically charged body 
responds to an electric field, a piece of iron is susceptible to a mag­
netic field, a heavy mass is affected by the gravitational field, and a 
man and woman are susceptible to the biologically charged field of 
human society. 
In the arts, including literature and music, the importance of 
polarity cannot be exaggerated. For example, when we talk about 
the "central" character of a drama, we are actually referring to a 
vector characteristic, as is the case when we speak of the "pene­
trating" look of a portrait or when we describe dissonance in music 
as "hurting." In all these cases the polarity of the work awakens a 
dynamic subjective response through a process of induced reso­
nance. From this subjective viewpoint polarity originates in any­
thing capable of moving us, be it toward or away from the object 
in question, i.e., by appeal or aversion. Obviously, romantic art 
leans heavily on polarity, whereas classic art depends more on 
symmetry. 
The concept of vector space as an abstract representation of an 
aesthetic field of forces can help the artist, writer, or composer to 
gain awareness of the relative strength of relationships between 
the parts of an artistic whole, relationships that he senses but of 
which he may not be fully conscious except in their local effects. 
But it is characteristic of a field of forces that every entity in the 
field has an ubiquitous influence, its presence being felt throughout 
the entire field. These distant influences are sometimes fatal to an 
artistic intention, but they can be either subdued or put to good 
use as long as their existence is known. The difficulty here is a 
little like the one of becoming aware of the air we breathe. The 
artist, then, would do well to systematically analyze with some 
kind of vector representation each of the many attractions and 
repulsions that woven together constitute the dynamic structure of 
his work. Undoubtedly the artist already does this in an incom­
plete and often subconscious way; by making the operation explicit, 
all of the poles or centers of a work are exposed. These poles may 
be of two kinds: (1) they may function as sources for the field of 
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forces, spreading outgoing influence and causing various local at­
tractions and repulsions to take place in near or even remote neigh­
borhoods; or (2) they may function as "sinks" (a nonpejorative 
expression), that is, as centers of ingoing polarities whose tendency 
is to dominate the field and simplify its polar structure to the low­
est possible level of complexity. A hen that moves about sur­
rounded by her chicks presents a quasi-stationary situation in 
which the hen is the source of polarity. A big fish that swallows the 
little ones keeps restoring balance by a steady elimination of com­
petitive forces: it is a sink. The structure of T. S. Eliot's Family 
Reunion is based essentially on the second kind of polarization. 
The central character of the play is so dominant that the rest of 
the cast remains in shadow despite the author's valiant attempts 
to bring them out. But at the same time the central character is 
also submerged in a polar situation exclusively his own, for he can­
not resist the attraction of an enigma that fascinates him. The 
articulation of these two systems of forces is the polar backbone of 
Eliot's drama, and when the enigma is solved and the attraction 
turns into repulsion, the character escapes and the play ends with 
dissolution of the vector structure that sustained it. This net of 
forces is behind the dramatic significance of every situation in the 
play, giving tension and direction to each of them. 
Poles are not necessarily obvious in a work, and there can even 
be fields of force whose poles are entirely external: these are the 
so-called solenoidal fields. For example, a painting depicting a 
prayer has its center literally removed to infinity, although the 
painting still may contain several additional sources or sinks. In 
a Greek tragedy fate is always a major force, everywhere and yet 
nowhere—precisely as in a solenoidal field—so that the general 
effect is one of an invisible deus ex machina, a puppeteer who leads 
men to their destruction regardless of the strength of their char­
acter and the nature of their conflicts. Further, it is possible to have 
a vector composition resolved locally into an irreducible rotating 
pair of forces whose effect is that of a whirling center. There are, 
then, (1) spaces of rest; (2) spaces of pure translation (not in the 
sense of symmetry, of course, but in the sense of actual or potential 
motion); (3) spaces of pure rotation (Rodin's "The Kiss," Rubens' 
"The Abduction of the Sabines"); and (4) combinations of them 
all. (Applications of polarity to musical aesthetics, in particular, 
have been discussed separately in the article "Polarity and Atonal-
ism" listed in the bibliography.) 
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Association 
The word "association" refers to the coordinated relationships of 
the parts in a whole, its unity. Often a work is criticized because 
it is disconnected, because it lacks unity, because it is fragmentary 
and without strong associative ties. This idea of association is by 
far the most basic of the three we are discussing. It is useful to re­
member, then, that in topology connection and inclusion are two 
of the discipline's most fundamental ideas. 
In a topological space one is not concerned with distances, areas, 
volumes, angles, or any other metric properties, but rather with the 
relationships of inclusion, overlapping, and disconnection between 
regions. A region is any set of points in a space such that any two 
of the points can be connected by a continuous curve without in­
tersections that is totally contained within the region (Fig. 2a). 
Another important idea in topology is the order of connection. A 
region may have other regions within it whose points do not belong 
to the first one; regions, one may say, with "holes," the number of 
which plus one, by definition, is the order of connection of the 
region. Thus, whereas the area in Figure 2a is simply connected, 
the one in Figure 2b is doubly connected. In the region in Figure 
2b it is impossible to take the two marked lines that connect two 
points and make them coincide through a process of continuous de­
formation without moving out of the shaded area. A doughnut and 
a ring are doubly connected three-dimensional regions. In these 
and similar cases it is important to emphasize that from the view­
point of topology the shape of the region is irrelevant, so that fig­
ures of the most disparate outside appearance can be considered 
topologically identical if it is possible to shape one into coincidence 
with the other through a continuous transformation in which no 
tearings or penetrations take place, a transformation that preserves 
the order of connection as well as the relationships of inclusion or 
exclusion between corresponding regions of the figures. 
There is still another topological distinction that we must men­
tion, the one between limited and unlimited regions. The whole 
of a three-dimensional space is an unlimited region, but the inside 
of a ring is limited by the surface of the ring, which is the boundary 
of the region. If the boundaries of a limited region belong to the 
region, the region is called closed (otherwise, it would be called 
open). The interior of a region is what remains after having taken 
away its boundaries. 
Fig. 2. (a) Simply connected topological region, (b) Doubly connected 
topological region. 
Fig. 3. Although it does not seem so at first sight, this is a figure of Christ, 
centered and facing us. It is a notable example of the degree to which the 
perception of a topological asscciation necessarily precedes the understanding 
of a work. The figure helps us to become aware of the existence of two 
phases—the grouping of regions and the subsequent aesthetic appreciation— 
by interpolating a lapse between them. 
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In man's perception, life and art seem pervaded by countless 
topological associations and relationships of inclusion, overlapping, 
and disconnection, all of which we take for granted without much 
reflection. The story of a dream is a doubly connected aesthetic 
region because the dream is seen from the outside, that is, from 
the region of the awakened state. Without being aware of it, we 
perceive the presence of an ideal boundary between the regions of 
wakefulness and sleep. A painting of a landscape, although physi­
cally limited by its frame, is perceived as an unlimited, simply con­
nected region unless it also depicts a house, a mill, a castle—or 
several of them. To each different topological structure the mind 
reacts readily with a new subjective response, the perception of 
boundaries being a key factor in our conception and articulation of 
life and art. In this regard, plurally connected spaces have a quality 
of richness that derives from a singular feeling of novelty (and, in 
a sense, achievement) that comes from simply crossing a boundary 
and entering a new region—a new vantage point from which to 
view the world. 
The Arabian Nights is a single tale interrupted by innumerable 
subsidiary tales. Similarly, if we accept the current interpretation 
that Kafka's novels are not unfinished but purposely left with gaps 
in the middle to allow room for unlimited interpolations, then we 
have examples of regions whose order of connection is virtually in­
finite. In Kafka's novels a multitude of obstacles and boundaries 
are interposed between the chief character and his objective to give 
a feeling of unbounded frustration (in America, The Castle, and 
The Trial the protagonist is obsessively driven by some vital ob­
jective). In mathematics, the topological structure of Kafka's 
novels would be called a "nested sequence of intervals," and it is 
this formal characteristic that gives Kafka's style its peculiar qual­
ity, so apt for describing the nightmarish, anguished atmosphere of 
our increasingly bureaucratic environment. 
When dealing with a system of associations, one can always 
superimpose symmetries and polarities, which so increases the num­
ber of potential combinations that it becomes impossible to catalog 
them. It is the artist's creativity that must separate the various 
formal aspects of his art in order to choose fresh combinations of 
them from an entirely new viewpoint. This century has rejected 
the romantic prejudice that warned against the rational, and espe­
cially the mathematical, analysis of art because it would smother 
the irrational sources of inspiration. In spite of this rejection in 
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principle, not very much has been done toward a systematic appli­
cation of mathematical concepts to the formal analysis of aesthetic 
effects. Nevertheless, to close a region or to leave it open, to make 
a hole in it or not, to include A in B or to keep them separate, all 
these geometric decisions affect the impression that a work of art 
finally makes upon the mind. Artists would do well to glance at 
the catalog of topological configurations, not with mathematical 
detachment but with the eagerness prompted by their aesthetic 
appetites. Such a glance would reveal a reservoir of formal com­
binations awaiting the happy discoverer who has the knowledge to 
use them. This knowledge requires training oneself to see diversity 
in unity as well as unity in diversity—the first, in order to dis­
tinguish new categories from uniform phenomena (different kinds 
of symmetry, polarity, and association, for example); the second, 
to become aware of what is common to seemingly diverse entities 
(a man and a facade, wrestling and whirlpools, a cup and a ring). 
This twofold training would solve the riddle of apparently identical 
situations that produce diverse subjective reactions, as well as that 
of apparently diverse situations that strike us as similar. Such an 
approach is the road to understanding the formal origins of aes­
thetic effects. 
Final Remarks 
There are many other concepts that mathematics can lend to 
art to pave the way for new aesthetic combinations, among them 
threads, one-sided surfaces, and coloring maps, all topological topics 
of considerable interest to design. (Nowadays Mobius strips are 
seen in museums as pieces of abstract sculpture, and Henry Moore's 
style is certainly inspired by topological forms.) Also interesting 
for the arts is the study of pathological curves and surfaces, im­
portant in that they set new boundaries for intuitive concepts 
whose limits are usually taken for granted. There are curves 
(Peano) that can fill a plane—a one-dimensional line covering a 
two-dimensional space; continuous curves (Weierstrass) that have 
no tangent; curves (Sierpinski) that intersect themselves at each 
of their points, consisting therefore of points of intersection ex­
clusively, and so on. These examples are not offered merely as in­
teresting curiosities; they are geometric constructions full of heur­
istic value for an artistically receptive mind. 
Mathematics is precise and decisive, but reality seems intrinsic­
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ally unpredictable and confused—in man's view, at least. Perhaps 
it is impossible ever to completely develop the thesis outlined here, 
either because reality possesses totally amorphous streaks that no 
kind of systematization can shape or because reality's complexity 
is beyond our intellectual and sensory limitations. But in any case, 
no theoretical approach can be fully congruent with real events. 
Without question mathematics can indeed enlarge the artist's con­
ception, but art will always be unpredictable and blissfully confus­
ing, as proved beyond doubt by the enormous variety of aesthetic 
interpretations. This granted, the lesson to draw is not to indulge 
in any kind of free irrationalism, but rather to learn to be satisfied 
with limited growth in the articulation of reason and fact. Fortu­
nately, there will always be room for perfection, which will keep 
the way open for a limitless number of departures, variations, and 
artistic and intellectual adventures. This, indeed, is in the nature 
of life, and we must rejoice that it is so, for it is only thus that we 
escape the dullness of a world in which all events are deduced from 
premises. 
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DECISION-AID APPLICATIONS 

Thomas E. Hoover 
DECISION AIDS FOR THE 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF UNIVERSITY FACILITIES 
The decision-making process with respect to the development of 
university facilities is one that must consider a large number of de­
tailed and varying requirements in the formulation of priorities and 
alternative development strategies relative to satisfying an un­
certain future market for university services. It is a class of prob­
lem that seeks to relate and allocate limited capital funds to a 
large number of programs highly variable in their activities and 
space needs, in anticipation of funding and partly unknown future 
teaching and research activities. As such, it is not unlike the capi­
tal budgeting problem encountered by large industrial organiza­
tions and by government. 
Increasing demand for the services of higher education during 
the past two decades, manifesting itself in terms of increased stu­
dent enrollments as well as increased interest in postgraduate edu­
cation, has created a situation in which it has become critically im­
portant that limited capital funds be allocated effectively so as to 
provide well for future needs. In view of the complexity of the 
problem, and in view of the difficulty of measuring effectiveness, a 
great deal of work has been undertaken recently for developing 
systems that will be of use to decision-makers for selecting reason­
ably optimum development strategies and programs. One such sys­
tem for the Ohio State University is described below. 
The organization of universities and the distribution of decision-
making responsibilities at various levels has an influence on the de­
sign of the system and how it is used. Each department of the uni­
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versity has the responsibility for providing the special facilities for 
its instruction and research programs. They must carry out this 
responsibility often without full knowledge of what enrollments 
will be and what the fast-changing world of research will require in 
the way of supporting facilities. In addition, decision-makers at 
the departmental level have few, if any, space resources of their 
own to reallocate, and they have no real way to directly create new 
floor space and facilities. Decision-makers at the college level are 
in a much more flexible position to reallocate facilities, although 
they have frequently refrained from doing so. They too, however, 
are limited in what floor space and facilities they can cause to be 
created. 
The decision-maker at the university level is in a better position 
to reallocate space. Although this authority is not exercised fre­
quently, he can, to a limited extent, create floor space by remodel­
ing and by using internal funds for capital construction. However, 
in making these decisions, he is faced with the same uncertainties 
regarding future needs as are decision-makers at the departmental 
and college levels. In addition, he faces more directly three other 
conditions: (1) the long lead times necessary for obtaining funds 
and for programming, designing, and constructing facilities; (2) 
the almost total dependence on state and federal sources of capital 
funds; and (3) the small amount of discretion allowed him in the 
allocation of such funds among projects because state and federal 
sources usually earmark funds for particular projects. 
At the state level, all university proposals, often from a number 
of campuses, are in competition. Decision-makers at this level must 
choose, on some basis relative to statewide needs and the limited 
resources available, between instructional and research programs 
and the facilities required to support them and the locations at 
which these investments are to be made. 
At many state universities, over-all population growth in the 
state and open-ended admissions policies have caused great unfilled 
needs for space. The growing graduate enrollment, previously 
mentioned, has a dual effect: not only does it increase the number 
enrolled but it also increases the length of time students are at the 
institution. 
There also has been a great deal of confusion and conflct over 
the relative worth of capital dollars versus operating dollars to the 
university. Regardless of the confusion, there always has been 
great competition to obtain capital dollars. For the purpose of 
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estimating the cost of an academic program, $1.00 per net assign­
able square foot (NASF) has been used as an estimate of the an­
nual capital cost of floor space. With the increase in the cost of 
construction, it may not be too long before $2.00 per NASF be­
comes more realistic. Thus, a program utilizing 50,000 NASF with 
operating costs amounting to $300,000 could be considered as a 
$400,000-per-year operation if the cost of space is included. Since 
70 to 80 percent of the operating dollars are personnel-related, and 
since people are the primary generators of the need for space, it 
may be useful for decision-makers to consider possible trade-offs 
within and among programs between capital and operating ex­
penditures. A critical, unsolved problem that prevents some trade-
off analyses is the general lack of measures of effectiveness in aca­
demic programs. Without these, cost-effectiveness analysis is 
greatly hampered. 
Interest in development of a rational basis for planning and al­
locating of space started at the university level, has spread to the 
state level, and now is even finding its way into the federal level 
(in terms of interest in grant allocations for construction). 
Initially, methods of planning were largely project-oriented, pro­
viding basic laboratories and offices to house departments. In a 
period of largely stable enrollment, staff, and population, and little 
sponsored research, this project-oriented approach was adequate. 
Little quantitative analysis was undertaken regarding utilization, 
capacities, and space needed to meet future growth. 
The next level of sophistication involved some quantitative 
guidelines of total space needed per full-time equivalent student. 
The guidelines varied greatly depending upon the size and com­
plexity of the institution. A guideline provided a good after-the­
fact analysis of existing space and a good long-range total univer­
sity space projection, if the right size and complexity range was 
picked. 
Currently used methods recognize differing needs by general 
room types, levels of study, and program. The system to be de­
scribed is really the next step in the evolution of a system to pro­
vide a basis for rational decision-making in the capital funds al­
location process. 
The system is composed of four phases of activity. The first 
phase involves the use of a simulation model for estimating and 
evaluating space requirements by academic program and year. Ex­
ogenously prepared population forecasts and participation rates are 
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used to provide inputs to the model in terms of enrollments and 
other space-using populations. Student enrollment by academic 
program and by year are projected. Teaching staff and other staff 
are estimated directly as a function of student enrollment or are 
set independently by quantifying decision-makers' policies. The 
projections and estimates take into consideration the patterns of 
part-time enrollments and part-time staff, differences in the de­
gree of theoretical and empirical research between programs, and 
other factors that affect the way in which floor space is used. 
The second phase involves the use of the output of the first phase 
by facility-planners and decision-makers to develop building pro­
jects that satisfy the space needs and to construct capital budgets 
that will fund the proposed projects. The third phase requires the 
construction of a project network to reflect known restrictions, 
time relationships, and precedence relationships for the projects 
proposed in the second phase. The fourth phase is the adjustment 
and evaluation phase. Adjustments can be made in the proposed 
projects and in the proposed schedule, and the simulation model 
can be used to evaluate the effects of the adjustments. 
The space requirement simulation model consists of a number of 
linear functions with which space-needs estimates are generated. 
The various classes of space found at the university are represented 
in the model. Constants are used in the functions that represent 
the NASF per activity unit for that class of space. For example, 
the need for research laboratory space for a given program may be 
represented in the following way: 
RLS=So + Mr(Rt-Ro) for Rt>R0, otherwise, Rt-Ro = 0 
where 
RLS = NASF of research laboratory and service space 
S0=NASF of RLS required for base-level operations 
Rt = Projected full-time equivalent (FTE) research space users 
for year, t. 
R0 = FTE research space users for base-level operations 
Mr = Representation of the "ideal" space module: NASF per 
FTE research space user 
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A simple version of the general space needs model is as follows: 
K 
Nn= 2 [SUi + Mik(Aijk-Aik)] for Aljh>Alh, otherwise, 
where 
Nij = Total NASF for program i in period j 
Sjj; = NASF of space type h required for base-level operations 
in program i 
M;A = Representation of the "ideal" space module (NASF per 
activity unit [A]) for type k in program i 
A iji( = Projected activity units for period j associated with type 
k in program i 
AJU = Activity units associated with the base-level space, S^, 
for type k in program i 
Fi = A general allowance for storage and miscellaneous space 
for program i 
The activity unit for a given type of space is fixed, e.g., FTE 
staff is a common activity measure for office space. Student contact 
hours (SCH) and or section hours are example measures of activ­
ity for scheduled instructional space categories. 
Inputs to the simulation in addition to the student population, 
the load it generates, and the staff required for the student load 
are the present inventory and the net changes that will take place 
in it between the base year and the target planning year. The net 
changes include new construction (in-process and/or planned) 
and space to be removed by razing buildings. 
Outputs from the simulation include the space projections (gross 
and net needs) by program, by year, and a measure of space 
utilization that is a measure of effectiveness. The space utilization 
measure requires some explanation. As noted, space is projected 
using linear equations with the constants representing ideal 
modular units of space. However, the supply of space is elastic for 
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a given level of demand. For example, classrooms may be planned 
using a factor of 1.00 NASF/SCH, but the need for classroom 
space in that program will not be critical until utilization reaches 
0.67 NASF/SCH. Thus for each type of space there is a range of 
acceptable utilization between the ideal and the near-saturation 
point that represents maximum possible use of space. A measure 
exceeding the ideal presents no problem, but a measure below the 
minimum indicates a critical shortage. 
The simulation model is used to make forecasts of space require­
ments for several years and for a few alternative population fore­
casts. The output showing space needs and utilization by pro­
gram and year can be used to develop maximum and minimum 
conditions to which planners and decision-makers can respond. 
The number of years in the planning period for the institutions 
varies with the source of funding, normal lead time for a facility 
from its authorization until it is ready for occupancy, and tho 
availability of data on which to base long range forecasts. 
Given the space needs data, the facilities-planners and decision-
makers must develop a set of building projects that will satisfy the 
space needs and propose a capital budget that will fund the 
projects. The system becomes quite open-ended at this point, 
constrained only by the space needs data, physical development 
plan (if available), and natural affinities of academic programs. 
Facility-planners and decision-makers must choose programs or 
combinations of programs that have projected deficits in space 
that will enable a building project to house them to be created 
within the constraints associated with physical development plans 
(including land-use criteria) and natural program affinities. 
They must also choose between building for long or short 
planning periods and between building general-use or specific-use 
facilities. They must weigh the several advantages and disadvan­
tages of each. For example, building specific-use facilities using a 
long planning period may be cheaper (in today's dollars) and 
provide adequate expansion space; but in turn it may divert badly 
needed future dollars to a program that, if it does not grow as 
expected, may leave unoccupied space to be converted to other 
uses at a high cost. 
Trying to satisfy the needs of many programs and still provide 
long-run expansion for each is a difficult task. One possible solution 
is to select projects that will satisfy space needs for groups of 
similar programs for the years in question. The assumption behind 
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this is that the flow of future funds will be such that the secondary 
programs occupying space in a facility built for a primary program 
will get new facilities and the space they vacate can be used for 
expansion of the primary program in the facility. 
Another problem facing the facilities-planner is the detail to 
which a proposed project is planned. The detail employed is a 
function of the type of funding support an institution gets. If 
only specific projects are supported, then very detailed plans and 
estimates must be made. If only general appropriations are in­
volved, then fewer details are required. The latter approach does 
not imply that accuracy can be relaxed. The latter approach per­
mits a more flexible response to the changing conditions facing an 
institution. 
Depending upon the type of funding, capital budgets represent­
ing gross totals or complete documentation of specific projects are 
developed for each year. Initially, the budgets are expressed in 
base-year dollars and later updated to future-year dollars when 
scheduled starting dates are determined. 
Any particular plan cannot possibly provide for all contingencies. 
There are some alternative courses of action that decision-makers 
can employ in the event of change. When a plan results in under-
building because of lack of funding or faster-than-expected growth 
in the population and enrollment, the expansion of certain pro­
grams may be curtailed. The space-needs models can be used to 
compute program capacities where restrictions are required. 
If an overbuilt condition should occur, faster growth rates in 
some programs may be encouraged or conversion of space for other 
uses may be considered. Again, the space-needs model can be used 
to calculate capacities and to help estimate growth rates. 
Implementation of program growth may be hampered by the 
failure to acquire resources when they are needed. The space-needs 
models enable the data to be calculated that may be used to ensure 
that space will be coordinated with the other resources. 
Individual projects have their own chain of events (from the 
development of architectural programs of requirements, through 
the design stage, to actual completion of construction) that varies 
in time duration depending upon the size and complexity of the 
project. 
Putting all the projects and project events into a network re­
quires attention to several factors from which precedence relation­
ships can be derived. First, priorities must be established for 
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projects based upon space deficits and the importance of the pro­
gram to decision-makers. Second, location preferences resulting 
from physical development plans may imply certain precedence 
relationships. For example, if a development plan calls for a build­
ing housing a high-priority program to be located on a site that 
contains an obsolete building housing a program, then space for 
that program, regardless of its priority, must be found before the 
site can be vacated for the new building. Where location and 
priority provide a mutually conflicting situation, then one or the 
other must be changed. Third, fund flow per year and/or the num­
ber of projects that can be managed at any one time may force 
projects to be advanced or deferred over others. 
Once all the precedence relationships (real and implied) are 
resolved, the preliminary project network can be derived. The 
starting year can be fixed tentatively and base-year project costs 
can be updated. If funding restrictions are violated as a result, 
appropriate adjustments can be made. 
The preliminary project network is tested using the simulation 
to see if the proposed projects will produce the required space and 
yield acceptable space utilization profiles. The results of the run 
should yield data to indicate if any adjustment in the projects 
and/or the network are required. 
The simulation model may be run in a sensitivity analysis in 
which the effects of various contingencies such as faster-than­
expected growth in population may be tested. Some adjustments 
may be suggested as a hedge against these contingencies. Slack 
in the network may also serve as a hedge against contingencies. 
Before adjustment and reevaluation can be considered complete, 
the degree to which the projects solve the space needs by discipline 
group for the years under study must be checked to ensure that 
this is under control. 
Changing time and events demand that the system be responsive 
to change. The planning period must be extended at the end of 
each year, and the project plans must be adjusted in response to 
unexpected changes in the population, delays in planning and 
construction, and delays and/or losses in funding. 
After each period, the plan is updated for both the project 
planning period and the forecasting period. The method used to 
extend the plan depends upon the degree to which projects are 
fixed in the initial period. For example, an institution may be 
working with a six-year capital plan (which is funded two years 
at a time) and a forecasting period of from ten to twelve years. 
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Every two years, the project plan may be extended for six years 
and the forecast may be extended for a period of from ten to 
twelve years. 
The stability of the solution is potentially a great problem. If 
reevaluated every two years, there is a chance that at least a part 
of any six-year plan will be found invalid. The response is to 
retain what cannot be changed and alter the balance of the plan 
in the time remaining in the planning period. If the population 
and policy elements are stable, then changes probably will be 
minimized. The long-range-forecast data also help produce 
stability, providing, of course, that they are reasonably accurate. 
The space-use models have been used in several phases of plan­
ning at the Ohio State University. Most of the current capital plan 
project estimates were developed using the space-needs estimates 
as a basis. Two professional college expansion programs were de­
veloped using the model. 
The reaction of individual departments and colleges is mixed. 
Representing small maturing programs adequately and handling 
the special facilities with low utilization seem to be the major 
problems. Reaction is also mixed depending upon the planning 
period. The longer the period, the more acceptable the results are. 
The shorter the period, the more real the need is, and thus there 
is greater sensitivity to the results. 
Elaboration of the system as a decision aid for development 
planning and budgeting is continuing. If its utility as a decision 
aid is demonstrated, it will be installed as an ongoing part of uni­
versity operations. State-level planners have expressed an interest 
in the use of such a system to aid them. The statewide system will 
include not only the space-requirement model but other com­
ponents as well. The system could be adapted for such use because 
a uniform information system encompassing all resources and 
student enrollments exists to support it. 
The system described is just one that may be used in facilities 
planning. Much more experience is needed with all elements of 
the system to say that it will perform well in the face of the many 
adverse conditions that may be encountered. The key to the 
general success of the approach rests to a great degree on the suc­
cess of program budgeting in universities. Without a commitment 
to rational resource allocation and to coordination in the process 
of their allocation, the utility of the system to decision-makers is 
weakened. 
Many components of the system need further investigation both 
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in a specific and a general context. The whole area of student 
population and load forecasting needs analysis. The trade-off be­
tween the degree of detail of forecasts in a given year and the 
number of years in the forecast needs to be studied. Space-needs 
models can be improved by further analysis. 
The alternatives available to facilities-planners and decision-
makers can be better quantified. Such questions as the following 
need to be answered: (1) What is an economical size for a build­
ing project? (?,) What is an optimal planning horizon for a facility? 
(3) What are the factors and their cost implications for choosing 
to build facilities for specific or general uses? 
The problem of what are meaningful measures of program 
effectiveness remains unsolved. However, the solution to this 
problem is as much a job of soul-searching for university faculty 
and administrators in higher education as it is a job of research. 
In conclusion, there is an important task remaining that is as 
much political as it is analytical. Controlling agencies need to be 
convinced that continuing flows of funds are needed and that the 
type of funding should allow flexibility in choice of projects within 
reasonable bounds. Perhaps this and other planning systems can 
be used to help convince controlling agencies that there is a ra­
tional basis for requests for funds. 
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Richard L. Francis 
ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO 
FACILITY LAYOUT AND DESIGN 
The purpose of this paper is to present a largely nontechnical re­
view of the use of two analytical models as decision aids in solving 
facility layout and design problems. The models are referred to 
as the linear assignment model and the quadratic assignment 
model; both models are examples of mathematical programming 
models. The discussion emphasizes the application of the models 
rather than the mathematics involved. 
By way of introduction, consider Figure 1. Imagine that the 
grid squares of Figure 1 represent 160 seats in a theater, and that 
the black square represents some focus of interest, such as a 
speaker at a lectern. Suppose further that there are to be 104 
customers in the theater; the following "theater design" problem 
may now be posed: Given that each customer would like to be as 
close to the focus of interest as possible, but that at most one 
customer can occupy any seat, which seats would the customers 
choose? Hopefully, the solution to the problem is highly intuitive; 
the customers would be arranged in an approximately semicircular 
pattern about the focus of interest, as is shown in Figure 2. Such 
patterns are well known, of course; examples include semicircular 
Greek theaters designed as early as the second century B.C. The 
discussion of early Greek theaters by Bieber [3] suggests that their 
designers recognized the fact that a semicircular design would per­
mit members of the audience to be as close as possible to the focus 
of interest. 
An alternative wording of the theater design problem might be 
Fig. 1. Grid representation of theater seats. 
Fig. 2. Closest seating of theater patrons to a focus of interest. 
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as follows: To which seats should members of the audience be 
assigned in order to minimize the total distance of the audience 
from the focus of interest? This wording of the problem leads 
directly to the formulation of a special case of the linear assign­
ment problem: Given n locations and n activities, and a cost of 
Cij when activity i is assigned to location j , how should activities 
be assigned to locations so as to minimize the total cost? For the 
theater design problem, "locations" would be equated with "seats," 
and "activities" with "members of the audience"; the term c(; 
would represent the distance of grid square j from the focus of 
interest. (Though the wording of the linear assignment problem 
implies the number of activities must be the same as the number 
of locations, this need not be the case. When there are less ac­
tivities than locations, one can imagine that the excess locations 
are taken up by "dummy activities" at a cost c,; = 0.) The solution 
of the theater design problem when formulated as a linear assign­
ment problem is identical with that shown in Figure 2. 
A simply hypothetical numerical example of the linear assign­
ment problem, as well as two possible assignments, is shown in 
Table 1; the example is for the case n = 3; the terms c , would be 
obtained by relabeling locations A, B, and C as 1, 2, and 3 respec­
tively. Examples related to the theater design problem include 
the assignment of plants to sites [13], the assignment of machines 
TABLE 1 
A  N EXAMPLE OF THE LINEAR ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM:

COSTS, cih FOR ACTIVITIES 1, 2, AND 3 AT LOCATIONS A, B, AND C

Activities Locations 
A B C 
1  1 2 3 
2 3 2 1 
3 2 3 1 
Possible Assignments Costs Incurred 
1 to C, 2 to A, 3 to B 3+3 + 3=9 
l t o B , 2toC, 3 to A 2 + 1 + 2 = 5 
to locations in a plant [16], and the assignment of instrument 
panel components to locations [10]. 
Although one might be tempted to try to solve the linear assign­
ment problem by simply enumerating all possible assignments and 
computing the cost for each, this approach is computationally un­
satisfactory for all but the smallest values of n. Given n activities 
 747 Analytic Approaches to Facility Layout and Design
and n locations, there are n factorial different assignments; for 10 
activities and locations, there are 3,628,800 different assignments. 
Fortunately, there is a solution procedure for the linear assign­
ment problem that is highly satisfactory; the formulation of the 
problem as a linear assignment model, which may be stated 
mathematically as follows: 
Subject to the following conditions,

_ J1 if activity i is assigned to location j

Xlj
~ (0 if not

2 xu = l,j=l, . . . , n 
(assign some activity to location j) 
n 
2 xu = l, ; = 1, . . . , n 
3=1 
(assign activity i to some location) 
minimize the objective function, (total cost): 
The economists Koopmans and Beckman [13] appear to have 
been the first to recognize that the linear assignment model could 
be applied to location problems. (It should be noted in passing 
that the linear assignment model is usually referred to simply as 
the assignment model, and has many other applications than those 
mentioned above.) A number of algorithms [2, 7, and 14], which 
are computationally quite efficient, have been developed for solving 
the linear assignment model; introductory discussions of the best 
known of the algorithms may be found in [5] and [18]. All of the 
algorithms involve establishing an initial assignment and then 
determining a sequence of additional assignments, each of which 
has a cost no greater than the previous one; as each new assign­
ment is determined, a simple criterion establishes whether a least 
cost assignment has been found. For any large-scale use of an 
algorithm a digital computer would be employed. A self-contained 
discussion of the use of the linear assignment model for locating 
machines in a plant layout may be found in the paper by Moore 
[16]; the paper may possibly also serve as an introduction to the 
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best known algorithmic procedure for solving the linear assignment 
problem. Some problems related to these types of problems are 
considered by Francis [8, 9], 
Although the applications of the linear assignment model to 
location and layout problems are interesting, there are many such 
problems to which the model is not applicable, such as those having 
"interactions" among activities. Table 2 gives a simple hypothet­
ical example of a problem having interactions. Three plants are 
to be assigned to three locations; there are shipments between 
TABLE 2 
AN EXAMPLE OF THE QUADRATIC ASSIGNMENT

PROBLEM: INTERACTIONS IN A PLANT LOCATION CONTEXT

Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 1 Plant 3 Plant 2 Plant 3 
Location Location Location Location Location Location 
A B C A B C A B C 
A - 4 6 A - 1 8 A - 5 6 
B 4 - 2 B 1 - 7 B 5 - 3 
C 6  2 - C 8  7 - C 6  3 ­
Quadratic (or Linear Total 
Possible Assignments Shipment) Cost Cost Cost 
1 to C, 2 to A, 3 to B 6 + 7 + 5 = 18 9 27 
1 to B, 2 to C, 3 to A 2+1+6=9 5 4 
plants, and the shipment costs depend upon the relative locations 
of the plants. For example, if plant 1 is at location A and plant 2 
is at location B, then the shipment cost between the two plants is 
4; if plant 2 is at location C, the shipment cost between the two 
plants is 6. Total shipment costs (also called quadratic costs for 
a reason to become clear shortly) are given for two possible assign­
ments; the linear costs were obtained from Table 1 assuming that 
the costs in that example are also applicable for this example. 
Numerous other examples of interactions exist. In a plant layout 
context, the interaction might represent the cost of the flow of 
materials between departments [1] ; in an office layout context, the 
cost of paperflow and personnel travel between departments [20]; 
in an instrument panel layout context, the total amount of eye 
travel [10]; in a wiring board context, the cost of connecting wire 
[19]. 
The example of Table 2 is one illustration of what is referred 
to in the mathematical programming literature as the quadratic 
assignment problem; the formulation of this problem is again due 
to Koopmans and Beckman [13]. In passing, it should be pointed 
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out that, outside of the mathematical programming literature, 
applications of the quadratic assignment model to layout and/or 
location problems are usually not referred to as such; the use of 
terms such as "relative location of facilities" or "assignment of 
facilities to locations" is more common. The total enumeration 
approach is even less feasible for solving the quadratic assignment 
problem than for solving the linear assignment problem; for a 
quadratic assignment problem involving the assignment of 12 
activities to locations, it has been estimated that the computation 
time involved in enumerating and computing the cost of all assign­
ments would be approximately ten years on the GE 265 computer, 
and three years on the IBM 7090 computer [17]. 
As with the linear assignment problem, the quadratic assign­
ment problem may be formulated in precise mathematical terms 
as follows: 
Data: ci;=cost when activity i is at location j 
dijpq-"interaction cost" when activity i is at location j 
and activity p is at location q 
minimize: 
2j ^4 Cjj Xij' 2id 2J 2ii 2-i X\j O'ijpq Xpq 
i - l j=l »=1 ;=1 p=l q=l 
subject to 
Xij = 0 or 1 for all i and j 
2 Xij-l, j = l, . . . , n 
»=i 
2 Xij = l, i = l, . . . , n. 
When all the terms dnPq in the quadratic assignment model are 
zero, a comparison with the linear assignment model demonstrates 
that the two models are identical. It is the terms involving the 
dijpq that distinguish the two problems; notice that when * j , = l 
and Xpq-1, then activity i is in location j and activity p is in loca­
tion q, so that the cost x,j dam xpq = dijPq makes a contribution to 
the total cost. If either x,j = O or xl)(,=0, then activity i is not in 
location / or activity p is not in location q, so that the term 
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xn dijPQ xPQ = 0 and makes no contribution to the total cost. The 
shipment costs of Table 2 provide examples of the terms dnPq on 
relabeling locations A, B, and C as 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
Just as for the linear assignment model, there are algorithms for 
finding minimum cost solutions to the quadratic assignment model; 
the algorithms of Gilmore [11] and Lawler [15] are the best-
known; a substantially complete list of references on the quadratic 
assignment model may be found in the paper by Hillier and Con­
nors [12]. However, it is unfortunately the case that the quadratic 
assignment problem, which has many more facility layout applica­
tions than the linear assignment problem, is substantially more 
difficult to solve; computational results for the algorithm are 
discouraging [12, 17]. Partly because finding minimum cost 
assignments in a computationally efficient manner is at present so 
difficult, there has developed a substantial interest in heuristic 
solution methods, which may be characterized briefly as methods 
that find "good" solutions, but do not always find a best solution. 
Enough different heuristic approaches have now been developed 
for solving the quadratic assignment problem that a comparison 
of the various approaches is of considerable interest; such a com­
parison may be found in the recent and quite readable paper by 
Nugent etal . [17]. 
As representative of two heuristic approaches for solving the 
quadratic assignment problems, the works of Armour and Buffa 
[1] and of Vollmann, Nugent, and Zartler [20], will be examined 
briefly. The work of Armour and Buffa is commonly referred to 
by the acronym CRAFT (Computerized Relative Location of 
Facilities Technique); the most complete set of references on 
CRAFT may be found in [4], together with an introductory dis­
cussion. Briefly, the CRAFT approach is as follows; given an 
initial assignment of facilities (which may be of different sizes 
and shapes) to locations, among all pairwise interchanges of 
facilities that are feasible, that interchange is made which results 
in the greatest decrease in the total cost. The pairwise interchange 
procedure continues until the total cost cannot be further de­
creased. The procedure is feasible for problems of reasonable size 
only when a digital computer is used, of course; the CRAFT com­
puter program is available through the IBM SHARE library [6], 
The CRAFT procedure is among those compared by Nugent et al. 
[17]. 
A heuristic procedure similar to the CRAFT procedure is em­
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ployed by Vollman et al. [20], whose work is of particular interest 
in that it is one of the few instances in which experience is reported 
on real applications of a heuristic procedure for solving the quad­
ratic assignment problem, and in that it deals with problems of 
office layout, as opposed to job shop layout or plant layout. One is 
happy to be able to report that the experience is quite favorable; 
a study carried out involving the office layout of a large oil com­
pany determined that significant cost reductions could be achieved 
through use of the procedure. The study is also of particular 
interest in that intangible aspects the procedure could not deal 
with were taken into account by using the procedure as a design 
aid for an architect. Both the oil company and the architect found 
the procedure to be of considerable value. 
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Francis Hendricks 
DEVELOPMENT ACTION SEQUENCING 
UNDER HIGHLY CONSTRAINED CONDITIONS 
An interesting class of problem for which decision aids have proven 
useful is the one having a large number of units of two types for 
which a sequence network is to be formulated where units of each 
type exercise a condition or constraint that must be satisfied over 
units of the other type. Such network formulation problems, 
particularly when the number of units or elements is even mod­
erately large in number, challenge the human mind's information-
processing capacity to reach a solution efficiently and easily. Such 
problems are widely encountered in management, planning, and 
design; and where the network formulation process can be stated 
explicitly, the solution methodology can be established as an 
algorithm for repeated routine use, often in conjunction with 
computer systems. 
A typical manifestation of this class of problem is in remodeling, 
construction, and redevelopment, where changes and improvements 
are to be created while on-going operations and services cannot be 
interrupted and where a variety of contingencies can occur to 
disrupt sequencing and scheduling. Rebuilding an airport while 
maintaining it in full operation, remodeling a building while 
tenants continue to use it, the construction of a subway or freeway 
system, and the renewal of a military installation or portion of a 
city are but a few familiar cases where existing conditions exercise 
a constraint over proposed changes and improvements, and vice 
versa, and where progress schedules may be disrupted by changes 
in priorities and projects, supply and availability problems, acci­
dental destruction of space and other resources, and the like. 
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A description follows of a general methodology for constructing 
action sequence chains or networks for this class of problem. The 
description, presented in illustrative form, including the means for 
dealing with a number of common contingencies, considers the case 
where existing buildings are replaced by new buildings while their 
functions remain in operation during the process. It is believed 
that the description may be generalized to cover a variety of dif­
ferent situations having essentially the same problem structure. 
Assume a rectangular district subdivided into twelve subareas 
that may represent blocks or development parcels. Figure 1 indi­
cates the locations of existing buildings and the subareas within 
which the proposed buildings are to be located. 
The information sets shown in Table 1 indicate which of the 
existing buildings are to be replaced by new buildings and into 
which new building the functions located in existing buildings are 
to be relocated. 
TABLE 1 
REPLACEMENT OF BUILDINGS AND RELOCATION OF FUNCTIONS 
New Buildings to Functions to be Relocated 
Replace Existing from Existing to 
Buildings New Buildings 
New Existing Existing New 
a - P i 
b Q Q g 
c R R i 
d S S c 
e T T b 
f U U h 
g V d 
h W w a 
i X X e 
j Y Y j 
P 
V 
It will be noted that two subareas are currently vacant and that 
they are to be the subareas within which new buildings a and g are 
to be located. In general, a development action sequence chain is 
begun with a new building that is to be located in a vacant sub­
area. Such buildings can be built immediately since no demoli­
tions are required, no activities are involved that need to be re­
located, and no interruption of any necessary function will occur. 
The next element in the development action sequence chain con­
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MAP OF MAP OF EXISTING BUILDINGS PROPOSED NEW BUILDINGS AND FUNCTIONS 
1 9X la 9i 
6 f 
R 10V 10 
Q U b 3c 6 
3 p n Yi2 11 12j 
2 2 
4S 7 4d 
5T 8W 5e 8h 
Fig. 1. Diagram of subareas showing the locations of existing (upper-case 
letters) and proposed (lower-case letters) buildings. 
cerns the existing buildings housing those functions that will be 
moved into the new building. When the new building is completed, 
the functions will be moved, the existing buildings demolished, 
the site cleared, and the process repeated until all new buildings 
have been constructed and all functions are relocated. 
To make more convenient the use and manipulation of the data 
contained in the two information sets shown in Figure 1, it will be 
useful to present them in the form of binary matrices as shown in 
Figure 2. Both matrices are formed by placing a zero at the inter­
sections of the rows and columns except at those intersections 
where the column and row designation coincide with the data 
presented in each of the rows of Table 1. Thus, Table 1 indicates 
that the new building b is to replace the existing building Q; the 
number one is placed at the intersection of column b and row Q. 
For situations of the complexity of this demonstration, develop­
ment action sequence chains can readily be formulated from the 
matrices set forth in Figure 2. However, for the highly complex 
situations for which this methodology is most valuable, it would 
not be convenient to assemble the development action sequence 
chains manually. In highly comnlex situations involving many 
existing and now buiMings, the methodology should be programmed 
for a computer. 
Manually, the development action sequence chain3 are formu­
lated as follows. Examine the Building Replacement Matrix 
(BRM) to identify the columns that contain all zeros. The new 
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BUILDING REPLACEMENT MATRIX

New Buildings to Replace

Existing Buildings

a b c d e f g h i j 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Q 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

T 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

U 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FUNCTION RELOCATION MATRIX 
Functions to be Relocated From

Existing to New Buildings

a b c d e f g h i {

P 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

S 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

T 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

V 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

X 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fig. 2. Data in figure 1 presented in matrix form. 
buildings designated by the headings of those columns are the 
ones to be constructed within vacant subareas; chains are begun 
with this type of project. From the BRM, it can be seen that two 
new buildings, a and g, satisfy this condition. 
Next, examine the Function Relocation Matrix (FRM) to 
identify the existing buildings whose functions will be relocated in 
new buildings a and g. The FRM indicates that the functions in 
building W will be relocated in new building a and the functions 
in building Q will be relocated in new building g. Thus, the vacat­
ing and demolition of buildings W and Q are the next elements in 
their respective chains. 
The process consists of alternately inspecting the BRM and the 
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FRM for the identification of the next element in the chain until 
identification is made of the last new building in the chain, BRM, 
along with the existing building to be demolished from which 
functions are to be relocated within the new building. This pro­
cedure will produce two development action sequence chains: 
a-W-h-U-f-P and g-Q-b-T-e-X-i-R-c-S-d-V. 
It will be noted also that there is a one in the diagonal of the FRM. 
This means that the functions located in existing building Y are to 
be relocated within the same subarea in new building  j . When this 
condition occurs, the functions in existing building Y will have to 
be temporarily relocated in an empty building—in this case either 
existing buildings P or V—during the demolition of Y and the 
construction of j  . 
To handle the temporary relocation of the functions in existing 
building Y within existing building P using the original matrices, 
it is necessary to add an additional column and row to both the 
BRM and the FRM. The additional row may be identified as P', 
reflecting the use of the existing building P for temporary reloca­
tion purposes. This is an extra step in the development process 
and, hence, an extra link in the development action sequence chain. 
Correspondingly, an additional column is added to the BRM and 
the FRM as a pseudo-project representing the temporary reloca­
tion of the functions in existing building Y that are destined to be 
relocated ultimately in new building j  . Let the pseudo-project be 
designated at j '  . Thus, the augmented original matrices will appear 
as shown in Figure 3. 
The final development action sequence chains for the demon­
stration are: 
a-W-h-U-f-P'-j'-Y-j-P and g-Q-b-T-e-X-i-R-c-S-d-V. 
The basic methodology described above for the formulation of 
development action sequence chains will always produce a logical 
order of development actions with the fewest number of temporary 
relocations of functions, although that order may not involve the 
shortest amount of time relative to other possible ordering involv­
ing additional numbers of temporary relocations of functions. In 
addition to the straightforward formulation of development action 
sequence chains, the methodology may be augmented for the pur­
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BUILDING REPLACEMENT MATRIX 
a b c d e f g h i j \

P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

P' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Q 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

T 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

U 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
FUNCTION RELOCATION MATRIX 
a b c d e f g h i } \

P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

P' 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

S 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

T 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

V 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

X 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fig. 3. Augmented BRM and FRM to reflect interim relocations. 
pose of handling a number of influences that might arise to change 
the construction program. The following are among the most 
common: 
1.	 Interim relocations of activities to allow construction of 
high priority buildings at an earlier date 
2.	 Accidental destruction of an existing building 
3.	 Change in the site of a planned building 
4.	 Elimination or addition of a new building due to a change 
in requirements 
If a new building, which is to be located on the site of an existing 
building, is to be constructed earlier than projected, it will be 
necessary to arrange for the temporary relocation of the functions 
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housed within the the existing building that is to be demolished 
in order to provide a site for the new building. If the temporary 
relocation is to be to one of the existing buildings, the procedure 
for handling this case utilizing the matrices set forth in Figure 3 
is similar to the ones described above for the temporary relocation 
of functions which are to be housed in a new building within the 
same subarea. 
An illustration of the procedure follows. Assume that new build­
ing i is to be constructed immediately following new building a. 
This change in sequence requires that existing building X be va­
cated and demolished to provide a clear site for the construction 
of building i. It means also that the functions in existing building 
X must be temporarily relocated. Assume also that existing build-
ABRM

a b c d e f g h i i' j j'

P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

P' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Q 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
U 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0

X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

AFRM

a b c d e f g h i Y ] j'

P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

P' 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

S 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

T 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

V 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Fig. 4. New ABRM and AFRM. 
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ing W, which will be vacated due to the construction of new build­
ing a, is suitable for the functions in existing building X and that 
they may be relocated there temporarily. As in the temporary re­
location illustration above, an additional column and row must be 
added to the augmented BRM (ABRM) and the augmented FRM 
(AFRM). The additional row may be identified as W, reflecting 
the use of existing building W for temporary relocation purposes. 
Similarly, let the additional column be designated i', reflecting the 
pseudo-project of temporarily relocating the functions in existing 
building X. The new ABRM and AFRM are shown in Figure 4. 
The reader can verify for himself that the amended development 
action sequence chains are: 
a-W'-i'-X-i-R-c-S-d-V and g-Q-b-T-e-W-h-U-f-F-j'-Y-j-P. 
The accidental destruction of an existing building for any reason 
may be considered as tantamount to the clearing of the subarea in 
which it is located for the construction of a new building. The effect 
of this circumstance may be demonstrated by assuming that exist­
ing building U has been destroyed and its functions have been re­
located in extra, unused space in existing building R. To reflect 
this, the ABRM and the AFRM may be modified, as shown in Fig­
ure 5, adding an additional row to both matrices—designated R'— 
by placing zeroes in all cells in row U in both matrices, and by 
placing the number one in row N' in the AFRM at column h. 
The creation of a new row permits showing that existing build­
ing f can be built immediately, i.e., all zeroes in column f of the 
ABRM. That the functions formerly located in existing building U 
are now located in R' is shown by the number one in row R' and 
column h in the AFRM. The deletion of the number one from row 
U in both matrices indicates that building U does not exist and 
that its functions are not located there. The resulting three devel­
opment sequence chains are: 
a-W'-i'-X-i-R-c-S-d-V, f-P'-j'-Y-j-P, and g-Q-b-T-e-W-h-R' 
A change in the subarea in which a new building is to be con­
structed without a change in the functions to be relocated in it 
affects only the BRM. The BRM can be changed easily by moving 
the number one in the column representing the new building in 
question from the row representing the existing building in the 
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ABRM 
a b c d e f g h i i' j j'

P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

P' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Q 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0

X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

AFRM

a b c d e f g h i i'j j'

P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

P' 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

R' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

S 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

T 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

V 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W ' l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fig. 5. Modified ABRM and AFRM to reflect the destruction of existing 
building U. 
subarea in which it was to be located (placing a zero there instead) 
to the row representing the existing building in the subarea where 
it is to be located. Where new buildings are added to, or eliminated 
from, the development program, it will be necessary to either add 
or delete a column from the matrices. Such a change is a change 
in the basic data for the development program. It can be reflected 
in the matrices by using the same processes as are used to establish 
them originally. 
It should be noted also that once the BRM and the FRM have 
been created, they can be multiplied, using standard matrix multi­
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plication techniques, to produce a new matrix that describes the 
sequences directly and thereby eliminates the necessity of alter­
nating between the BRM and the FRM to identify the construc­
tion and demolition sequences. In addition, though no application 
involving more than two constraints has been attempted as yet, it 
appears that the two-constraint methodology could readily be 
adapted to handle three or more constraints represented in matrix 
form. 
The methodology for formulating development sequence action 
chains as described above is most valuable for problems involving 
large numbers of existing and old units of development whether 
they be buildings, portions of municipal service systems, or what­
ever. While the methodology provides for the orderly arrangement 
of data for manual use, its convenient use and reuse with highly 
complex programs for generating the information on development 
action sequence alternatives as a base for further analysis with 
respect to timing, resource requirements, costs, and so on, will re­
quire that it be programmed for a computer. Computer programs 
of the methodology developed and used by the authors have proved 
to be useful as decision-making aids for generating alternative 
chains for evaluating according to criteria exogenous to the method. 
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John W. Dickey 
ADAPTIVE DIAGNOSIS 
OF PROBLEMS 
Anyone who has the opportunity to be involved in the education of 
both architects and engineers faces an interesting and enlightening 
experience, especially with respect to the significantly different ap­
proaches that the two professional groups take in solving problems. 
Although it is dangerous to generalize, it usually can be said that 
engineers are extremely adept at analyzing the potentiality of a 
solution once it has been proposed, but are hard-pressed to deliver 
a possible solution, especially in an unstructured situation. Archi­
tects, on the other hand, can create possibilities for new solutions 
at an extremely rapid rate, yet appear unable to rigorously analyze 
the suitability of the ideas. The difference between the two pro­
fessions is that one appears to rely more on intuition and subcon­
scious "feelings" whereas the other relies more on "systematic" 
analytical tools. 
In viewing this difference in approaches, the observer can only 
feel that there must be some way in which the two approaches can 
be brought together to synthesize a technique (or techniques) that 
would take advantage of the strong points of each—the use of in­
tuition and experience on the one hand and of logic and precision 
on the other. If such a technique could be found, it obviously 
would be of immense value to those professionals who are concerned 
with solving problems inherent in our environment. 
NOTE. The author expresses appreciation to Mr. Michael Beachy, graduate
student in the Environmental Systems Program of the College of Architec­
ture at Virginia Polytechnic Institute for his assistance in developing some 
of the thinking for this paper. 
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A General Approach 
The evolving field of operations research offers some potential for 
finding such a technique. In particular, the early (1763) work of 
Bayes [1] in dealing with subjectively established probabilities re­
cently has been rediscovered and incorporated in sophisticated 
mathematical models. This approach appears to be providing some 
interesting insights into several old problems [3, 6] while at the 
same time leading to new situations that heretofore have never 
been explored [4]. The present purpose is to demonstrate, with an 
example, a Bayesian-related approach. 
Perhaps the most vivid example of the use of a Bayesian ap­
proach to a problem would be its use as a tool in the problem identi­
fication process itself. Almost every architect, engineer, or planner 
agrees that problem identification is one of the most difficult, nebu­
lous, and yet most important stages in the design or planning pro­
cess, requiring the greatest expertise on the part of the professional. 
Thus, if a Bayesian-related technique is of value in problem identi­
fication, then it may well be of equal or greater value in some of the 
other, more tangible stages of the design process, such as identify­
ing solution strategies. 
To understand the technique, one must begin by hypothesizing 
on the general manner in which a problem (or set of problems) is 
identified. At the beginning, the designer would have only a vague 
idea of what the actual problem or malfunction may be, and this 
vague idea most likely would have been derived by noticing certain 
symptoms that seem to prevail. In an office building during the 
summer months, for example, the designer may notice that people 
are working in a rather lackadaisical manner, that some are per­
spiring, and that most have dressed in their lightest clothing. From 
these observations, the designer would have a premonition that 
there was a problem with, say, the air conditioning system or pos­
sibly the "heat absorbing" glass used in the windows. 
In either case, the designer would not be willing to make any 
physical changes until he was more confident as to the actual mal­
function causing the problem. Consequently, he probably would 
conduct some tests or experiments to reaffirm or change his present 
feelings as to the actual malfunction. For instance, in the situation 
described above, the designer may decide to experiment by lower­
ing to its lowest point the setting on the thermostat controlling the 
air-conditioner to determine whether that causes a change in the 
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situation. He might also place screens in front of the windows to 
keep out the sun's rays and observe the outcome of that experi­
ment. He might decide to perform both experiments, depending 
upon the outcome of the first experiment he conducts and the costs 
involved. However, regardless of the experiments he chooses to 
conduct and the sequence in which they are performed, the de­
signer will gain information from them, and he will become more 
confident about the nature of the problem. 
If the problem identification process typified by this example is 
representative of what happens in most real world situations, then 
that process might be described as being composed of eight ele­
ments: 
1.	 Possible malfunctions (problems), m 
2.	 Designer-specified chances (probabilities), P(m), that the 
actual malfunction is of type m 
3.	 Existing symptoms, s, that imply different malfunctions 
4.	 Possible experiments, e, that can be performed 
5.	 Costs, c(e), associated with each experiment 
6.	 Certain outcomes or responses, r(s), from an experiment 
measured by the intensity of the symptom observed 
7.	 Designer-specified chances (probabilities), P[r(s)\m,e~\, 
that response on symptom s of magnitude r(s) would occur 
if malfunction m did exist and experiment e were per­
formed 
8.	 Utilities, u[P(m),r(s),e], associated with malfunction 
probabilities corresponding to each possible response on 
experiment e 
These elements would be related as follows. Viewing the various 
symptoms that exist, the designer, based upon his experience and 
intuition, guesses at the chance that a certain malfunction may 
exist. Not feeling overly confident about his guess, he strives to 
make it more realistic by performing an experiment selected on the 
basis of a utility whose value is found by considering the magnitude 
of the malfunction probabilities (the greater the variation from 
equal, the greater the utility) and the probable experiment re­
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sponse and cost. He then notes the response in terms of changes 
in the symptoms and revises his estimates of the malfunction 
probabilities accordingly. This procedure is repeated until the 
utility becomes great enough for him to feel that he now can move 
on to the next stage in the design process, that of finding a cure 
(solution) for the identified malfunction. 
As presented thus far, the problem identification process can be 
seen to rely heavily on subjective probability estimates based on 
many of those intangible yet significant factors, such as experience, 
background, and training, that provide the designer with the abil­
ity to make "good" guesses. Yet it is possible for the designer to 
become logically inconsistent with himself when making these 
guesses, and this obviously would be undesirable. For instance, he 
may estimate initially that the probability of the malfunction being 
in the air-conditioning system, in the previous example, as 0.50; and 
then, after having noted the continuing presence of perspiration 
after the "turn down thermostat" experiment, he may revise this 
figure to 0.70. This value, as will be seen later, is logically incorrect 
and might lead to some mistaken identities that, in turn, might 
hinder attempts to solve the problem. Thus, it is now possible to 
begin to see the interplay between the use of experience and intui­
tion and logical manipulation. 
The actual mechanics of the logical manipulation to be used in 
the problem identification procedure are, as intimated above, in­
corporated in an equation developed by Bayes that can be set forth 
as 
D r , , -. P(m)-P[r(s)P[m r(s),e] = 2P(m)-P\_r(s) m,e] 
where 
P[m\r(s),e] =the (posterior) probability that the malfunction 
will be type m given that response r(s) of 
symptom s has been observed in experiment e\ 
P(m) =the (prior) probability that the malfunction is 
of type m; and 
P[r(s)\m,e]= the probability that response r(s) on symptom 
s would be observed if malfunction m did exist 
and experiment e were performed. 
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This equation, developed under strict mathematical rules, can be 
interpreted loosely as follows: the new (posterior) estimate of the 
chance that malfunction m exists is a relative function of the old 
(prior) estimate weighted by the chance that certain responses 
will be found from experiment e. 
For present purposes two other equations must be generated, 
one for determining the over-all probability of getting a given re­
sponse, r(s), from an experiment, and the other for calculating the 
"utility" of a given response from a certain experiment. In the 
first case, the equation is: 
P[r(8)\e]=2P(m)'Plr(8)\m,e] , (2) 
where P[r(s)|e] is the probability of getting response r(s) to ex­
periment e. This response, of course, depends on what malfunc­
tions actually exist, and this feature is portrayed in the equation. 
A measure of utility, like most measures, is difficult to specify. 
If it is assumed, without detracting from the general applicability 
of the subsequent discussion, that (1) only one of two possible 
malfunctions can exist, (2) there is only one symptom, and (3) the 
response related to the symptom is either positive, meaning the 
symptom exists, or negative, meaning that it does not exist, then 
the utility function can be simplified. Logically, it would be de­
sirable to have the chance of one malfunction or the other existing 
to be as close to zero or one as possible, or, in other words, as far 
away from the undiscerning 50-50 case as possible. The quantity 
u\P{m),r,e\ = |P(1) - 0.50| + |P(2) - 0.50|, (3) 
might be of use in this regard. Since u[P(m),r,e~\is the utility de­
rived from obtaining response r (on the one symptom being ob­
served) from experiment e and P(l) and P(2) are the probabilities 
of having malfunctions one and two respectively, calculated from 
equation 1 based upon original estimates of the probabilities, 
u[P(ra),r,e] can be seen to give a value of 0.00 for the 50-50 case 
and 1.00 for the 1-0 or 0-1 case. Thus, a high value for u\P(m)yr,e] 
would indicate that a great amount of confidence could be placed 
in the assumption that the highly probable malfunction actually 
existed. A low value would imply that it would be difficult to tell 
which malfunction was present. 
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Quite naturally, it would be expected that u[P(m),r,e] would 
increase as more experiments are performed since the effect of more 
experimentation would be to provide more information about the 
malfunction. However, this increase in information must be 
weighed against (1) the probability of actually achieving it (ob­
taining certain responses from particular experiments) and (2) the 
cost of the experiments. This line of thinking would lead to a util­
ity function for a set of experiments as noted in the equation 
where C is the cost of all of the experiments in the set and e is the 
last experiment performed. The goal would be to choose, in a 
sequential manner, those experiments that would lead to the great­
est value of U. These would be the ones that would provide a re­
fined ability to identify the malfunction and at the same time keep 
the costs of experiments low. 
A Detailed Example 
The hypothetical situation referred to earlier will be used to illus­
trate the methodology. For the illustration one symptom, people 
perspiring, and two possible malfunctions, the air-conditioning sys­
tem and the heat-absorbing glass, will be considered. It will be 
assumed that both malfunctions have an equal probability of oc­
curring. 
Two experiments are feasible—one in which the thermostat is 
set at the lowest temperature and the other in which a sun shield 
is placed next to the heat-absorbing glass window. These experi­
ments will cost $10 and $20 respectively. It is estimated by the 
designer that if the air-conditioning system is not functioning (mal­
function mj) and the thermostat is turned down (experiment e,), 
the probability of the problem continuing would be 0.80 and of the 
malfunction being identified, 0.20. He also specified probabilities 
for the other combinations of possible malfunctions and expert 
ments as shown in the lower portion of Table 1. A complete detail­
ing of the major aspects of the situation is included in the table. 
The questions to be answered are those concerning the nature 
of the actual malfunction and the experiments to be conducted to 
determine the malfunction, assuming that there is actually only one 
malfunction. Should experiment e, or e> be conducted, both or 
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TABLE 1 
CONDITIONS FOR DETAILED EXAMPLE 
Symptom 
Si = Workers in a building are perspiring. 
Possible Malfunctions 
mi = Air conditioning system does not work.

m2="Heat absorbing" glass not absorbing heat from sun.

Possible Experiments 
ei=Turn down thermostat to lowest temperature setting. 
experiment is performed 
e2=Put up screen to shield sun. 
Responses 
n = Perspiration (Positive) 
r2=No perspiration (Negative) 
Initial Estimates Costs of 
of Malfunctions Experiments 
P(m,) =0.50 c(d)=$10 
P( ) =0.50 c(<?2)=$20 
Probabilities of getting « , » , » „ « •  , 
responses if a given
malfunction does
exist ana a^certain
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neither? The answer lies in the sequence of experiments that pro­
duces the greatest utility. 
To begin the procedure, a decision tree is constructed as shown 
in Figure 1. Each experiment as well as each possible response 
represents a branch of the tree. The alternate experiments and 
their responses compose branches from the first set of branches. 
For example, the performance of experiment ex with a positive (con­
tinued perspiration) response followed by experiment e-> with a 
positive response comprises the complete lefthand branch in Figure 
1. 
Since the initial chance of the malfunction being either the air-
conditioning system or the heat-absorbing glass is 50-50, at least 
one experiment must be conducted in order to obtain a better esti­
mate of the malfunction. If experiment ex were attempted, at a 
cost of $10, the probability of obtaining a positive or negative out­
come could be calculated by using equation 2. Thus: 
Plr^er] = 0.50(0.80) + 0.50(0.10) = 0.45. 
Similarly, the probability of a negative response on experiment e, 
is: 
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(0.50) 
(0.50) 
u = 0.000 
u = 0.000 
e 2 
(0.88) 
(0.12) 
u = 0.76 U = 0 
u = 0.64 
(0.26) 
(0.74) 
u = 0.48 
e 2 e 2 e l 
U = 
0.021 
(0.97) (0.72) (0.50) (0.07) (0.97) (0.50) (0.72) (0.07) 
(0.03) (0.28) (0.50) (0.93) (0.03) (0.50) (0.28) (0.93) 
u = u = u = u = u = u = u = u = 
0.94 0.64 0.00 0.86 0.94 0.00 0.64 0.86 
Fig. 1. Decision tree for example problem. 
P[r2|eJ = 0.50(0.20) + 0.50(0.90 = 0.55. 
Bayes rule (equation 1) then can be used to determine the prob­
abilities of having various malfunctions given a certain response to 
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a given experiment. Considering the first experiment, for instance, 
the probability that the first malfunction is causing the problem 
can be calculated as 
0.50(0.80)

P[m1\rlfe1'] = 0.50(0.80) + 0.50(0.10) = ° '  8  8 '

For the second malfunction under the same conditions the prob­
ability is: 
0.50(0.10) 
=Plm2\r1,e1'] = 0.50(0.80) + 0.50(0.10)  °*12 * 
The numbers given in parentheses on the upper left hand branch 
of Figure 1 are obtained in this manner. 
It should be noted that earlier the same example situation was 
used to demonstrate the possible inconsistency involved in esti­
mating P\_ml\rue1'\ directly. At that point, the guess was 0.70, but 
as can be seen above the actual value obtained from the Bayes 
equation is 0.88. It can be seen, therefore, that intuitive guess­
work should be tempered by logical considerations. 
Continuing, the utility u[P(m),r1,e1'\ of obtaining a positive re­
sponse rx from experiment one can be calculated by using Equation 
3. It should be anticipated that the response utility should be 
fairly high, that is, close to 1.00, since the probability of having one 
malfunction is great [P(mi) = 0.88]. This turns out to be the 
case since 
u[P(m),rlte1] = |0.88 - 0.50| + |0.12 - 0.50| = 0.76. 
The corresponding utility for the negative response is 0.64. 
At this point in the process, the designer should consider the 
utility for the experiment as a whole since he is trying to decide 
which, if either, of the two experiments to perform. To calculate 
this utility he should weigh the utility of each response by its 
chance of occurring. This procedure would prevent him from giving 
great emphasis to the utility value of a response which will not be 
likely to occur. Moreover, it would also be desirable at this time to 
consider the cost of the experiment so that he can balance the pos­
sible returns against the expense involved. Taking these two fac­
tors of probable response and cost into account, utilizing equation 
4, the following is obtained: 
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0.45(0.76) + 0.55(0.64)

U(e1) = £jg = 0.069 .

Similarly, for experiment two, it is found that 
0.42(0.64) + 0.58(0.48) 
°-
0 2 8
 '$20 
Since U{eA) is greater than both U(e.2) and the utility for doing no 
experiment, the designer would conclude that it would be desirable 
to do at least one experiment, and that one should be e, (turn down 
thermostat). 
Now that it has been established that eA is the first experiment to 
do, the question must be asked as to whether to do experiment e2 
also. The answer to this question depends on two factors—first, 
the actual outcome (response) to experiment e, and, second, the 
possibility of an increased utility resulting from performing e2. 
Suppose, for example, that ex is performed and the people continue 
perspiring, that is, response r1 occurs. Knowing this result, the de­
signer can adapt his decision-making process to this particular re­
sponse and use Bayes equation and equation 2 to calculate new 
probabilities of different malfunctions existing if certain responses 
to experiment e2 are observed. The probability of having a positive 
response in experiment e2 is 
P(r1|e2) = 0.88(0.70) + 0.12(0.15) = 0.63 , 
whereas that for a negative response is 
P(r2\e2) =0.88(0.30) + 0.12(0.85) = 0.37. 
Notice that the procedure proposed herein is truly adaptive in 
that these probabilities are changed from those seen in the upper 
righthand branches of Figure 1. The cause of this change is the new 
information about the probabilities of having various malfunctions 
that is obtained by conducting experiment e, (turn down thermo­
stat) and noting response r, (continued perspiration). The mal-1 
function probabilities also are altered since, from equation 1, it can 
be seen that 
0.88(0.70)

P(m,|r,,e2) = 0.88(0.70) + (0.12) (0.15) = ° ' 9 7 '
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and 
0.12(0.15) ) 0.88(0.70)+0.12(0.15) =
 °-
03
 ' 
As a consequence of these calculations, it is found that the de­
signer can be more confident than ever that the air-conditioning 
system is at fault (mL) if continued perspiration (response n) 
occurs after the sun shield is installed (experiment e,). The mag­
nitude of the response utility value adds to the strength of this 
conclusion since 
M[P(m),r,,gJ = |0.97-0.50| + |0.03-0.50| =0.94 , 
and this figure is close to the maximum possible of 1.00. 
Once again, however, he must weigh the importance of this 
utility by the chance that the corresponding response may actually 
occur. The total cost of experiments up to this point also must 
be considered. Subsequently, the utility for the experiment be­
comes 
0.63 (0.94)+0.37 (0.64) 
$15+120 
The conclusion to be drawn at this stage is that although it 
might be possible that an increased ability to identify the malfunc­
tion will result from running the "sun shield" experiment (e2), 
say, from 0.88 to 0.97 for malfunction m,, the extra confidence 
derived is not enough to overcome the extra cost involved. The 
result is that the overall utility for performing both ex and e2 is 
diminished over performing eA alone, so that e> should not be under­
taken. This conclusion would imply the end to the process and 
indicate that the malfunction probabilities are 0.88 for the air-
conditioning system and 0.12 for the heat-absorbing glass. 
For instructive purposes, it may be best to return to Figure 1 
to see what would have happened if experiment e, had been per­
formed and a negative (no perspiration) response had been ob­
served. In that case the possibility of conducting the sun shield 
experiment, (e.), would still be under consideration, but there 
would be different probabilities associated with m, and m.. The 
new utility associated with running experiment eL., calculated in 
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a manner similar to that in the previous case, would be 0.021. This 
value would be lower than the 0.069 figure, again implying that 
experiment e2 should not be performed after e,. 
Recapitulation 
The procedure described above appears to have some interesting 
possibilities. It is complex even for a simple illustrative situation, 
yet, when the basics are understood, it becomes easier to use and 
apply to more complex problems. What is important, however, is 
that characteristic stressed at the beginning: the ability to provide 
a mechanism for integrating the intangible perceptive capabilities 
of the designer with the logic and consistency of mathematics and 
statistics. The designer has the opportunity to use any skill or 
experience he has at hand to estimate the chances that certain 
problems exist. Thereafter, he is guided by logical precepts in 
choosing experiments to be run and conclusions to be drawn. 
This characteristic that allows for the integration of the "quali­
tative" and "quantitative" aspects of problem identification (and 
thus of design) is rarely encountered. Most techniques involve 
either one approach or the other; they emphasize complete reliance 
either on intuition (as is often the case in architectual education) 
or on prefabricated logic (as often in engineering education). Both 
of these approaches have their limitations. The time has come to 
strive toward combining the advantages of each to synthesize what 
hopefully will be a valuable technique. The procedure described 
here is an initial attempt in this direction. 
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part 4

HUMAN CREATIVITY AND JUDGMENT 

Hoyt L. Sherman 
MANAGING VISUAL INFORMATION 
Notwithstanding the fact that a large number of highly interest­
ing efforts have been initiated to model the managing of visual 
information, the present state of the art still suggests that human 
beings, as compared with other animate and inanimate systems, 
are most facile at his task. The increasing level of multidisciplin­
ary interest and research oriented toward simulating this highly 
intricate process suggests that some day, probably not too far off, 
there will not only be a significantly greater understanding of the 
process but also that there will be developed systems, algorithms, 
and other pseudo-processes with which it may be simulated. 
The discussion of managing visual information very much in­
volves the matter of relationships. No particular visual element or 
stimulus can be managed apart from its relationships to other 
proximate visual elements and to the states of the system with 
which these elements are interacting. The notion of "relationship" 
used here relates well to those used by Asenjo and by Ernst and 
Yovits. Of particular interest are Asenjo's discussion of topology, 
with its concern for the nature of the connection or relationship 
between elements, and Ernst and Yovits's discussion of the in­
formation relationships and transformations in decision processes. 
There appears to be a great deal of potential for better under­
standing and for modeling the process by which human decision-
makers manage and utilize visual information with information 
science theory and methods. 
Visual information contains important cues for identifying the 
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apparent relationships among visual elements in space. These 
apparent relationships are the aesthetic properties of an arrange­
ment or composition as well as the spacial properties. The choice 
of the word apparent is deliberate. It suggests that a particular set 
of relationships relative to their spacial and aesthetic properties will 
be perceived differently by a system depending upon the states of 
the system. In the case of human beings, for example, no two 
people will attribute the same aesthetic and spacial properties to 
a set of relationships because the neural states of their minds, based 
upon their past learning and experience, are different. Thus, a 
discussion of the subject must consider both the states of the 
system of relationships perceived and the states of the perceiving 
system. 
As Gestalt psychology defines the visual field as a field of stress 
among relationships, designing the visual field might be defined a^  
resolving that stress. Such a notion would apply equally well to 
architecture, sculpture, painting, and the other visual arts. If one 
is to design the visual field and successfully resolve stress, it is 
important to understand the visual cues used to identify relations. 
In this sense the resolution of stress should require the meaningful 
and purposeful ordering of cues. A successful ordering of cues 
would be achieved if they revealed to the perceiving system sets 
of relations that are non-random but structured in terms of recog­
nizably significant and meaningful, in terms of the states of the 
perceiving system, coherent or unified patterns. 
A notion of this type that considers not only the character of 
the visual field but also the character of the perceiving system that 
it is interacting with provides a basis for understanding why an 
environment or a painting is not interpreted in the same way nor 
is it equally liked or disliked by any two particular people. With 
respect to visual fields a number of illustrations follow that focus 
upon two classes of relationships, the relationships between ele­
ments in the visual field and their relationship to the perceiving 
system, while cataloging some of the important and interesting 
human capabilities about which we have, essentially, only descrip­
tive knowledge. 
The first illustration is the familiar figure-ground phenomenon, 
where there is an apparent alteration between the two confronting 
faces and the vase in the center shown in Figure 1. If the perceiv­
ing system's attention is given to either the faces or the vase, the 
remaining pattern becomes ground. With the vase as figure, the 
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Fig. 1. Face-vase; the interchangeability of figure and ground. 
black rectangle becomes ground; and with the confronting faces 
as figure, the white rectangle becomes ground. The dynamics of 
this relationship, the whole versus the part, are present in all visual 
fields. Figure 1 illustrates how the ground forms the figure. It 
illustrates a mode of perception that is not typical of perceptual 
habits, which are principally concerned with objects, isolated 
elements and not relationships. 
Position is the first consideration in the understanding of a 
relationship. It is of primary significance in the limited hierarchy 
of visual cues by which a perceiving system relates to space. This 
hierarchy consists, in order of significance, of position, size, and 
brightness. Two or more positions may take on relational signif­
icance in terms of proximity. This phenomenon is illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 consists of a number of spots arranged 
Fig. 2. Random arrangement. 
Fig. 3. Ordered arrangement. 
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Fig. 4. Brasilia's legislative buildings. 
in a random order. Randomly arranged, it is difficult to identify 
the number of spots if viewed for only a fraction of a second. 
Figure 3 consists of the same number of spots grouped proximally 
in three clusters. Here, under the same viewing conditions, the 
number of spots is immediately identified as fifteen. Proximity 
has facilitated this immediate sensing of the correct number of 
spots. The phenomenon is automatic; the viewer is unaware of 
making that decision. Ordering by grouping is an important means 
for achieving apparent unity. Brasilia's legislative building, shown 
in Figure 4, is an excellent application of proximity. A different 
aspect of proximity is shown in the medieval hill town of San 
Gimignano in Figure 5. 
Proximity and position often indicate direction. Apparent 
direction is one of the most common aspects of the visual field, and 
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Fig. 5. San Gimignano. 
it is critical to aesthetic order. Direction is best known as perspec­
tive with its orthogonals converging at the vanishing point. The 
vanishing point is frequently the focal point of the composition. 
In the limited hierarchy of space cues, size is next in importance. 
It is obviously the critical aspect of mass and scale. Variation in 
size, as ordered apparent diminution, is the controlling factor in 
perspective. Apparent diminution of size as mediated by perspec­
tive is not as easy to judge as it would seem. Figure 6 depicts two 
light poles and a row of traffic guards in perspective. It is hard to 
believe that the apparent size of the distant pole and traffic guards 
are really as small as they are when compared with the near ele­
ments. This simple photograph attests the persistence of the 
phenomenon of size constancy. We assume that the distant pole 
is of the same order as the near pole, and this assumption modifies 
our perception. However, it is accuracy in controlling apparent 
size that is critical to effectiveness in design. 
It should be noted that the marked in-depth perspective tends to 
dissipate the space enclosure or form in its focusing attention on 
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Fig. 6. Light poles. 
the vanishing point unless certain elements or patterns are so 
disposed as to interrupt this dissipation. At the opposite pole, a 
too shallow perspective fails to provide a commodious space unless 
certain architectural or decorative elements are used to apparently 
enhance the actual space. 
Brightness tends to be the most unreliable space cue of the three 
in this space cue trinity. Constant change in illumination produces 
a wide variety of brightness levels in the lights and darks of the 
architectural masses. This constant change makes brightness an 
unreliable space cue. In spite of the relative spatial unreliability 
of the brightness cue and its transitory nature, we must cite the 
role of light and dark as an important factor in mediating solids 
and voids. Light and shade are somewhat more reliable than 
shadow in mediating change in plane. In general, the fundamental 
function of light and dark is to mediate volume, thickness, and 
substance, whereas the fundamental function of color is to differ­
entiate the visual field. 
These two functions are given in the variety of value-color 
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intrinsic to the materials employed and the change in plane in a 
given environment. The integrate of the value-color of materials 
and the transitory nature of light and shade should not only func­
tion to display hierarchically the mass, plane change, trim, and 
detail, but also should become an aesthetic override. In this inte­
gration of value-color of materials and the transitory nature of 
light and shade, we have an aesthetic that is fixed in the relation­
ship of elements and materials but is continuously changing be­
cause of the variation of light and shade. Apparent variety within 
fixed limits—an ideal aesthetic! Suffice it to say, the designed 
variety generally dominates variety created by light and shade. 
Value and color as functioning in the display and aesthetics of 
form obviously should be an integral part of the designer's vocab­
ulary. At the student level this capacity should be initially 
developed in a drawing-color-3D class, where form invention is 
appropriately displayed by value and color contrast. Color is 
intentionally omitted in this discussion for the basic reason that 
the perception of color has yet to be understood. 
Efforts at describing color harmony by the use of the color wheel 
and the color solid are relatively superficial. The various systems 
do not, and cannot, include all of the variables that are requisite 
to color organization. Knowledge of color harmony is best gained 
through direct experience. 
Having touched on the limited group of the space cues and their 
role in the aesthetic, let us now examine a cue that is better than 
II II II II II

Fig. 7. Closure. 
Fig. 8. "Ma Jolie (Woman with a Guitar)," by Pablo Picasso. 
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proximity in effecting organization. This is the cue of closure, 
which supersedes proximity. Figure 7 shows the unitary function 
of closure. Here we see that the apparent units created by prox­
imity (top line) are no longer viable when the proximal patterns 
are modified to represent closure. The apparent units now are the 
areas between the proximal patterns; the proximal units are no 
longer apparent. Closure is not limited to the planar; it is also 
three dimensional—distant elements may close with frontal ele­
ments. In addition, and most important, a given closure may close 
with other closures to create a field of more inclusive closures. The 
more inclusive closure can be shown by the early cubist painting 
in Figure 8. The inclusive closure has an organizing property. 
Through inclusive closure parts are related to a whole. Attention 
to closure as an expression of the whole-part relationship is an 
effective means for determining proportion of the elements. 
There are three other unifying elements in addition to closure 
involved in cubist painting that are also critical to organization. 
Coincidence of edge is one. Its presence has been in use for cen­
turies as an integral part of the decorative note—in patterned wall, 
floor, and so on. Coincidence of edge creates pattern integration. 
It functions as a pattern integrator by having an edge of one ele­
ment common to the edge of another element. It is most typically 
seen in the mortar, tile, and siding joint. The integrating charac­
teristics of coincidence of edge is strikingly seen in the Ohio State 
University's Visual Demonstration Center, where the demonstra­
tion of this phenomenon consists of a vertical white cardboard 
plane approximately 6 x 24 inches, with a playing card hanging 
three feet in front of this plane, all surrounded by a black void. 
The observer visually aligns the edge of the playing card with an 
edge of the white cardboard plane. This creates a coincidence of 
edge; immediately the hanging playing card is seen as integral with 
the white plane. The two elements are seen at the same distance. 
Continuity, or good continuity, is another unifying phenom­
enon seen in the cubist pattern. Continuity here, however, is seen 
as a broken continuity, but its unifying function is not disrupted. 
The principal applies equally well to architecture. The continuous 
wall surface and linear elements, such as cornice play a simple 
but basic role in providing apparent unity to the architectural 
ensemble. Wright's Robie House, shown in Figure 9, is a superb 
example of continuity. Texture is an important adjunct property 
of surfaces in that texture of any kind establishes the position and 
the existence of surface as a visual and tangible fact. 
Fig. 9. Robie house. Frank Lloyd Wright 
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Fig. 10. High Court, Chandigarh. Le Corbusier. 
Most common to all arts is repetition. Repetition is in one sense 
a form of continuity. It not only establishes a rhythm to pattern 
and mass but by repetition of the element, identity becomes unity. 
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Fig. 11. Overlay demonstration. 
186 Decision-Making 
Fig. 12. Temple of Luxor. 
Still another cu3 that possesses some degree of integration is 
the space cue of overlay. This cue not only plays a role of inte­
gration but it is also the most effective of the space cues. As 
integrator, the overlapped portion of a given element is common 
to the overlapping element. This commonality affords a degree 
of integration. Furthermore, greater apparent space is experienced 
with a stimulus that presents overlay than one without overlay. 
For example, Mr. Wright's architecture, in general, was replete 
with the cue of overlay. Corbusier's building at Chandigarh (Fig. 
10) contains a classical example of overlay. The vertical members 
at the principal entrance clearly display the role of this cue. 
Figure 11 further clarifies the significant role of overlay in the 
visual field. 
The overlay cue is ever present in the environment. However, 
if the cue, which is essentially planar, is to be present, it must be 
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planned for. The significance of this necessity can be understood 
through comparisons with the massive columns of the temple at 
Luxor (Fig. 12), which appear to overlap but which are read as 
colonnades of volume, not overlay. 
Similarity, another integrating cue, is potentially possible from 
ridge line to base line. Similar shapes are given at the primary 
level in cornice, fenestration, and base course. At the secondary 
level, similarity may be given in the shape of materials, detail, and 
trim. Similarity achieves its unity because we assume that similar 
things are identical. An additional variety of similarity is given by 
perspective; deformation created by perspective produces this 
variety. 
Mass, the primacy of architecture, must be reaffirmed by roof 
planes and facade elements. These elements must function not 
only to enrich facade but also to enhance critical changes in plane; 
above all, facade elements must play their role in displaying the 
salient and/or reentrant intersections of enclosing walls that, taken 
together, tend to establish form and position. 
Base line is not only a cue that contributes to the description 
of the major masses of a given structure but is also most important 
in relating one structure to another. With planting, the base line 
is not only further emphasized but the planting serves as a textural 
value-color transition from the facade to the earth plane. Defini­
tion is maintained, but the edge is softened by the planting to 
provide greater environmental integration. 
Pregnanz, another category of unity, is characterized by 
emphatic form. In one sense, Pregnanz may be related to the 
word pregnant. A common example would be the Rock of 
Gibralter, from the familiar "Prudential" side. Architecturally, 
Corbusier's Ronchamp (Figure 13), with its battered walls ac­
cented by its nun headdress-like roof, tower, pulpit, and de stijl 
fenestration, speaks positively of Pregnanz; its form tends to be 
sculptural. The sculptural form does not readily lend itself to 
analysis as does the familiar rectilinear structure. Ronchamp, how­
ever, is derived from cubist patterns. 
Circulation as an approach should present principal masses, 
entrances, and supporting detail. Interior circulation should, 
hierarchically, appear to lead the individual to all critical visual 
cues. In addition to the interior visual cues, a properly placed 
decorative cue may not only contribute to apparent facility in 
circulation but it may also add interest to the environment. 
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Fig. 13. Ronchamp. Le Corbusier. 
Decorative cues provide convenient points for fixation. Involun­
tary and voluntary eye movement is continually fixating points in 
the visual field. 
The spiral disk demonstration, again from the Visual Demon­
stration Center, will help to partially sum up the apparent influ­
ence of the various phenomena on the part-whole relationship. 
This demonstration serves to further show the influence of ground 
on figure. First we observe the disk in motion. The apparent depth 
is equivalent to a pipe two feet in diameter and 100 feet long, 
observed at eye level at a distance of twenty feet. At a given cue 
we shift our attention to a small white target. Immediately the 
small target appears to expand in size and to come forward. We 
will not undertake to explain the phenomenon in detail; suffice it 
to say it belongs to the family of after-image effects. 
Important to our thesis is the fact that the visual system is 
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seeking equilibrium. By analogy, this equilibrium is seen as the 
designed form-organized elements in the environmental complex. 
Equilibrium is indicated in the drive to effect an internal balance 
by the immediate appearance of the opposite phenomenon. 
Excitation, generated by the spiral disk, creates a dynamic field 
in the visual system to increase the apparent size of the small 
target. The apparent increase in the size of the target fills the 
area of the spiral disk. 
It is the demonstration of the field dynamics that is most im­
portant to design, and to aesthetics in general. It is because of 
the apparent interrelationship of elements in the visual field that 
these elements can be so organized as to create an apparent unity 
of the whole: the parts in relationship to the whole. Wolfgang 
Kohler's theory of perception adds further evidence to the struc­
ture of perception as design: ". . . . A theory of perception must 
be a field theory. By this we mean that the neural functions and 
processes with which the perceptual facts are associated in each 
case are located in a continuous medium; and that the events in 
one part of this medium influence the events in other regions in 
a way that depends directly on the properties of both in their 
relation to each other." 
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William T. Morris 
MATCHING DECISION AIDS 
WITH INTUITIVE STYLES 
Discussions of decision-aiding lead one naturally to the subject of 
mathematical models and digital computers, which have been 
associated with many of the interesting developments of the past 
twenty years. In this discussion, however, we set out to explore a 
somewhat different hypothesis: that the very success of models 
and computers may have distracted our attention from some of 
the basic realities of the work of making decisions. It is well known 
that the benefits of analysis and computation are not to be had 
unless at least two basic conditions can be realized. To be the 
subject of analysis, a decision must be anticipated so that the 
sometimes extensive process of modeling it can be carried out in 
sufficient time for the results to be of some use in the actual con­
text of affairs. In addition, one must have the skill to take an ill-
defined decision situation and translate it into a well-defined re­
search problem so that the concepts involved are operational and 
the crucial steps of mathematical representation and measurement 
become possible. Those whose chief professional activity is the 
making of decisions need not be reminded that these conditions 
are not readily met, for they are constantly aware of the difficulty 
of achieving them. Analysts who study and support professional 
decision-makers might profit from the reminder that, first, in the 
world of authority and responsibility not all important decision 
situations can be usefully foreseen and must be regarded as 
"decisions of encounter" rather than "programmed decisions" 
[14]. Further, analysts might well explore the possibility of 
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viewing the decision-maker's all too frequent unwillingness or in­
ability to be explicit about the decision situation as a datum rather 
than an annoyance. In other words, instead of concentrating on 
the decision-maker's difficulty in communicating to others the 
values and predictions he is accustomed to handling implicity, 
one might ask what can be usefully done without the heed for 
explicitness. 
These "facts of life," the inability to anticipate and the inability 
to be explicit, suggest that a good deal of professional deciding lies 
beyond the present frontier of decision analysis [9]. One can 
simply accept this as a fundamental limitation, or one can turn 
to the world of unanticipated decisions and implicit decision 
processes, asking if there is a contribution that science might make 
in this world. Can one develop decision-aiding methods that en­
hance the effective intuitive skills built up by professionals through 
years of ill-organized experience? Do the methods of science 
preclude it from contributing to those decisions of encounter that 
must be made under the pressure and pace of daily affairs? [See 
13.] A decision of encounter, an unanticipated decision, is one 
that precludes very much delegation, very much seeking of "out­
side" assistance, and perhaps even precludes very much reflection 
on the part of the decision-maker himself. These decisions must 
be taken on the basis of what we will simply call the subject's own 
implicit or intuitive methods. Indeed, we will say that whenever 
a decision-maker either is not, or cannot be, explicit about some 
aspect of a situation, then that aspect is intuitive or implicit [15]. 
This definition of "intuitive" is not very satisfying because it fails 
to suggest our personal introspective appraisals of intuitive deciding 
and because it deliberately sets aside the distinction between in­
ability and unwillingness to be explicit. It turns out, however, to 
be a useful definition for the purpose at hand. From the viewpoint 
of the analyst, introspection is likely to be an unreliable guide, 
and it makes little difference in the short run whether explicitness 
cannot be achieved because of unwillingness or because of inability 
to express one's decision processes. 
Intuitive, implicit, or judgmental decision-making is, after all, 
the mainstay of the experienced decision-maker and for good 
reasons. Intuitive, unaided methods have typically served the 
decision-maker well, and he can reflect on some personal history 
of productive reliance on his developing intuition. Until very 
recently there has been little to choose from except implicit 
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methods; and even now, aids tend to be available only in very 
well-defined situations to those with special training. Effective 
professionals in many fields including management, the sciences, 
and the arts are usually highly implicit deciders and find this way 
of working not only reliable and habitual but satisfying in that it 
seems to utilize their unique skills and sensitivities. It is especially 
important that intuitive methods appear well suited to meet the 
pressure of ongoing affairs, permitting rather immediate responses 
on the basis of limited information. There is considerable evidence 
to show that unaided human decision-making is reasonable, effec­
tive, and reliable within at least a modest range of decision-making 
challenges [18]. There are, obviously enough, some very serious 
ways in which implicit methods fail and mislead us, and it is these 
that concern us here. 
It is now rather well established that one objective of decision-
aiding is to extend the capacity of the human mind to remember 
and perform simple logical operations. Much of the mathematical 
analysis and computer application of recent years has been an 
attempt to extend the "logical" limitations of the decision-maker 
in extensive repetitive tasks involving the storing and processing 
of information. We wish, however, to turn in a somewhat different 
direction, facing some other sorts of difficulties that might be 
characterized as "psychological" rather than "logical" limitations 
on perceptual and cognitive activity. These difficulties appear when 
intuitive methods lead us astray, trap us, and, sometimes to our 
great surprise, fail to merit the confidence we have come to place 
in them. The particularly difficult situations are those wherein the 
limitations of intuitive methods are not obvous to us at all but 
occur at the subconscious level of decision processes. It is our 
hypothesis that if one were to investigate aids for decisions of 
encounter, the most productive area of study is likely to be these 
psychological limitations rather than the more conventional 
logical ones. There is, of course, a long history of attempts to over­
come these psychological problems by means of highly rationalistic 
and pseudo-logical models requiring one to externalize the decision 
process in terms of some seemingly sensible steps. It has often 
been suggested that one should "define the problem, develop alter­
nate solutions/' or perhaps, "list the goals or objectives, develop 
alternate courses of action, evaluate the degree to which each 
action accomplishes each goal" [3, 11]. 
These recipes are the subject of numerous articles and books on 
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how to make decisions. They are appealing in that they sound 
very reasonable and appear to be obviously "the right way to do 
it." There appears to be very little evidence, however, that they 
have any interesting effect on the actual decision-making behavior 
of experienced persons. Although the evidence is admittedly 
experiential, the best hypothesis appears to be that if one really 
wanted to alter the behavior of an intuitive decider, these pseudo-
logical schemes are not going to be very effective. The reasons 
that might be advanced in support of this hypothesis are useful 
in guiding the search for other methods of dealing with perceptual 
and cognitive shortcomings. 
We would suggest that the failure of these methods might well 
involve a failure to recognize that every experienced decision-maker 
develops his own personal style, which cannot be radically re­
formulated in the short run. It may also be a failure to meet what 
appear to be the really difficult and troublesome problems of 
decision-making. These "define the problem" formulations have 
a kind of pious ring, telling one what he should do in making a 
decision but not how he should do it nor what it will gain him if 
he does. They say little of the great problem of division of labor 
in decisions. What aspects should be delegated, what aspects 
should be handled by the computer, and what should be turned 
over to staff specialists for analysis? They seem to say that the 
amount of mental effort or cognitive strain they require ought to 
be invested in every decision, failing to recognize that some deci­
sions warrant more time than others and that in some, experience 
is far more highly developed than in others. They say nothing of 
the relative costs and benefits of the type of explicitness they 
require. They seem to assume that all intuition is bad and ought 
to be immediately replaced. These methods contribute little to 
the handling of risk and uncertainty, yet these are surely the cen­
tral difficulties in many decisions. They almost equate uncertainty 
with irrationality, failing to help the decision-maker resolve the 
serious question of how much uncertainty to tolerate and how much 
effort to devote to gathering additional information in order to 
reduce the uncertainty. They require one to know his own mind 
with full clarity, which he clearly does not. They suppose that 
one cannot act without being perfectly clear about one's objectives, 
a requirement that would bring most organizations to a standstill. 
Such pseudo-logical methods simply do not represent the sort 
of thing that is "done" in most professional circles. To use these 
 194 Decision-Making
methods explicitly is not really "socially acceptable" and might 
even betray some degree of incompetence. Their deliberateness 
fails to meet the time constraints that surround many decisions 
of encounter. They require more self-discipline and self-awareness 
than most of us find comfortable and imply a radical reformulation 
of one's habiti. In short, they do not appear to be worth their 
cost. If even a few of these reasons turn out to be confirmed 
through the study of efforts to influence decision-making, they will 
provide the incentive to develop a basic hypothesis that may lead 
us in a new direction. One might call this the "Personal Style 
Hypothesis" because it involves the premise that each decision-
maker's own personal style of deciding is the fundamental point 
of departure. Simply stated the hypothesis is this: More is to be 
gained from attempts to apply natural enhancements to the deci­
sion-maker's personal style than from equivalent efforts to radically 
reformulate and externalize his style in the image of some pseudo-
logical model. We view this, not much as a novel and completely 
untested hypothesis, but rather as a fairly obvious interpretation 
of the data that is already in and a suggestion that we pay more 
careful attention to what really goes on in the making of actual 
decisions. We see it as a very rough specification of the direction 
one must take if one is to really influence and assist the intuitive 
professional facing an unanticipated decision problem. The Per­
sonal Style Hypothesis can be understood if we make clear the 
somewhat special meanings of the concepts of "personal style" and 
"natural enhancements." 
One might quickly develop a host of dimensions for describing 
decision-making style, and this may be well worth doing, for we 
have two purposes in mind. First and most important is the de­
velopment of self-consciousness, self-awareness, or self-knowledge. 
One reading of a great deal of the evidence turned up by modern 
psychology is that the key to the improvement of the intuitive, 
implicit decision process is self-awareness, and that this must begin 
by motivating the subject to explore the various dimensions of his 
own style of deciding [22]. We will return shortly to this most 
fundamental notion. Our second purpose supposes that by ex­
ploring the dimensions of style we will be able to suggest more or 
less specific ways of enhancing that style. We would thus like to 
find ways of looking at style that are useful in the sense that they 
lead us to such enhancements. We might begin to lay out some 
of these dimensions as a series of questions. For example: 
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1.	 To what extent is one's style of decision-making intuitive, 
implicit, and private? To what extent is it analytical, 
explicit, and public? [1] 
2.	 To what degree is one tolerant of ambiguity in a decision 
situation? Can we decide in the face of ambiguous notions 
about objectives or ambiguous statements of the alter­
native courses of action? Some studies suggest that ex­
perienced decision-makers are highly tolerant of ambiguity 
and capable of resolving that ambiguity in their own way 
[8,20]. 
3.	 Similarly, to what degree is one tolerant of uncertainty as 
to the consequences of one's actions? Some of us require 
considerable information and assurance before we will act, 
others are far more willing to act on the basis of limited 
information and substantial uncertainty. We should not 
imagine that one such style is always "better" than the 
other [7]. 
4.	 How reasonable is our hindsight? How effectively do we 
learn from our past decisions? Are we given to regretting 
decisions that turn out badly or do we suppress these 
feelings and look to the future? Do we distinguish clearly 
between a good decision that depends on reason and logic, 
and a good result or outcome that always depends to some 
degree on chance, luck, and circumstances beyond our 
control? 
5.	 How much cognitive effort does one invest in a decision? 
Some decision-makers are careful and deliberate thinkers, 
others tend to proceed "off the top of their heads" or "by 
the seat of their pants." 
6.	 To what degree does one delegate or seek external aids 
to deciding? 
7.	 To what extent is there a need for coherence between one's 
beliefs, one's actions, and one's objectives? We may seek 
coherence by becoming more optimistic about a course of 
action after we have chosen it than before. Sometimes we 
adopt the belief that what we have become committed to 
is the best possible course of action, although we had no 
such conviction prior to our commitment. We achieve 
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coherence or reduce "cognitive dissonance" by revising our 
perceptions [16]. 
8.	 How sensitive are one's unaided decision-making abilities 
to conditions of stress? There is considerable evidence that 
most of us become distinctly poorer decision-makers when 
we are under stress or pressure [10]. 
9.	 To what extent are our perceptions and thoughts influ­
enced, not so much by the external world, but by our own 
needs and desires. One of the great discoveries of modern 
psychology is that what we see and what we think are 
influenced subconsciously by our needs and tensions [22]. 
10.	 To what degree is one clear about his own decision-making 
processes? How much self-knowledge or self-consciousness 
does one have in this connection? It is well established 
that we seldom understand very well the reasons we do 
what we do, or the goals we are striving to attain. 
11.	 To what degree are our perceptions of the external world 
distorted because of distortions shared by our associates? 
Science is full of instances of socially shared distortions, 
often going about under the heading of "common sense." 
Indeed, one of the best definitions of common sense pic­
tures it as that kind of sense which tells us when we look 
out of the window that the world is flat [22]. 
12.	 To what degree does one abstract or simplify the external 
world in making a decision? 
13.	 To what degree does one rely on rules of thumb or policy 
categories for disposing of decision problems? [12] 
14.	 To what degree does one look ahead in a decision? Is the 
planning horizon in the relatively near or relatively distant 
future? One of the skills of a good chess player is his 
ability to look ahead to the future consequences of his 
moves. The ability of computers to play chess is rather 
directly related to their "look ahead" ability. 
Proposals for various dimensions of personal style could go on, and 
it might be important for a decision-maker to consider those that 
are useful for understanding his own style. We turn now, however, 
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to the concept of "natural enhancements" that appeared in our 
Personal Style Hypothesis. 
We are looking for ways of enhancing, complimenting, supple­
menting, or assisting the decision process that are well adapted to 
the nature of that process. We want to develop enhancements that 
do not arise from some rationalistic view of choice but rather from 
a specific study of decision-making style. Such techniques must 
be well suited to the context of affairs, in that they meet the time 
constraints within which one must act, and they must be shown 
to have benefits that will match the cognitive efforts required of 
the user. The techniques likely to succeed are those that do not 
require a great amount of special training or "selling" and that the 
decision-maker finds "naturally assimilable" into his own personal 
style. Such a set of specifications may seem difficult if not im­
possible to meet, but there are some grounds for optimism. The 
decision-aiding techniques we seek are more likely to be concerned 
with the implicit and intuitive aspects of deciding than with the 
explicit aspects. They are more likely to be qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Further, they are more likely to be the sort of thing 
that a decision-maker is able and willing to do for himself, rather 
than things that must be done for him by others. 
Let us try to illuminate these general notions by means of specific 
examples of possible relationships between aspects of personal style 
and enhancement techniques. As we have mentioned, there is con­
siderable psychological evidence to support the notion that under 
conditions of stress, the effectiveness of one's intuitive, implicit 
decision-making skills is likely to be degraded. It raises directly 
the question of what individual or organizational efforts might be 
undertaken to remove the stressful conditions that may lead to 
intuitive degradation. This leads in turn to the larger question, 
"What are the best conditions for the flourishing of effective 
intuitive skills?" There are, of course, some very obvious answers 
to the question of "stress relieving" the decision-maker that involve 
the rearrangement of workload, taking the problem home, or a 
quite retreat for necessary reflections. There are some less obvious 
answers as well. We know that it is sometimes effective, when one 
has a very large number of things to do and feels "pressured," to 
simply write the tasks down and progess through the list one at 
at time. This simple way of handling stress has the effect of making 
the pressure explicit and thus reducing one's internal anxiety. It 
also has the effect of concentrating attention on one decision at a 
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time, thus making the situation intuitively manageable. Similarly, 
we begin to notice that when a decision-maker is faced with a 
decision involving a considerable degree of uncertainty, the pres­
sures and anxieties are to some extent relieved by making those 
uncertainties explicit, perhaps even by expressing them in the 
language of probability theory. This tends to depersonalize the 
uncertainty, to relieve the decision-maker from being its sole 
bearer, and to allow him to concentrate his intuition on other 
aspects of the decision problem. One should note here that these 
techniques are things the decision-maker can do for himself and 
things that generally depend on his own self-consciousness and 
self-awareness in decision-making. 
It is also of some interest to notice that the more general ques­
tion of the conditions under which one's intuition can function most 
effectively has not been widely studied in management situations. 
In fact, those who seem to have had the most interest in this prob­
lem are the sages who developed Eastern religions such as 
Buddhism and Taoism [17]. These men gave considerable thought 
to "freeing the mind," or creating the conditions under which one's 
intuition could work most effectively. The familiar progression in 
Yoga from concentration to meditation and comtemplation is 
aimed at freeing the mind from irrational passions, unconscious 
needs, and all manner of distractions so that it may be most 
reasonable. It is of special interest that many of the contemporary 
findings of psychology tend to confirm the notions developed by 
these ancient thinkers. Again we come around to the point that 
what is needed is self-knowledge or self-awareness in the decision 
process. 
Wishful thinking is our common phrase for the sort of distortion 
that creeps into perceiving and conceptualizing as a result of basic 
needs and desires. Psychologists have been much interested in this 
need-determined sort of distortion because we ourselves are often 
not conscious of it [22]. We consider three hypotheses about the 
effects of needs in the decision process. 
1.	 Habitual ways of viewing a decision situation arise because 
a conception that meets the needs of one situation is un­
critically applied to others. Habits might be thought of 
as ways of economizing the limited capacity of the mind. 
Rather than develop a conception that tries to account 
objectively for each individual choice situation, one simply 
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resorts by analogy to customary conceptions or tends to 
fit decisions into categories previously developed. Organi­
zations develop such habits, and they tend to get formal­
ized into policies or routines for decision-making. These 
habitual conceptions are perpetuated because they satisfy 
one's need to respond to the pressure of affairs that overtax 
the conceptualizing capacity of the mind. Habits also help 
to satisfy the need for being able to defend a decision in 
an organization. Certainly, a widely used defense for an 
unsuccessful decision is the claim that it was based on 
"the way we always do it," or that it was placed in a 
category for which a policy was already determined. 
2.	 One's conceptions of choice situations tend to move toward 
a view of the situation as the person would like to see it, 
and not necessarily as it is. Expectations are not inde­
pendent of desires, and conceptions play a part in satisfy­
ing needs when actions prove inadequate to the task. If 
a person finds himself in very limited control of a situation, 
to some extent quite powerless to act in a satisfying way, 
then at least he can remake his conceptualization of the 
situation so as to view it more satisfactorily. If the need 
for certainty and confidence in decision-making cannot be 
achieved through predictive knowledge and the ability to 
control events, then perhaps conceptions will become sub­
jectively free of doubt and uncertainty in response to this 
need. Perception is a selective process that tends to give 
structure to the vastly complicated situations encountered 
in experience. In perceiving a situation, some elements of 
it "stand out" more clearly than others. The term is 
"figure and ground," the figure being those elements per­
ceived most clearly against the suppressed background of 
the remainder. The psychologist goes on to hypothesize 
that the elements tending to stand out as figure are at 
least in part controlled by needs, in the sense of having 
previously been perceived in satisfying situations. This, 
of course, works as the result of fears as well as desires. 
3.	 Finally, conceptions of choice situations get distorted be­
cause of the social and organizational processes that lead 
a person to view things in ways accepted by his associates. 
Socially shared views—which come not so much from con­
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tact with reality as from the need to agree, to belong, or 
to avoid questioning the views of a group—are a part of 
most decisions. An individual decision-maker in an or­
ganization experiences a demand from his superiors that 
his behavior be reliable, predictable, and, in a general 
sense, within control. They need to know how he is going 
to make decisions so they can account for, and plan on, 
the basis of his behavior. He thus finds it increasingly 
necessary to conform to the organization's way of concep­
tualizing decision situations or to follow the organizational 
rules. The rules and conventions tend to become impor­
tant, no longer because of their original objective effective­
ness for achieving organizational goals but rather for their 
own sake. It becomes less important to make a decision 
so as to advance the objectives of the organization and 
more important to make a decision acceptable in the or­
ganizational process. This leads to viewing decisions as 
falling into one or another of a relatively small number of 
organizationally sanctioned categories. Thus, concep­
tualization of choice situations becomes a rigid process. 
This may well mean the decisions are less and less success­
ful at the same time that they are becoming more reliable, 
predictable, and defensible within the organization [14]. 
It may well be that the influences of our needs on our perception 
and thinking constitute one of the most serious sources of difficulty 
in our intuitive or implicit decision processes. Our needs for wish-
fulfillment, escape, or self-defense may be sources of difficulty 
largely because we are not aware of their distorting effects on our 
decision-making. This leads us again to what we take to be the 
essential conclusion of psychological research in this connection. 
Vigilance, self-knowledge, self-awareness, or self-consciousness con­
stitute the basic strategy for freeing ourselves from the subcon­
scious sources of distortion. Knowing oneself makes it easier to se3 
decision situations accurately, but knowing oneself in this sense is 
not easy. 
One obvious suggestion, which may indeed turn out to amply re­
ward the effort required, is simply to keep an explicit record of 
one's predictions or decisions in repetitive situations. It may be 
surprisingly effective, for example, to explore one's thinking for the 
systematic effects of needs by "keeping score." Suppose, for the 
 201 Matching Decision Aids with Intuitive Styles
example, we had occasion to repeatedly estimate the cost of doing 
particular jobs and later had an opportunity to learn the actual 
costs. It is important to keep a written record of one's estimates 
because the memory also is subject to need-determined distortions. 
Comparing the estimate with the actual may well reveal systematic 
biases and unreliability. Knowledge of these is the first step in 
disciplining the intuition. A very interesting experiment is to re­
peatedly predict where the stock market will be a week or a month 
in the future, and then to compare these predictions with what 
actually happens. It is likely that a large number of investors 
would profit from a knowledge of the systematic optimistic or pes­
simistic biases on which their market decisions are based. 
Certainly, one of the most difficult aspects of choosing is coming 
to grips with the multiple, conflicting natures of most value struc­
tures. In deciding which of two houses to buy, we compare them 
on the basis of price, number of rooms, tax rate, style, location, and 
so on. It is relatively easy to compare the houses one attribute at 
a time, but the difficulty arises when these comparisons must be 
somehow aggregated into an over-all preference. Similar problems 
occur when one must choose between development projects, plant 
locations, candidates for vice-president, and, in fact, in nearly all 
interesting decisions. The basic kernel of self-knowledge is this; 
the one-dimensional comparisons are easy for the unaided intuition, 
but the multidimensional comparisons are difficult. We have some­
times been disdainful of the decision-maker who gives a "check 
mark" to the house with the lower price, another to the house with 
the greater number of rooms, and so on, making the decision in 
favor of the house that receives the greater number of check marks. 
On second thought, however, this decision-maker has worked out 
for himself a simple decision-aiding device that moves toward a 
very sensible division of labor. He uses his unaided intuition to 
make the easy one-dimensional comparisons, but then employs a 
very simple logical model to do what his intuition finds difficult, the 
task of aggregating these judgments into an over-all preference. 
Now, it is obvious that a little more effort on his part might have 
lead to a more sophisticated logical model in which he ranked the 
attributes of the houses in order of their importance to him and 
then gave each house a numerical score for each attribute. Finally, 
the model would have combined ranks and scores into an over-all 
measure of the desirability of each house. The principle of division 
of labor remains the same [4]. 
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There is currently a renewed interest in this type of decision-
aiding scheme, and a number of careful studies have yielded in­
teresting results [21]. We know that if someone else designs a 
complex ranking and rating system and tries to "sell" it to a deci­
sion-maker, only the most limited success can be expected. On the 
other hand, many decision-makers seem to develop and use such 
logical models for themselves rather naturally. Though these tend 
to be simple rather than sophisticated logical models, we are dis­
covering that such simple models are surprisingly effective [6]. 
One meaning of effectiveness is that decisions reached by laborious, 
unaided, intuitive methods are in many cases the same as those 
reached by surprisingly simple logical models for combining one-
dimensional judgments. In this sense, simple models "work" for 
many decision-makers who have been studied as they worked on 
rather difficult decision problems. There are other ways to gauge 
the effectiveness of these methods as well. Decision-makers seem 
to develop them easily, find their use appealing, and have less cause 
to later regret decisions made with such aids. We suspect also that 
these methods serve to increase the reliability of the resulting deci­
sions by reducing to some degree the effects of the unconscious dis­
tractions we have previously examined. 
These three examples of the relations between dimensions of per­
sonal decision-making style and natural enhancements may lend 
some credence to our basic hypothesis, or at least suggest some 
justification for studying it further. The notion of self-directed 
change is important here because there is considerable evidence to 
indicate that although outsiders may show a decision-maker that 
his behavior is not as satisfactory as he may have supposed, sug­
gest to him the sort of things that may be unconsciously influenc­
ing it, and offer some suggestions as to the way in which it might 
be changed, if change is actually to occur it must be the work of 
the decision-maker himself. Coming to know one's own mind as 
the basis of self-motivated change is, so far as we can now tell, 
the effective way of disciplining the intuition. There are also other 
obvious advantages. Nobody has to sell a decision-maker on the 
use of decision-aiding techniques that he has developed himself; 
There is none of the traditional resistance to change to overcome. 
The process is also well adapted to the context of affairs, serving to 
enhance the intuitive powers of the manager to deal with unan­
ticipated decisions. It encourages him to evolve decision-aiding 
techniques that are particularly suited to his own style and cir­
cumstances. 
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Our conclusion, then, comes around to saying that the contribu­
tion of science to the intuitive decision processes operating to some 
degree in all decisions, and to a very great degree in decisions of 
encounter, is to encourage the process of achieving self-conscious­
ness, which will lead to self-directed change. Self-analysis, we are 
suggesting, will form the basis for self-motivated change leading 
toward the achievement of an effective and disciplined intuition. 
This is, after all, the basic conclusion of modern psychotherapy and 
ancient Buddhism. Once a person becomes aware of the inner 
sources of his behavior, the needs that have unconsciously driven 
him, he will be able to free himself from their influences. To en­
hance the intuition, one must have feed-back not only from the re­
sults of his decisions but also from his own appraisal of the internal 
sources of his behavior. 
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Donald Watson

CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
IN DESIGN 
. . . Solving a problem simply means representing it so as to make the solu­
tion transparent. If problem solving could actually be organized in these 
terms, the issue of representation would indeed become central.—Herbert A. 
Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 
Nature never works in ways you can't model. So . .  . science is wrong in 
telling us that advanced study requires special codes and abstractions. 
I'm sure that full conceptuality is going to return to the scientific method, 
and that will expedite the closure of science and the humanities. The most 
important and useful work . . . will be achieving this return to modelability. 
—R. Buckminster Fuller, as quoted in Life 
Creative and innovative design with regard to the quality and op­
timality of decisions and choices within comprehensive design pro­
grams involves a number of interesting issues that bear importantly 
upon the effectiveness of problem-solving and architectural design. 
A comprehensive design program may be defined as including the 
generation of alternative solutions or actions to be taken with re­
spect to an identified problem or objective and the decision process 
by which a selection is made among the alternatives. 
Comprehensive design programs are undertaken on a variety of 
different scales and levels of complexity. This range is indicated by 
a continuous line in Figure. 1. Those design problems that are 
simple, small, and discrete would be grouped at the left side of the 
diagram in Figure 1. Grouped at the right side of the diagram 
would be those problems that are highly complex in that they con­
simple complex 
small jarge 
discrete interrelated 
building architectural program 
elements 
social program 
transactions 
communications program 
messages 
Fig. 1. Conceptual orientations to a range of design problems. One element cannot be considered independently of the others. 
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tain a large number of interrelated variables. Urban and regional 
problems are typical of those grouped at the right, whereas the 
design of a doorknob is typical of those grouped at the left; the 
design of buildings would be located somewhere between these 
extremes. With respect to the context for design decisions, Thomas 
Markus has set forth two observations [17, p. 15]. The first is that 
no matter at what point in the continuum between simple and com­
plex problems one's design project is located, the solution alterna­
tives are constrained by relationships to elements on either side of 
that point. For example, the design of a building involves both the 
constraints of construction details as well as those of the larger 
urban context within which it is to be located. The second observa­
tion is that the larger more complex constraints are normally in­
herited and are not under the control of the designer; rather, they 
are set by historical investment patterns over a long term and can­
not be changed except at prohibitively high cost. 
What is represented by one heavy line in the diagram is actually 
the sum of separate conceptual orientations to design problems. 
Most conditions are not resolved simply by the specification of a 
physical system that is described with comparative ease in an archi­
tectural program. Implicit in each program for a building design is 
a social program, that is, a pattern of social behavior, however in­
formal or minimally structured. In addition, there can be said to 
be a communications program, not easily separated from the social 
program except by terminology familiar to organizational analysts, 
such as the origin and destination of messages, decision and control 
points, and so on. The important point to be made is that the 
traditional conceptual frame of each discipline may seriously de­
limit the inquiry in a design program only to those factors for which 
the terms are well developed. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that though decision 
aids may be applied to a wide range of problems in a number of dif­
ferent disciplines, they are more useful for some types of problems 
than for others. On one hand, particularly when the variables can 
be reduced to a common dimension such as dollars, mathematical 
decision theory, for location and resource allocation problems, for 
example, may be very useful. However, for behavioral problems in­
volving human adjustment and activity, effective solution strategies 
are difficult to identify and useful decision aids are few. Finding 
solutions to complex behavioral problems may profitably involve 
the client or user as a problem-solver. 
IDENTIFY "That is" 
DESCRIBE "What is" 
ANALYZE "How is" 
EXPLAIN "Why is" 
PREDICT "What wil l" 
EVALUATE "What ought" 
concrete abstract 
specific general 
fact rule theory 
"analogue" "symbolic" 
IDENTIFY 
DESCRIBE 
ANALYZE 
EXPLAIN 
PREDICT 
EVALUATE 
Fig. 2. Phases of empirical experimentation in the design process and a for­
mat for "cycling" critical hypotheses. 
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Consider another set of terms familiar to design programming, 
those that represent phases of decisions in an extended information 
process as diagrammed in Figure 2. The terms themselves are im­
perfect and vary in meaning from writer to writer; however, similar 
terms appear in many disciplines [1] and have been adopted in the 
methodology of the so-called systems approach. The terms should 
not suggest that the cognitive process of the individual actually 
occurs in such terms. On the contrary, the format is used as a way 
of delaying "evaluation" in the sense of premature selection of 
useful data. Of course, evaluation, and the editing that it implies, 
runs throughout the design process, even from the outset, where it 
influences one's perception of the world and one's understanding of 
the nature of the problem to be solved. Churchman observes that 
"our acceptance of the facts is a normative judgment" [4]. It 
cannot be assumed that two or more people who have different 
needs and purposes will agree on "what are the facts." However, 
the terms suggest that, before one selects a solution as the most 
suitable, the analysis on which the evaluation is based should be 
tested for its descriptive and predictive power. That is, before 
agreement is reached on "what should be done," it may be that 
agreement should be reached first on "what is." If values cannot 
be agreed upon, then the participants in the program should at 
least agree on a method for deriving and testing value assumptions 
such as cycling the critical hypotheses through the elements in 
Figure 2 —an operating discipline closely related to Bronowski's 
"Habit of Truth" [2]. The guidelines for proceeding from one 
phase to another are the subject of a fully developed literature on 
experimental design and scientific method. Design failures that are 
due to faulty experimental design make up the gallows humor of 
the research and development field. 
The previous discussion and Figures 1 and 2 provide a back­
ground for a discussion of another aspect of the design process, the 
creative thought process. Figure 3, a generalization of many con­
tinua, is presented as a diagram of that process. Different modes 
of thought vary with respect to the level of abstraction and resolu­
tion—from concrete representations to abstract and symbolic gen­
eralizations. These conceptual modes reveal themselves incom­
pletely and only at separated points of a continuous design process 
in the form of verbal statements, idea sketches, and the multitude 
of ways in which a designer "talks to himself," studies his design 
and communicates it to others. What is known about creative 
concrete abstract 
specific general 
fact rule theory 
iconic analogue symbolic 
( 
IDENTIFY 
1 
DESCRIBE 1 
1 
i 
ANALYZE 
^  ^ ^ C 
A 
EXPLAIN 
, { 
PREDICT i — < 
( » 1 
EVALUATE 
Fig. 3. Framework for the design process indicating modes of generative ideation. The transformation of information in 
model form. 
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thought processes is based largely upon the observation of external 
behavior. How a designer or problem-solver represents his thoughts 
externally should help reveal his understanding of the problem and 
the thought process by which he develops solutions. These repre­
sentations, or externalizations of aspects of creative thought, might 
be called models or frameworks that relate the problem-solver or 
designer to himself and to the real world. 
Several authors [7, 13] describe different classes of models in 
terms somewhat related to those included in Figure 3. Iconic 
models are defined as those that represent physical properties in 
some proportional scale, such as a photograph or a measured draw­
ing. Analogue models are those that represent the essential vari­
ables and the interrelationships of what can be either a set of 
physical elements or an abstract formalization, such as a circula­
tion network, a sociometric diagram, a decision chart, and so on. 
Symbolic models are those by which first-order abstractions are 
themselves symbolically represented, such as the mathematical 
representation of a theory. 
Such models are representative of varying degrees of abstraction 
and symbolization. Models, however, can be specific and symbolic 
as well as general and iconic. Though these latter types of models 
are not specifically represented in the diagram in Figure 3, the dia­
gram still serves well as a basis for setting forth a number of con­
clusions about the creative thought process. 
First of all, a comprehensive design program may be thought of 
as a series of transformation of information in model form. As 
noted already, a variety of vocabularies—words, diagrams, mathe­
matical symbols, and so on—can be employed throughout the dia­
gram noted in Figure 3. Obviously, some forms of vocabulary are 
more appropriate than others for each degree of abstraction, and 
some people can better deal with one degree of abstraction than 
another. However, it is thought that individual levels of capability 
for dealing with a wide range of abstraction can be enhanced [12]. 
Observation of external behavior in the form of generated models 
does not provide a clear indication of the underlying associative 
chain of thought, however. McCulloch suggests with respect to 
thought processes, and the generation of ideas, and the difficulty of 
understanding this process well, that ideas derive more from ab­
duction than from deduction or induction [10]. However, as with 
experimental testing, when the connection, or logical relationship 
or transformation process, cannot be recalled or reviewed, errors 
can occur; and they cannot be easily identified and corrected. 
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At any point in the diagram in Figure 3 multiple models or repre­
sentations at different levels of abstraction can be used as a means 
of generating variety. An example from the literature on creativity 
is to take any object—an ash tray, for example—and to first think 
of as many other uses for the object as possible. Then consider its 
function—to receive ashes—and think of as many other ways as 
possible for serving that function [12]. This technique may be a 
key exercise for an actively creative mind. Once elements of a pro­
cess or function can be conceptualized in the abstract, a number of 
alternate structures serving that function can be generated. This 
point is considered further below. 
Techniques mentioned in the literature on creativity are often 
ways of increasing the variety of ideas by generalization and iso­
morphic symbolization; that is, ways of moving farther to the right 
in Figure 3. It appears that the sudden insight, or brainstorm, 
comes to a person when dealing with a subject in terms that en­
courage isomorphic variations [6]. Many authors describe the ac­
cidental "pairing" of two previously unrelated ideas. The process 
of conceptualization in successively abstract modes is a program 
for that sort of ideation—what might be called the "Habit of 
Imagination." 
Although creativity and imagination are normally associated 
with that function of the mind that generates variety whereas 
critical judgment is associated with the reduction of variety, the 
terms are misleading if they imply two independent trends of men­
tality. There is as much creativity required in the process of em­
pirical experimentation (the vertical axis in Figure 3) as there is 
critical judgment in the process of generative ideation (horizontal 
axis). The two dimensions represent various functions of thought, 
one that connects us with empirical reality, another that allows our 
separation from it. An interesting correlation between the two is 
suggested by experiments wherein the number, though not neces­
sarily the quality, of ideas that a brainstorming group may produce 
is increased by lowering the threshold of judgment and avoiding 
criticism and evaluation. 
The final point to be made in connection with Figure 3 is that it 
may be useful for charting the steps taken in actual design pro­
grams utilizing self-observation techniques. A design solution may 
be seen to develop in ways suggested by the various paths repre­
sented in the diagram as A, B, and C. Path A might indicate a solu­
tion whereby a designer is inspired by existing imagery that gives 
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him a visual idea that then becomes his correction of, or contribu­
tion to, the initial problem situation. In other respects his design 
would hardly be innovative. A decision path such as B would be 
guided by ideals or normative conceptions from the outset that are 
reinforced rather than brought into question by the initial situa­
tion. Given the time and cost limits of normal problem-solving, de­
signers may assign problems to classes within which they can apply 
evaluations that have proven themselves in the past. Bruner notes 
that the value of a rigorous theory or set of laws is to eliminate the 
necessity of empirical experimentation every time a decision is 
made [3], Path C is one that represents a process of systematic 
analysis and evaluation from which general theory is derived and 
then applied to a specific situation. This is the process that is nor­
mally proscribed in the comprehensive development of new proto­
typical design. 
Having considered generally the nature of problems, activities in­
volved in the design process, and creative thought, the scope of the 
discussion can be narrowed to consider specific conceptual models 
that are used, or could be used, in the analysis and design of a 
specific building with a given program of requirements. 
The literature in the field of psychology offers a general descrip­
tion of the cognitive process. It acknowledges the tendency of the 
mind in comprehending data to sort and to catalogue information 
into a number of preconceived concept categories. There are listed 
in Figure 4 a number of concept categories that are often used in 
the structuring of architectural design problems. They can be 
tentatively stated without implying that they are what they ought 
to be or that such concepts are used by all designers; at best they 
may be taken as an initial operating frame of reference. The cate­
gories are not mutually exclusive; data with respect to any particu­
lar aspect of a building would appear in several categories. 
Concept categories are best explained as sets of relationships that 
are learned through education and experience (Fig. 4). If original 
research is undertaken, categories are suggested by relationships 
perceived when a subject is studied in terms of a given set of fac­
tors, e.g., microclimate. Like all sets of known relationships, the 
categories represent constraints on the number of design choices, 
and can be useful in delimiting the field of options to a workable 
number. By now most architectural designers are familiar with the 
technique of diagramatic "mapping" by which sets of requirements 
can be visually displayed, separately or overlapped, such as legal 
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SITE	 topography, ecology 
existing architecture and environment 
legal and market constraints 
CLIMATE	 wind and sun studies, etc. 
ACTIVITY	 movement patterns (time and motion) 
social interaction (transactions) 
communication (messages) 
SERVICE	 mechanical, access, etc. 
AESTHETICS	 insights or developed theory 
STRUCTURE	 strength of materials, etc. 
CONSTRUCTION manufacture

transport

erection

use

Fig. 4. Concept categories in architectural design. They organize our per­
ception of a problem and determine the components of its solution. 
zones, topography and other site characteristics, climate, character 
of existing environment, views and approaches from afar, and so on. 
Mapping such so-called given requirements of a particular site is a 
useful decision sequence in setting up an architectural problem. 
Further, Figure 4 is related to Figure 1 through the social and 
communications aspects of the activities that buildings and en­
vironments are designed to support. These two considerations are 
broad aspects of activities that can and should be given operational 
definition and with which designers can identify and describe the 
phenomena of human activity. In that sense they may also sug­
gest the potential contribution of the behavioral sciences to the 
formulation of design proposals. The activity category of the dia­
gram in Figure 4 is perhaps the most demanding, together with the 
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aesthetics category, since, compared with the other categories, 
there is a dearth of useful theory and aids for decision-making. 
Environmental analysts and designers can formulate models of 
problems and solutions in terms of the factors identified in Figures 
3 and 4. Four of the many forms that such models may take are 
illustrated in Figure 5. The models are abstractions of activity 
patterns, and they serve to indicate that it is possible to construct 
analogues of systems so that important relationships may be 
Fig. 5a. An analytic model of circulation linkages. From "Circulation 
Graphs," Ulm 19/20, August 1967. 
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SB 
Fig. 5b. An analytic model showing intensity of use of activity zones and 
circulation linkages. From D. Watson, "Modeling the Activity System" [9]. 
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Fig. 5c. From D. Watson et al., "A Study of the Arts and Architecture 
Building, Yale University" (1967). 
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Fig. 5d. From M. A. Milne et al., "Computer-Aided Design: The Problem 
of Undergraduate Study" (Dept. of Architecture, University of Oregon, 
1966). 
studied. However, the models that are formulated and used in 
problem-solving and design influence greatly not only how the 
problem is viewed but also the range of possible solutions. These 
models are related to, and emerge from, the culture and science of 
our nation and are transmitted more or less equally among us 
through general and professional education and experience. As 
such, really significant innovation that shatters some beliefs and 
models and advances new ones occurs from time to time. It is 
thought that the material presented here can provide some basis for 
organizing conceptual and creative thought so as to aid in achieving 
significant innovation. That is, a good problem-solver should not 
be bounded by special languages or topics but, rather, skilled in 
representing comprehensive views of a problem and in translating 
such views from one model type to another. It appears that crea­
tivity and innovation ultimately depend on such skills. 
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IMPLICATIONS 

Ian I. Mitroff

WHO LOOKS AT 
THE WHOLE SYSTEM? 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, 
it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch 
of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, 
it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.—Charles Dickens, 
A Tale of Two Cities, Book I, Chaper 1. 
The tragedy of Dickens's words lies not with their universality, for 
every epoch has its best and worst of times. The tragedy is that in 
certain times, such as our own, the feeling of despair assumes over­
whelming proportions. The tragedy of our times is that we feel 
that the best and worst stand irreparably opposed in bitter con­
trast and irony. Every one of the positive features of our civiliza­
tion is at the same time the worst of negatives. On the one hand 
stands the efficiency of our great transportation systems; on the 
other stands the brutalizing facts of cars that are "unsafe at any 
speed," air pollution due to auto exhaust that is already at the 
danger level, more deaths each year due to auto accidents than in 
any of our previous wars, and street and highway systems that 
carve up the landscape with an almost total disregard for the other 
systems that must serve all the other human needs and wants. On 
the one hand stands the great productivity and wealth of our in­
dustrial system, the richness of our way of life with its perhaps un­
paralleled range and variety of products and services—in short, our 
unparalleled standard of living. On the one hand also stand our 
great urban centers with their unlimited opportunities for diversity 
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of living, culture, and recreation. But on the other hand stand the 
by-products of our industrial systems and of our urban centers: the 
unclean air we breathe, the polluted water we drink, the pesticide-
poisoned food we eat, the overcrowded and despair-breeding neigh­
borhoods that many of our urban poor are forced to live in with no 
hope of ever finding any way out, our overcrowded and substandard 
schools—in short, all the ugliness, noise, and frustration of urban 
life that haunts and even threatens to destroy the very fiber of our 
civilization. As an aside, recently some social psychologists have 
speculated that a good part of the motivating factors for our urban 
unrest may not be due to racial problems but may instead be due 
to the feeling of being a caged animal in an urban zoo with every 
potential way out marked with the sign of despair, "No Exit." 
By now we are all too familiar with this list of virtues and vices. 
Our daily news media (but another example of our "best" and 
"worst") parade them in front of us, and our best muckrakers make 
a fortune from documenting their existence and "causes." We are 
only too hungry to read about our problems, especially the more 
sensational they are. Unfortunately, we are not as hungry to em­
bark on their solution, particularly their long-term solution. In 
fact, the greatest tragedy of all may be the feeling that we are 
powerless to do anything about them, that we are no longer the 
masters of our technology that once promised to solve all our prob­
lems and to usher in the good life. The feeling is that technology 
and civilization are themselves part of the problem, and that it is 
even naive to believe that there are solutions, let alone progress. 
Apparently if there is anything left to believe in, it is that all of our 
beautiful solutions are only problems in disguise. The cry is that 
for every problem that technology solves, it creates ten new prob­
lems in its wake. 
Now, of course, technology is no more the blame for this situa­
tion than any other single aspect of Western civilization. This does 
not mean that technology is nowhere responsible. It it can claim 
partial credit for the solution to many of our problems, it must also 
share part of the blame for their creation. To force this recognition,, 
we shall want to take a step aside, be reflective, and examine some 
of the assumptions under which our technology has operated. In 
fact, it is my contention that part of what's wrong with our tech­
nology is its lack of a reflective philosophical basis. This deficiency 
applies both to the training of scientists and engineers as well as to 
the practice of science and engineering. Among the many factors 
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and questions we shall want to consider in coming to grips with 
this deficiency are the following: 
1.	 Granting from the outset that science and engineering are 
different in many fundamental respects [see 36], what 
common philosophical presuppositions do they neverthe­
less share? To be more specific, what common philosophical 
presuppositions about the nature of reality do the methods 
of scientific research share with the methods of engineer­
ing design? 
2.	 How is the practice of science and engineering and the ed­
ucation of scientists and engineers related to the preceding 
philosophical presuppositions, whatever they are? 
3.	 How does the current philosophical base inhibit our con­
ceptualization of the components of the process of scientific 
inquiry and of the engineering design process? How does 
it restrict our current inquiries into the nature of these 
processes? 
4.	 What implications does the current philosophical base 
carry for the development of future kinds of scientists, 
science, engineers, and engineering? What, in other words, 
will the engineer and the scientist of the future look like? 
More important still, what should they look like? 
In considering these questions, it will be helpful to borrow some 
terminology from one of the newest creatures to appear on the 
scientific/technological scene, the systems scientist [see 12, also 
5]. Since the systems approach cuts across both science and en­
gineering, the language of the systems scientist is a fruitful method 
for getting at some of the common philosophical presuppositions 
that science and engineering share. Although it definitely is an 
extreme version, the following propositions represent, and far more 
than we would like to admit, the philosophical assumptions upon 
which much of our science and engineering is built. The first propo­
sition is that systems actually exist in empirical reality. This is 
the empiricist's assumption. It implies that, first of all, there is 
such a thing as "reality," and secondly that "it" is "empirical" in 
nature. More often than not, this proposition is never raised to 
consciousness. It is taken completely for granted. The second 
proposition is that every system can be broken down into its com­
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ponents, the components individuated from other components, and 
their properties measured separately. Note that this proposition 
not only implies that it is possible to individuate the components 
of a system but that it is actually possible to understand the com­
ponents of a system without having to understand the nature of 
the whole system of which the components are a part. The third 
proposition has been forcefully stated, though not necessarily 
agreed with, by Rene Dubos, the Nobel Prize-winning scientist and 
philosopher. In Dubos's own words, "the most influential assump­
tion of modern science is that the best and indeed the only scientific 
approach to the study of natural phenomena and of living orga­
nisms is to divide them into fragments and to investigate elemen­
tary structures and properties in greater and greater detail" [19, 
p. 264]. Where the second proposition only says that it is "possi­
ble" to study the components of a system, the third proposition 
says that it is not only possible but that it is the "best" and only 
scientific way. A fourth proposition [for other sets, see 3, 8-10, 15, 
19, 23-25, 27, 28, 42, 43] is the assumption of interdependence be­
tween the observer and the phenomena he is measuring, i.e., that 
observer effects can be separated and distinguished from object re­
sponses. A point, which we shall be emphasizing again and again, 
is that the reflective systems scientist would in all likelihood 
strongly contest all of these propositions [5]. It is highly debatable 
whether one can even identify the components of a system, let 
alone understand them, without having to understand something, 
if not a great deal, about the whole system [5]. 
Notice that in terms of this philosophy the scientist and the 
engineer turn out to be very hardheaded fellows. They are supreme 
realists. Terms like "the whole system" seem hopelessly vague. In 
their way of thinking, they are meaningless terms since they can­
not be defined with precision, and if there is one thing that our 
engineer and scientist respect, it is precision. (In this respect they 
are like the logical positivists for whom questions of ethics are also 
meaningless, since for one thing, the idea of "good" is, for them, 
indefinable in any naturalist sense [1].) Consistency is also an­
other one of their idols. Unfortunately, in spite of all their love for 
precision and consistency, they lack the gift of self-reflection which 
would make it possible for them to be consistent in their own argu­
ments. Whether they like it or not, the engineer and the scientist 
cannot help making statements about the whole system. Whether 
they like it or not, and whether they spell their assumptions out or 
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not, their everyday operating procedure bespeaks a philosophy. 
Where in one breath the engineer and scientist say that terms like 
the "whole system" are meaningless, in the next breath they argue 
that whatever the "it" of the whole system is, "it" can best be 
understood by studying "it" in parts. The conclusion is that, try 
as we may, we cannot avoid making statements about the whole 
system. As is so often the case, a single sentence of Michael Po­
lanyi's is sufficient to sum it up: "A complete physical and chemi­
cal topography of a frog would tell us nothing about it as a frog, 
unless we knew it previously as a frog [38, p. 342]." Commenting 
on this statement, Matson has written: 
Our recognition of the frog as a frog (the Whole Frog, or frog-in-itself) 
is independent of and antecedent to whatever notations we may make 
about it as detached observers; and, in turn, our awareness of the frog 
qua frog recedes and vanishes in the process of its reductive analysis. 
[30, p. 150] 
All of this is not intended to imply that the philosophy of 
studying smaller and smaller system components has not greatly 
added to our general understanding as to how complicated systems 
function as a unit. For over three hundred years, such an approach 
has increased our knowledge of man and his relationship to the 
world. Rather, the point is that there is room for arguing that 
this strategy has also inhibited our general understanding as much 
as it has facilitated it. The danger in concentrating all of one's 
resources on studying smaller and smaller fragments is that one 
has little, if anything, left over for putting the fragments back 
together again. The system as an integrated unit tends to get lost 
in the process of fragmentation [19, 30]. An even greater danger 
of the philosophy of studying smaller and smaller fragments is 
that it tends to become self-perpetuating. The deeper one probes 
into any phenomenon, the more fragments one can always find left 
to be fragmented. 
Churchman has prepared a powerful critique of the philosophy 
of proceeding by parts. He notes that the 
philosophy of proceeding first with the simplest problems and then work­
ing to the more difficult ones itself is based on the assumptions (1) that 
simple cases are readily identifiable and (2) that progress from the simple 
to the realistically complex is possible. 
Thus the fruitfulness of this model depends on whether the model is 
in fact a starting point for describing the more complicated and realistic 
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types of experimentation. If there is a simple beginning to an investiga­
tion, then one presumably knows beforehand what the more complicated 
steps will be, i.e., one can visualize that this first step is the beginning 
of a series leading to the more complicated steps. It is not self-evident 
that one begins with simple cases. One must show that such a procedure 
is the best possible one, and apparently this demonstration cannot be 
accomplished without already knowing a great deal about the nature 
of the more complicated cases. 
These remarks are not intended to preclude the simple-to-complex 
approach to experimentation. They are intended, however, to indicate 
that the proponents of this approach have the onus of proof of simplicity 
and the potentialities of the simple-to-complex approach. [8, pp. 162-63] 
If the point of this discussion were merely philosophical, it would 
be easy to ignore it. We could say that it is nothing more than a 
matter of playing cute word-games, and let it go at that. Un­
fortunately, the assumptions under which the engineer and scien­
tist operate have grave practical consequences. For example, it 
may be enough for the engineer to argue that in building a high­
way to go from A to B, his concern is only that the highway move 
traffic "efficiently" and "economically." It will not be enough for 
the inhabitants between A and B, who realize that the engineer 
is thereby ignoring other vital aspects of the "system," e.g., the 
displacement of hundreds of homes, shops, stores, churches, and 
playgrounds. Or, tell the city's poor that their neighborhood prob­
lems can be broken down into separate components and the whole 
solution somehow reconstructed from the parts. Tell them that 
the waste-removal system can be understood and improved 
separately from the transportation, business, or political system. 
A recent article by Dr. Robert Coles, a research psychiatrist at the 
Harvard University Health Services, vividly portrays how much 
the transportation system is in so many respects an integral part 
of the health system that confronts a city's poor [13]. Most 
middle-class whites would literally die if they had to travel re­
peatedly back and forth across their cities on public transportation 
to have to wait endlessly to see a public health physician or nurse 
only to then be told to come back again and again. 
Anyone who has ever dealt with large complex systems knows 
that the parts are so strongly coupled that it is almost frustrat­
ingly impossible to identify the individual components, let alone 
separate them. We can almost state it as a theorem that for sys­
tems that are of any interest, the components are virtually in­
separable [5]. Conversely, we might say that it is only for systems 
that are not of any strong interest that the components are 
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separable. A favorite illustration of the strong inseparability of 
systems concerns a political cartoon depicting Governor Reagan 
of California as an executioner about to chop off the head of some 
victim. In this case the "victim" was the operating budget for all 
the state departments. The caption under the cartoon read, "Don't 
worry, I'm only going to chop off 10%," referring to the governor's 
ill-fated scheme to indiscriminately reduce the operating budget 
of all state departments by 10 percent. 
The disturbing thing about the philosophy of proceeding by 
parts is its inherent lack of a sense of reflectiveness. It provides 
the perfect rationalization for each systems analyst going off on 
his own separate way (or in the jargon of our times, "doing his 
own thing")—each working on his own privileged component, and 
no one feeling compelled to justify his effort to the others. As 
justification for this, we often offer the petty argument that we 
are only describing Nature as She is, not as we want Her to be. 
In doing so we ignore outright that systems analysis is a creature 
of our making, not Nature's, that the problem a scientist or engi­
neer solves and the way he breaks that problem or system down 
into components is a choice of his making; it is a function of, 
among other things, his particular scientific/technical training and 
his personality [23, 28, 40, 47]. Those boxes on all of our flow 
charts that are supposed to describe the world are as much a 
description of us as they are of Nature itself. Nature does not 
come packaged in black (or white) boxes neatly labeled as input 
here or as output there. Rather it is one's frame of reference that 
supplies the way he packages Nature. It is only our fragmented 
educational and professional systems that keeps the components 
and the boxes separate. Universities may be organized into 
separate and autonomous disciplines, but it is not clear that 
Nature and most systems are. 
This tendency to compartmentalize is also part of our long 
tradition of empiricism that has perpetuated the myth that things 
are really "out there," i.e., that what things are is independent of 
the way we as observers look at them as objects. Marshall Mc-
Luhan would no doubt say that this is part of our cultural book 
heritage [31], What the book originally imposed artificially—i.e., 
the space and time of linear perception and thinking (the space 
and time of one separate look and thought at a time)—we have 
not only come to perceive as natural but, even more, as scientific. 
All of this has contributed to our confusing the goals of scientific 
inquiry with the actual practice. Unfortunately, the goals do not 
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will the means. Merely proclaiming that one of the goals of sci­
ence is objectivity does not thereby make the behavior of scientists 
objective in practice [40, 43]. Also, it does not separate the 
observer from what he is observing. 
Without the barest twinge of self-consciousness our educational 
system perpetuates these myths. We are masters of teaching our 
students (and here I must include myself) how to break a system 
down into components (i.e., analysis), but we are poor in teaching 
them how to put the components back together again (i.e., syn­
thesis) [18]. We have blandly assumed that because engineering 
is problem-oriented, engineering design is best taught through the 
solution of countless problems. This may indeed be the case, but 
only if we reevaluate the kinds of exercises that have been tradi­
tionally called "problems." Most, if not all, of the problems given 
to engineering undergraduates require only a single answer. As 
a result, these problems are already so overdefined that they 
prohibit the student from taking an active role. Since the student 
works neither to define the problem nor to formulate the criteria 
for a "solution," they are problems in name only. Consider what 
Baddour has had to say: 
Examination of the effect of the single-answer problem on engineering 
attitude reveals: 
(1) Incomplete	 or contradictory data have little place in single-answer 
problems. 
(2) Engineering judgment	 is not required of either the student or the 
instructor, hardly a situation to encourage its development. 
(3) The very existence of an objective standard puts the instructor in an 
almost impregnable position, which only a few of the very bright 
students will dare to challenge. Skepticism and the questioning at­
titude are not encouraged by this situation. Neither the data, the 
applicability of the method, nor the result are open to question. 
(4) The single-answer	 problem usually suggests the infallibility of logic 
rather than the ultimate word of experiment. The early history of 
science bears witness to the paralyzing effect of this attitude. [2, p. 
651] 
The point should be clear. Engineering students are generally 
expected to find the one correct solution to a given problem rather 
than to question the problem itself. Little wonder that fields, such 
as the humanities, that are not taught in this fashion are perceived 
by engineers as inherently subjective and nonscientific. 
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Whether this kind of "education" is responsible for, or the 
product of, the philosophical base is really not the important 
question here. What is important is to note their mutual reinforce­
ment. It is to be expected that there should be an intimate rela­
tionship between the pedagogy of the single-answer problem and 
the philosophy of proceeding by parts. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not radically different in the so-
called pure sciences. Thomas Kuhn's book The Structure of Scien­
tific Revolutions bears eloquent testimony to this sad fact [27]. 
A statement by Nadler provides a convenient and forceful 
summary of the discussion up to this point: ". . . The analytical 
approach focuses on components rather than on wholeness. Atten­
tion to components is essential in [scientific] research, but in 
[engineering] design it very often leads to suboptimization for the 
entire solution" [36]. Nadler's statement also provides a basis 
for raising a point that we merely touched on in passing earlier, 
i.e., that each particular analyst only analyzes a problem in terms 
of the language of his special discipline. Suboptimization, in other 
words, is a function of at least two factors: (1) an analyst can 
only include a limited number of components in his analysis of 
any problem, and (2), as much as his professional education ex­
pands his vision, it also restricts it. If the professional by virtue 
of his special training is able to see certain components that the 
nonprofessional cannot see, the professional is also unable to see 
certain components that the nonprofessional, or some other kind 
of professional, can see [see 48; 24, p. 5]. The first factor says that 
for every problem that technology solves, it will leave ten new 
problems in its wake because of its failure to deal with a large 
enough chunk of the whole problem, i.e., its failure to look at the 
whole system. The second factor says that technology will leave 
t3n new problems in its wake because of its failure to solve the 
correct problem. The fish 30 miles downstream from a factory 
dumping industrial waste into a river will die from the first factor 
because they are not considered to be part of the costs of running 
the immediate factory system. The fish, by now already dead, will 
also have died from the second factor because the value of their 
existence, if measured at all, will only be measured in terms of the 
"normal" costs (negligible) of "doing business," and not, unfor­
tunately, in terms of their value to life and to living things in 
general. 
The second factor provides a basis for considering further some 
of our earlier questions: How does the current philosophical base 
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inhibit our conceptualization of the components of the process of 
scientific inquiry and of the engineering design process, and, how 
does it restrict our current inquiries into the nature of these 
processes? If the fact that every professional views the world 
through the selective filter of his own profession has serious con­
sequences for professional practice and education, we should expect 
that it also has a serious consequences for how a profession views 
and studies itcelf. If a profession tends to look at the world in a 
rational, analytic, piecemeal fashion, and if this approach imposes 
limitations in the solution of the world's problems, then we should 
expect the profession to study its own processes in much the same 
manner and therefore to be subject to the same limitations. We 
should expect to be limited and stifled in our attempts to develop 
a comprehensive and unified theory of the engineering design 
process. 
The vast majority of empirical and theoretical studies on the 
nature of the engineering design process have either directly 
attempted to break that process down into a number of components 
or have assumed that such is ultimately the case [22, 29, 37, 39]. 
The vast majority of these studies have also assumed that because 
the description of the final output of a design, i.e., the design 
object itself, is technical in nature, the description of the designer 
and the organizational environment in which he works can also 
be affected in these terms. The engineer is represented as some 
kind of a transducer whose function it is to transform some given 
input into some clearly specified output. These studies are thus 
predicated on the subsumption of a mechanistic and reductionistic 
philosophy [see 6, 7, 9, 10, 30, 44]. This means that not only is it 
assumed that behavioral variables can be clearly differentiated 
from physical or technical variables but even stronger, that be­
havioral variables can be reduced to physical variables. As a result, 
human behavior or behavioral variables, if acknowledged at all, 
are seldom if ever treated as legitimate variables in their own light 
or in any sophisticated sense. 
Perhaps an example will serve to make these points clearer. 
Consider a typical paragraph from K. W. Norris's paper "The 
Morphological Approach to Engineering Design:" 
The first step in all organized design processes is to establish and set 
out the field of investigation. Especially if one is looking for a new or 
peculiar solution, this field should include all acceptable and reasonable 
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or possible solutions. One of the normally accepted ways of doing this 
is to produce a straightforward list of possible answers. The morpholog­
ical way of doing this, however, is to produce a table or matrix where all 
the parameters concerned are listed vertically and the corresponding 
parameter "steps" are listed horizontally. The parameters of such a 
"morphological chart" describe, in general, the feature, and functions 
of the subject considered. They indicate what the subject must in fact 
"BE" or "HAVE". The parameter "steps" on the other hand describe, 
in general, the "MEANS" of achieving the required characteristics as 
indicated by the parameters. [37, p. 116] 
Notice that the emphasis of this paragraph is on the "parameters," 
the "steps," the "Means." The emphasis is on a technical descrip­
tion of "the problem" rather than on who it is that will be solving 
the problem and accepting "the solution." The trouble with 
Norris's position is that he too easily assumes that by merely using 
his "morphological approach," an engineer will finally produce "a 
solution which may need a little explanation but in its more 
developed forms will certainly be acceptable to the client" [37, p. 
130]. It is as though the creation of the term "morphological 
approach" is supposed to magically bring about the creation of a 
good design. Again, Norris is assuming that design is a rational 
process governed by some universal laws of engineering design. 
But what happens if every engineer has his own idiosyncratic set 
of "universal laws"? What happens if the equations an engineer 
uses in a particular design situation are not only a function of the 
technical needs and wants of a client but are also a function of how 
the client expresses those needs and how he interacts with the 
engineer? In short, what happens if the technical behavior of the 
engineer is a function of the social interaction between the engineer 
and the client, i.e., a function of their personalities? What happens 
if there is gross misunderstanding and even open conflict between 
the parties to a design? Would not this strongly affect that sup­
posedly "straightforward list of possible answers"? 
However, it is important to stress that these objections do not 
necessarily imply opposition either to using Norris's method or to 
analyzing the engineering design process. Nor does it imply oppo­
sition to breaking that process down into components, for that is 
precisely what the term "to analyze" means. Norris's theory of 
design is an admirable attempt at analyzing the engineering design 
process and a useful technique for the practicing designer. One can 
ask, however, what guarantees the completeness of Norris's 
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schema? What guarantees that the components we identify in 
theory actually and separately exist in reality? What leads us to 
believe that we can neatly partition phenomena into the physical 
and social? An even more basic question is, What leads us to be­
lieve that though a science of the physical is possible, a science of 
the behavioral is not? Unfortunately, engineering education in 
general and the pedagogy of the single-answer problem in specific 
do not prepare one for answering these questions. These questions 
are outside the realm of engineering education. They are philo­
sophical. An adequate answering of these questions presupposes 
both a background in philosophy and behavioral science. Whether 
the theorist is aware of it or not, in postulating and constructing 
a theory of the engineering design process he is assuming more 
than his natural role of an engineer; he is also assuming the role 
of a philosopher and of a behavioral scientist [see 20, pp. 76, 80]. 
It should also be made clear that the preceding points are 
definitely not the result of mere philosophical speculation. For the 
most part, they are the result of this author's attempts to build a 
working computer-simulation model of the design behavior of a 
practicing mechanical engineer. Since the results of this effort 
have been extensively reported elsewhere [32, 33, 34], only a brief 
summary will be given here. 
The particular kind of problem investigated was one of pressure 
vessel design. The original objective of the study was to simulate 
the entire process by which a design was first conceived and finally 
translated into being. This involved two major phases: (1) simu­
lating how the engineer generated an initial set of feasible design 
alternatives, and (2), simulating how he selected a particular 
alternative from that set for final design. The client in this process 
was represented by a set of technical input variables defining his 
design needs. The engineer was represented by a set of technical 
design equations whose function it was to transform the input into 
a final design object. The outcome of this effort, which was exten­
sive, was an enormous success in simulating how the engineer 
generated design alternatives and, unfortunately, an enormous 
failure in simulating how he searched that set for a particular 
solution to a particular client's needs. There were good reasons 
for success in the first part and failure in the second. In the first 
part of the process, i.e., how the engineer generated design alter­
natives, the client's needs could be represented as technical input 
variables that were relatively independent of who the particular 
design engineer happened to be. In the second part, i.e., the 
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process by which a final design alternative was selected, the client's 
needs could not be represented by technical input variables alone 
that were in any sense independent of the particular design engi­
neer. The behavior of the engineer was so strongly coupled to that 
of the client, and vice versa, that it was difficult to say where the 
internal properties of the one left off and the external inputs of the 
other began. A final design alternative was selected through the 
process of face-to-face interaction. How the client and the engineer 
responded during this phase of the design process was a strong 
function of their individual personalities and their respective 
images of each other. 
On the whole, it seemed that most of the engineer's clients fell 
into one of two classes: those who overdefined their design require­
ments, and those who underdefmed them. The first class, the over-
definers, literally made no solution possible; no design could 
simultaneously satisfy every one of their constraints. The under-
definers, on the other hand, made too many solutions possible. 
They either never got around to defining their needs or did not 
know what they wanted. Often they would say, "Look, tell me 
what I want. If I knew what I wanted, I never would have come 
to you in the first place." 
The trouble with the overdefiners was twofold: not only were 
they cocksure about what they needed, but they even thought they 
knew more about design than the engineer did. In part this was 
a function of their personality, their need to assert themselves; 
in part it was also a function of their position and background. 
Whereas the engineer had only a B.S. in mechanical engineering, 
his clients usually had a Ph.D. in physics. Furthermore, the engi­
neer was only in the organization, a large university research 
laboratory [46], as an adjunct to render support to the basic 
physics goals of the laboratory. In the last analysis, the physicist 
always had the final word. Little wonder that the unwritten motto 
of the engineer's design group was, We always give our clients 
what they want even when it is not what they need. 
In reality there were, of course, many more types than the two 
just mentioned. One could spend a whole study on analyzing and 
classifying the personalities of physicists and on the kinds of input 
different personality types characteristically defined. One thing, 
though, is clear: many more studies are needed on how problems 
actually get defined and why different personality types assume 
different "givens" in the formulation of problems. 
It should be noted that not all the difficulty in communication 
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that occurred between the engineer and the physicist was due to 
such factors as the mismatch between different personality types 
or the fact that physicists in general had more power and status 
in the organization. The breakdown in communication was due 
to a variety of factors. One of the other reasons why engineers and 
physicists had difficulty in communicating with one another and 
agreeing on the "ultimate" basis for designing pressure vessels was 
because they had been trained to look at nature in fundamentally 
different ways. The engineer looked at the design object as a 
piece of working equipment (in effect, a structural support) that 
had to be built and serviced; the physicist looked at the object as 
a nuclear barrier. And the two images were not isomorphic. From 
the point of view of engineering, the pressure vessel had to be 
thick enough, and then some, to withstand the pressure loads. 
From the point of view of physics, the vessel had to be as thin as 
possible to obstruct as little as possible the incident and reactive 
nuclear particles the physicist was interested in observing. 
The preceding points up one of the most interesting findings to 
emerge from the study. This was the tremendous degree to which 
each of the parties to the design was unaware of the innumerable 
assumptions they were each making about the process of design. 
In fact, it is correct to say that we were generally unaware that 
they were even making any assumptions. But this is not to imply 
that both parties were unaware of the conflicting requirements that 
the pressure vessel had to satisfy. Engineers generally understood 
that the pressure vessel had to be thin enough to meet the physics 
requirements, and physicists generally understood that the vessel 
had to be thicker than they would have liked it to be in order to 
satisfy the engineering requirements. What they were unaware of 
was how much their professional orientation not only affected their 
conception of the other party but also their self-conception. To the 
engineer, the physicist was an eminently unpractical fellow incap­
able of appreciating the practical basis for design. To the physicist, 
the engineer was an eminently untheoretical fellow incapable of 
ever appreciating the theoretical basis of physics. According to 
the engineer, if the physicist were more practical he would have 
been better able to understand why the engineer's design pro­
cedures were still rational, given the nature of the practical design 
problems an engineer had to face. According to the physicist, if the 
engineer were more theoretical, he would have been better able to 
establish a more rational theoretical basis for design. So it went, 
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endlessly back and forth. Of course, what is really interesting is 
that each demanded from the other what they were unable to do 
and be for themselves. As a matter of fact, the physicist was not 
always as rationally theoretical as he thought he was. Many of 
his equations were no more than rules of thumb, and many of the 
engineer's design equations were on a much firmer empirical and 
theoretical base than the physicist's. 
The difference between what the engineer and the physicist said 
they did and what they actually did was considerable. At the 
conscious verbal level both parties could point to explicit, well-
defined rational procedures as justifications for their behavior and 
position. These procedures were largely the idealized models they 
had learned in the course of their professional education. The 
physicist, for example, could point to the Bohr model of the atom 
as typifying the structure and practice of physics. The engineer, 
on the other hand, could point to the formula for bending in beams. 
Neither of these stereotypes, of course, bore any necessary relation 
to the real practice of physics or engineering; they were just part 
of the professional ideology that each had picked up along the 
way. And, of course, since neither of them shared the same 
ideology, each was suspect to the other. 
It should not be inferred that ideology does not have an im­
portant role to play. The occupational sociologists tell us that 
ideology is one of the factors that integrates an individual into a 
profession, i.e., that he shares a common set of group reference 
norms [23]. Such norms are also valuable for pointing to the ideal 
practice of the profession. They tell us how we would like to prac­
tice science and engineering if we were free from observer bias and 
if we could control all the relevant factors, assuming that we knew 
them. Again, because one of the goals of science and engineering 
happens to be that mysterious beast called "objectivity," this does 
not automatically will its occurrence in practice. Newton's Laws 
(the end product of scientific inquiry) bear as little relation to the 
way science and engineering actually get done as the multiplication 
table does to the way people actually multiply numbers in their 
head. 
In an extremely interesting paper entitled "The Role of the 
Subconscious in Executive Decision-Making," Robert Ferber has 
documented the existence of this same phenomenon in manage­
ment. The purpose of Ferber's paper is to define the limits of 
executive rationality and irrationality. In it he states: 
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Psychologists tell us that our minds work on conscious and subconscious 
levels. On the conscious level we are aware of what we really think and 
can reason things out step by step. On the subconscious level or levels 
any number of physical and emotional influences can affect our thought 
processes. Then the person feels that a certain thought exists without 
knowing how or why. If this thought appears very desirable to the in­
dividual, ratic nalization occurs. In rationalization the person tries, often 
subconsciously, to bring the subconscious thought into a pattern of con­
scious thought that will justify it. [21, p. B-520] 
Naturally, to comeone else who is not involved on the subconscious 
level, it is often a trivial matter to detect the process of rationaliza­
tion in others. Of course, this almost follows by definition. By 
definition, few of us are in touch with our own subconscious, or, 
more properly speaking, our own unconscious. As Ferber puts it: 
These [rationalizing] motives are easily seen in others and rarely within 
oneself, because the conscious mind is usually quite out of touch with 
the subconscious. When a company hires an executive, it is really getting 
two executives for the price of one: the conscious, rational thinker and 
the subconscious rationalizer, who occpy the same desk. [21, p. B-523] 
We have little reason to believe that the scientific and engineer­
ing professions are any more conscious of their unconscious images 
than management is. The danger with this is that decisions made 
at the unconscious level will be prevented by the process of ration­
alization from being examined at the conscious level. In Ferber's 
words: 
What is needed, really, is an integration of the decision-maker to the 
point where the conscious knows what the subconscious is doing. Although 
the company would no longer be getting two executives for the price of 
one, it might be getting one prince instead of two paupers. Both con­
scious and subconscious thinking can aid a man in his work, but the two 
should be in touch. [21] 
So much for the thesis that design is a wholly rational process 
that can be solely described in technical terms. Literally every 
facet of the technical processes studied were permeated with the 
engineer's personal feelings and evaluations. This is all the more 
dramatic when we consider that both the engineer and the physicist 
had had extensive training in science. 
So much, as well, for the thesis that science and engineering are 
completely objective ways of inquiring and that they constitute 
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the standards for objective inquiry. Science and engineering still 
have a long, long way to go in coming to grips with some of their 
most cherished assumptions before they can lay claim to "dis­
interested objectivity." They are still too immersed in their self-
images to be objective. They are not as distanced from the phe­
nomena they observe as they have so glibly assumed. In short, 
whether they like it or not, if the goal of the sciences and engineer­
ing really is to get rid of the human subjective element in tech­
nical knowledge, it will take many more studies of the type 
described here. One does not make a field of inquiry objective by 
ignoring the human element; objectivity can only be the result 
of a sophisticated way of accounting for the human element. This 
means strangely enough that the physical and engineering sciences 
will have to become much, much more committed to the develop­
ment of the social sciences than they have ever conceived of as 
necessary, for it is one of the functions of these sciences (via the 
psychology and sociology of science [4, 23, 28, 42, 47]), to study 
how all the sciences actually do science. This, in turn, means that 
we shall have to start using the methods and results of these sci­
ences in order to improve on our own. The time is long past for 
physical scientists and engineers to ask whether the social sciences 
are even "sciences," much less whether they have anything to 
contribute. These are no longer fruitful questions. Olaf Helmer 
and Nicholas Rescher's excellent paper entitled "On the 
Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences" should be required reading 
for all those who think that the physical sciences are universally 
"hard" and that the social sciences are perpetually doomed to be 
"soft." To quote Helmer and Rescher: 
It is a fiction of long standing that there are two classes of science, the 
exact and the inexact, and that the social sciences are by and large mem­
bers of the second class—unless and until, like experimental psychology 
or some parts of economics, they mature to the point where admission to 
the first class may be granted. [25, p. 25] 
Writers on the methodology of the physical sciences often bear in mind 
a somewhat antiquated and much idealized image of physics as a very 
complete and thoroughly exact discipline in which it is never necessary 
to rely upon limited generalizations or expert opinion. But physical sci­
ence today is very far from meeting this ideal. Indeed some branches of 
the social sciences are in better shape as regards the generality of their 
laws than various departments of physics such as the theory of turbulence 
phenomena, high-velocity aerodynamics, or the physics of extreme tern­
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peratures. Throughout applied physics in particular, when we move 
(say in engineering applications) from the realm of idealized abstraction 
("perfect" gases, "homogeneous" media, etc.) to the complexities of the 
real world, reliance upon generalizations which are, in effect, quasi-laws 
becomes pronounced. (Engineering practice in general is based on "rules 
of thumb" to an extent undreamed of in current theories of scientific 
method.) [35, p. 30] 
In a sense, one of the most important developments of the 
modern philosophy of science has been the active demonstration 
of the interconnectedness between the various sciences. Physics 
is not the standard for scientific method; in fact, no science is. 
Rather each science conditions each of the others. Physics, which 
only provided the initial model for scientific method, could learn a 
lot about new developments in scientific methodology [11] if it 
were willing to study and learn from the social sciences, as the 
social sciences have historically been willing to learn from the 
physical sciences. Philosophers of science, such as E. A. Singer 
and C. West Churchman in particular, have shown that as much 
as social and behavioral concepts can be, and traditionally have 
been, defined in physical and mechanistic terms, the procedure can 
now be reversed. Physical and mechanistic concepts can now be 
defined in social and behavioristic terms [6, 7, 9, 10]. 
With these ideas as background, we are now ready to consider 
our fourth and last question that we posed earlier: What impli­
cations does a revised philosophical base have for the education 
and practice of future engineers and scientists? First of all, with 
physics no longer the standard for defining concepts and processes, 
and with the growing appreciation of the legitimacy of a wide 
variety of behavioral concepts and models, we can anticipate the 
growing alliance between some seemingly disparate fields of study. 
For example, I can visualize engineering-psychology, which as we 
currently conceive of it is better represented by the term engineer­
ing-experimental psychology, broadening to include engineering-
clinical psychology. The Ferber paper referred to a while ago gives 
an indication of what the concerns of this field would be as well 
as what the training of its practitioners would consist of. The 
following statement by Ferber is especially pertinent here: 
A psychological consultant can be to his client company as the psychia­
trist is to an individual. Indeed, many top management engagements 
include at least the part-time assistance of a psychiatrist or clinical 
psychologist. [21, p. B-524] 
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What is suggested then is that there may be a need to merge these 
two roles, the engineer and the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, 
in a single individual. Such a strange fellow may be a real neces­
sity, and not just a luxury, if we are ever to develop a unified 
theory of the engineering design process that accounts equally well 
for the unconscious, irrational aspects of design as it does for the 
conscious, rational aspects. Such a fellow could also prove ex­
tremely worthwhile for a large organization to keep around. He 
could be extremely useful in helping to resolve disputes between 
different individuals where the technical aspects of the dispute 
are so intertwined with the social aspects that it proves virtually 
impossible to treat them separately. It is clear that such an in­
dividual would have to be fluent in both worlds, the technical and 
the clinical. The big question is, of course, how fluent? 
Proceeding a step farther, one can anticipate the engineer-
sociologist, part engineer and part sociologist. Given our current 
distinction between the individual and the group, where it would 
be the function of the engineer-clinical psychologist to treat in­
dividuals, it would be the function of the engineer-sociologist to 
study and to treat groups. 
Proceeding even further, one can visualize the engineering-
anthropologist. His function would be to study and to treat whole 
communities, if not whole cultures. The distinction between the 
engineer-clinical psychologist, -sociologist, and -anthropologist is 
measured by the size of the groups they are trained to treat. This 
separation of roles is, of course, predicated on our current distinc­
tion between the life-space of the individual, the group, and the 
culture. This distinction is not always easy to maintain, and in 
one sense, it is always artificial, i.e., it is more a construct of our 
making than it is of nature's. There are really no natural dividing 
lines between the fields of psychology, sociology, and anthropology. 
But this is another matter. 
The biologist Robert S. Morrison has astutely noted that, in its 
unrelenting efforts to better know life, science has strangely 
enough increasingly withdrawn from life: 
. . . The kind of world science has chosen to talk about is in a way alien 
or at least uninviting to most men. . . . The scientific method has achieved 
its successes by reducing the subjective individual component of experi­
ence to a minimum. In its unremitting effort to produce as wide agree­
ment as possible, it is most successful when it has reduced natural phe­
nomena to pointer readings. Most of what makes life worth living, its 
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warmth, its color, its love and joy, as well as its pain and its tragedy— 
indeed all its immediately subjective presentations to consciousness—is 
deliberately circumvented or simply omitted. [35, p. 281] 
As Morrison also notes, "This is not to say that the scientist does 
not experience those human emotions" in his role as a scientist. 
As human beings, scientists do of course. Unfortunately, these 
same human enotions do not always get into our scientific models. 
This is where the need for the engineering-anthropologist arises. 
In the process of abstracting from nature in, say, the process of 
building a model for a proposed highway, the people the highway 
is intended to serve always seem to get left out. Somewhere along 
the way, the people in the community get converted into "entities," 
"consumers," or "subjects." Their all too human needs become 
"inputs"; their cherished life-goals become "future system states." 
In this process of abstraction, the highway engineer never sees the 
real community as it actually exists; he never feels its life style, 
knows its people, or walks its streets. He is a stranger to their 
customs and their way of life. How, then, can he or anybody else 
pretend to know enough about them to be able to design what is 
most efficient for the community, let alone what is best for the 
whole system? 
What is suggested is that we may have to train our future engi­
neers in anthropological field methods. Before we even dare to let 
them draw a single line on a blueprint, we may have to send them 
out to live with a community, for months if need be. They will 
have to learn how to breathe its air, eat its food, and respect its 
customs, symbols, totems, and taboos. They will have to learn 
the limitations of our strange magic, to learn, for example, that 
the richness of a way of life can only be partially captured at best 
by input/output analysis. 
In short, engineers will have to become a part of the system that 
they are designing for. It will not do for the designers of the SST 
to live far removed from its proposed flight path. It would be 
interesting to see whether the designers of the SST would be as 
willing to argue that we will once again have to learn how to 
"adjust" to the machine, in this case, the noise of the SST, if they 
also had to live with the noise. When one is not a part of the 
experiment, it is only too easy to experiment on others. If informed 
consent is at the heart of morality [5, 9, 41], then we will be 
obliged to give our clients the best possible presentation of the 
technical, social, and moral issues involved so that they can make 
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up their minds as to whether they really want a highway. If we 
as "experts" do not act to raise these issues, who will? If we as 
experts do not act to teach our clients to become their own experts, 
who will? If we do not include the poor in the planning of their 
own communities, will anybody else? Not if the qualification for 
participation is being an "expert," for by definition the poor are 
not experts or else they would not be poor. 
It is clear that the discussion has raised more questions than it 
has provided useful answers, and many more new roles have been 
proposed for the engineer than realistic proposals for creating them. 
Further, the discussion has treated engineering and science 
harshly. But it has done these things only because society is be­
coming extremely demanding of our scientists and engineers. It is 
no longer quite as willing to live with the artificial boundaries that 
we have erected between professions. Fifty years ago it was quite 
easy to define the domains of the scientist and the engineer. Today 
this is no longer so. But this is only further proof of the importance 
and vitality of the professions. It is only a dying or standstill pro­
fession that has no new demands placed on it. One does not hear, 
for example, a great clamor for the need for defining the role of 
the barber of the year 2001. 
As long as new roles are being proposed for the engineer without 
indicating how they can be brought into being, one further proposal 
might be set forth. This one is perhaps the most outrageous of 
all: the engineer-theologian. Yet, as strange as it sounds, would 
not this really be the natural outcome of a science and technology 
that focused its efforts on describing larger and larger whole sys­
tems? It does not take much reflection to see that our experiments 
have been becoming increasingly larger and larger. We have people 
like Athelstan Spilhaus talking about experiments as large as a 
whole city [45]. Furthermore, we are no more than a stone's 
throw away from experimenting with our largest natural system 
to date, the solar system itself. And as soon as we ask, "Experi­
ment for what purpose, for what good?," are we not on the verge 
of creating an experimental theology? Notice carefully the em­
phasis on the word "experimental," for this marks the distinction 
between the old and the new theology. The old theology talked 
about Someone Else creating the heavens; in the new one, we will 
do the creating ourselves. Let us pray that it will be for the better 
and not for the worse. 
With all the other feelings that science has repressed in its 
unconscious, it shouldn't really be surprised to discover that at 
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least one of those feelings has been religious [15]. What else are 
we to make of the quest for unity, for orderly explanation [see 14, 
16]? What are these if not religious goals? In his latest book, 
Challenge to Reason [5], Professor Churchman appears at his 
best when he suggests that perhaps the only difference between 
the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century systems scientists (Spi­
noza, Leibniz, Kant, Descartes) and the modern systems scientists 
is the degree of their consciousness about the true guiding purpose 
of their efforts: 
In place of the term God, the term that typifies our gropings for a twen­
tieth-century rationalism is system. A system is rational; it explains, it 
unifies, it does all the things for its components that Spinoza's and Leib­
niz's God did for theirs. [5, pp. 122-23] 
Who looks at the Whole System? In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, i t was God. The twentieth century is 
struggling to replace the concept of God with such concepts as 
that of the General Systems. The twentieth century's version of 
God is, to quote Professor Churchman, the "Guarantor of Our 
Decisions, or G.O.D." 
Gods never really die. They just go underground to reemerge 
in the strangest of places. God does not know it, but today He is 
either already enrolled in an engineering school or is planning to 
enroll in one soon to begin studying systems science. For those 
of us who have a hand in designing curricula, it behooves us to 
design a curriculum befitting His concern for the whole world. 
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DECISION AIDS 
NEEDS AND PROSPECTS 
There are two general observations on decision-making aids that 
seem appropriate at this point in time. These may be set forth 
more in the form of a practitioner's plea than a researcher's con­
clusion. The first is: Get technologically aided deciding operative. 
The second observation follows closely on the first; it calls for the 
the appropriate representation of real life. 
The first observation, essentially, is a charge to the theorists 
and the applications people to put both the technology of informa­
tion science and decision theory into their proper role as a cognitive 
extension of decision-process bodies' thought processes. The talk 
has been endless but the full-scale operative installations few. The 
most direct form of this is on-line computing in the hands of middle 
and supervisory management—not just top management levels. 
This point is generally in support of Professor Morris's discussion 
of enhancing the personal style of the decision-making body. 
The second observation suggests that with more formalized 
technologically aided deciding in fact, there will be a far greater 
opportunity for clear observation of how decisions are made. As 
such, it will provide opportunities for formalized monitoring of the 
decision process activity—a period of clinical observation, of sorts. 
Ten years from now we would thereby hope to have more hard 
evidence on hand about how decisions are made than there is 
available at present. 
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Fig. 1. Above and on the following pages are examples of vintage visual 
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Technologically Aided Deciding 
As recently as fifteen years ago visual aids for management sci­
ence training took the form of those presented in Figure 1. 
Although these hardly need interpretation, comment is unavoid­
able. The message certainly has not changed over the years— 
prediction is still the sine qua non of effective managing and 
decision-making. But it seems a somewhat mild word, although 
its roots suggest something very strong: to "state beforehand," 
a difficult feat to perform accurately and consistently. The term 
"pre-live" perhaps more emphatically conveys what is being sought 
and what can best serve the many moments of truth faced in 
decision-making. For when all the shouting is over, all the thinking 
done, it comes down to one person or group saying, "This is what 
will be done." And all the shouting and all the thinking by the 
observers and theorists comes to very little unless it serves such 
moments. Clearly, and unfortunately, the best way to serve is 
through non-involved time travel. The next best, and possible, is 
the aforementioned pre-living—an examination of what life will be 
like under possible courses of action and possible uncontrollable 
events. An examination like this requires some image of real life, 
and the capabilities range all the way from the mind's eye to 
elaborate computer models. The question of which extreme is bet­
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ter ought not to arise—it is really a design problem to establish 
the appropriate representation of real life. 
Certainly, the arguments to have formal abstract representations 
of real life are strong. The trick is to make them an adjunct to 
intuition, not a replacement for it. Given reasonably useful models 
that can be rapidly executed permits decision-making bodies to 
have some realistic pre-living experiences that can be mutually 
shared. Various catchphrases come to mind: "One is seeking the 
answer to the 'what if question." "One is trying out life before­
hand," resulting in a kind of beforehand hindsight. Whatever the 
label or characterization of the process, it unavoidably goes on 
and can be given a wider base of mutual understanding through the 
use of formal abstract representations or models. And whatever 
the faults of the models themselves, one is directed to the com­
ments of Ira Lowry [6] in his AIP Journal article of several years 
ago: "It is better to try something—anything—than to merely 
wring one's hands over the futility of it all. . . . Model builders 
. . . can take comfort in the thought that they are building for 
the distant if not the near future." 
The point is to get models more operative than they now are. 
One of the most effective ways to do this would seem to be person­
alized computing. Technology now offers the capability for 
decision-making bodies to have direct access to appropriately sized 
computers in the form of keyboard consoles and pictorial devices. 
In this on-line relationship, the deciding body can accelerate sub­
stantially the steps in its pre-living process, make the process much 
more complete, and bring into being, it would seem, better deci­
sions. But it raises certain problems and demands discipline so 
that there will not be willy-nilly production of noise in the form 
of proliferated system possibilities. Still, the generation of alter­
native ways of life as candidates for actuality often depends on 
what has already been considered and examined. Even with over­
night computing, the thread of concept can be lost or distortedly 
recovered. This impedes the posing of meaningful, even inspired, 
possibilities. Moreover, it cuts down on the number of alternatives 
likely to be considered in a formal way. On-line computing over­
comes this time lag, permits otherwise suppressed speculations to 
be introduced, and lets managing and planning creativity flourish. 
Personalized computing is a fairly new dimension outside the 
scientific community, and makes a major step in the direction of 
technologically aided deciding. It is important, though, to see 
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the computer in its proper light, a view often blocked off. A com­
puter has the necessary huge storage to accommodate not vast 
collections of trivia but vast sets or relationships. A computer has 
the speed not to find isolated bits of data whimsically requested but 
to trace, rapidly, intricate interrelated events and actions mean­
ingfully proposed. A computer in such an on-line role does not 
create "management- or government-by-machine"; rather, it per­
mits machine-aided deciding and, as such, acts as a real cognitive 
extension of the decision body's thought processes. 
A personal image of this general set of ideas can be conveniently 
set forth in the form of propositional statements addressed to the 
general managing/planning activity of any organizational form, be 
it private business or public government. These statements are: 
1.	 Managing can be viewed as systems designing. 
2.	 The designing process is essentially one of pre-living and 
selecting. 
3.	 Formal mathematical/computer models, as representations 
of the real world, are extremely helpful in pre-living pos­
sible plans or systems. 
4.	 Formal decision theory is helpful in selecting an appropri­
ate plan or system from among the candidates pre-lived. 
5.	 Models can be designed or tailor-made to meet specific 
managing situation needs. 
6.	 The whole process of system-model-information designing 
goes on and on—it is evolutionary and adaptive. 
Now these are brave words; the trick is to make them more 
than that, which is what this first charge to the theorists is all 
about. Certainly part of the job is being done. There are some 
organizations in the management consulting field—working from 
the top down—that have installed hot-Hne simulators complete 
with enlarged color cathode ray tube display in boards of directors 
meeting rooms. I suspect that some of these installations are 
impeded by the technicians' craving for detail, but at least it is 
a positive start. However, it is needed at nil levels of designing 
and managing, and the case for this kind of lash-up in public 
government is particularly strong. The interactive dilemma at 
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different levels of government hangs to an appreciable extent on 
the inability to regenerate details of program of action. Local 
governments trying to deal with state planning boards, for in­
stance, with alternative recommendations are constantly hampered 
by the difficulty of "drawing that new line" on the blueprints of 
construction programs. The technical fraternity often presents an 
accomplished fact not so much because of conviction in merit but 
more because of the glacial maneuverability they have on technical 
detail. An even simple on-line computing arrangement at alder­
manic council meetings might do very much toward illuminating 
various proposals—the most quarrelsome malcontont might well 
rapidly be shown to be just that, or quite possibly an innovative 
genius whose concepts of action when projected turn out to be 
very appealing indeed. 
Professor Morris discusses the need to enhance the personal style 
of the decision-maker. It appears that technologically aided de­
ciding can help achieve this end by permitting the more extensive 
use of intuitive processes, particularly the conjectural capability. 
For in all managing or deciding roles, conjecture really is the 
noblest state. In the most tactical or far-ranging leadership the 
"what if" question is uppermost in the mind. If it is well posed 
and well answered, the next moment, day, year, or decade is a 
healthy one for the organization. It is not just a matter of success, 
either—outside events can be devastating; but it can be a matter 
of survival, an educated fearlessness for enduring the outrageous. 
One measure of management is its ability to plan its catastrophes, 
and the on-line computing arm has a large role to play in this. But 
it is not just a foul-weather friend; it must serve the whole decision-
maker, however overused that term may be. The computer cannot 
answer all questions, but those it can and yet does not now answer 
divert the decider unnecessarily and cripple his ability to deal with 
non-computer matters of judgment, involving vastly more complex 
human factors. Intuition, then, is far from equivalent to an "aw 
shucks" demeanor, as it is often portrayed; it is remarkably sophis­
ticated, far beyond our current capability to mimic—a capability 
that commands profound respect. 
There is one specific area regarding useful models that bears 
attention, briefly at least. As model complexity gets higher, un­
certainty about real life diminishes. Howover, the information 
costs start to rise considerably, and the incremental reduction in 
the penalties of deciding drop off perhaps not as sharply. In the 
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other direction, uncertainty increases as the model complexity 
diminishes—the information costs go down, but the decision 
penalties rise. One seeks to strike some sort of balance or "total 
cost" minimum. And one can almost hear a good decision-maker 
saying to himself when making a call to action, "The costs of addi­
tional information are considerably greater, now, than the penalties 
of the wrong decision." 
The role of decision theory in the modeling process has not been 
loudly touted. Professor Morris's recent paper [11] certainly airs 
the problem and comments intriguingly on it with this note at the 
end: " . .  . The teaching of models is not equivalent to the teach­
ing of modelling. . . .  " A specific decision-theoretic approach is 
described in a paper by Harris [4] regarding the appropriate level 
of resolution in a forecasting model [see also 1, 13]. 
Various catchphrases come to mind here as well—shall it be a 
bludgeon or a scalpel? Refinement is not equal to insight. Pre­
cision does not guarantee operationality. Again, whatever the 
epigram, this kind of contribution from theorists is vital to the 
realization of effective technologically aided deciding. The whole 
matter can be bogged own too easily in highly detailed marshland. 
To avoid this, the best of decision-theoretic effort must be exerted 
so that the information system is reasonably compatible with the 
overall information process. Such a decision process with a built-in 
compatible information system is an exercise, to paraphrase M. J. 
Moroney [9], in how to be sure while yet being uncertain. 
The discussion thus far focusing on the technological possibilities 
and the need to become operational serves also to dramatize the 
need to consider the question of value rather than to defer it to 
what more meaningfully becomes "keen executive judgment." The 
word "optimality" is disturbing because all problems are multiple-
value problems with trade-offs that are relentlessly situational. On 
this point Professor Morris [10] notes that "the problems of the 
scientific study of values are far from solved . . . The analyst may 
wish, after this brief introduction, to simply take note of the prob­
lem and then avoid it. . .  . Indeed, . . . there is little choice in 
the matter." Ira Lowry, in a recent commentary on optimal de­
sign [7], makes this point: "On reading this paper on optimal de­
sign, my first reflection was that if God had been exposed to [it] 
. .  . He would have postponed the Creation indefinitely and ap­
plied to the Ford Foundation for a research grant. . .  . In the de­
sign of large systems, . . . scientific analyses of system mechanics 
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will enable us to avoid large mistakes even though it will not enable 
us to locate optimum optimorum. I, for one, am willing to settle 
for this limited goal." The general idea in Lowry's commentary was 
that the curve is flat—that many systems seem to have a unique 
adaptive capability to a whole range of decisions, and the brouhaha 
over value may not be as critical as some would have us believe. 
The whole problem of value seems to solve itself to a limited de­
gree. Yesterday's value discussions on the mystique of cost pre­
diction and scheduling arrangements are today's technology. Some 
disciplines are discovering other disciplines' technology and meth­
odology and relieving what to them has been a "value" problem— 
architects are fully aware of flow diagrams now, which, regrettably, 
have been commonplace in industrial engineering for some time. 
The level of argument is constantly rising in a qualitative and not 
just in a quantitative sense. It really does little good to talk about 
the value of a man's effort when we have little hard evidence to de­
scribe his projected output. 
So the call here is to pre-live fully using all the technological as­
sistance we can to enrich our mind's-eye capabilities. When tech­
nologically aided deciding becomes a way of life, when the costs, 
the service, the physical characteristics, the time characteristics, or 
whatever become rapidly projectable at the flick of a finger, or even 
at the sound of a voice, then we can start looking around and take 
the next bold step forward. 
Observation 
As this bold new world of technologically aided deciding comes 
into being, the opportunities for looking at the decision-making 
process are considerably improved. Even without this, the charge 
to be more "explicitly self-aware" is very strong. We have ample 
evidence of the virtues of taking a process viewpoint of ongoing 
phenomena. The Quality Control living legacy is there for all to 
see. Two purposes can be served by this self-examination—the en­
richment of adaptive concepts in the decision process and the en­
richment of the entire decision process itself including the various 
value characteristics. 
At best, technologically aided deciding has too much of a one-
shot image. One gets the impression that various alternatives are 
displayed, a selection made, and that's that. The theme of obser­
vation must be woven into a decision process itself. In decision­
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making there is a continuous aftermath that demands continuous 
monitoring. To look continuously at perception versus actual is 
necessary for objective, mutually sharable, adaptive strategies. Suf­
ficient theory exists now for the exercise of such adaptive strategies. 
And certainly among the decision-making pros it has a place—it is 
the old "batting average" idea that many seem to be rediscovering 
recently. But operated as a natural thing—non-formally—it tends 
to become casual, frenetic, even convulsive, and this is particularly 
true on the public governing scene. So part of this call to observa­
tion is to inject a sense of systems hygiene into the decision-making 
process. 
Behavioralists for some time have dealt with small-scale labora­
tories—small groups interacting on well-defined highly limited 
systems. The problems are certainly profound and complex. One 
on the outside, however, gets the distinct impression that there is 
the equivalent of a molecular committee seeking to synthesize 
Boyle's law—undeniably a challenge but perhaps a questionable 
tactic. Hard looks at ongoing decision-process phenomena are dif­
ficult to come by but possibly easier as technologically aided de­
ciding becomes more common. In any event, a period of clinical 
observation is called for; it is really the manager-decider who is 
important, not just the target system controlled and directed. So 
much of the recent work has been directed at this target system, 
elaborately depicting it with all sorts of technological and meth­
odological power. Little attention—or, at least, little concrete 
guidance—has been directed toward the manager. Management 
science, in other words (to recall a forgotten author's observation), 
smacks more of the "science," if that is really the right word, and 
much less of "management" than is appropriate. And this, the re­
verse of "scientific management" of the 1920s. It comes down to 
the point that we now really need more simulators of a manager 
than of a production process. 
Another assist in this direction of observation may come from 
the work in operational gaming. Although traditional operational 
gaming tries to create a real-life off-line environment, it conven­
tionally does very little in the way of teaching the player the tricks 
of coping. Accordingly, some thought has been given and some 
action taken on what can be called decision-process gaming [see 2, 
3, 5, 8, 12, 13, 15]. Such games have a computer available for as­
sistance during the game itself. A player can manipulate the 
models, analytical techniques, simulators, or whatever, through a 
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computer console and pretest or pre-live possible decisions. Using 
decision-making aids in this quasi-real-life setting is a far stronger 
learning experience. There is also a research possibility because cer­
tain models themselves and sensitivity in particular can be ex­
amined more objectively. 
Even moie seems possible. For decision-process gaming really 
represents an off-line technologically aided deciding system. The 
mind's-eye formal model interaction certainly can be explored. The 
observed-observer interaction can be studied. A miniature decision-
process laboratory comes into being. It offers the usual advantages 
of a laboratory over real life. One is not too sure how responsive 
behavioralists will be to such laboratories—it is often quite un­
nerving to watch a session of, say, CLUG or CITY I in process. 
However, more awesome phenomena have certainly been encount­
ered, and we can hope for the durability of our behavioral brethren. 
The second point, then, is a call to observation of the decision 
process. We have been through a fairly long period of hypothesiz­
ing on how the beast behaves; now must come a period of testing 
and evaluation in the classical scientific method sense. Explicit 
self-awareness can certainly be agonizing and confusing. But as it 
becomes a way of life, the agony diminishes and benefits accrue. 
The people in quality control advance the hard line that any manu­
facturing process has two outputs, both of equal importance—the 
product and information. The same is certainly true of any phe­
nomena, the decision-process phenomena here. The call to formal 
observation serves the spirit of the decision process itself and the 
theoretical enrichment of our understanding of it. 
Needs and Prospects 
The needs, again, are twofold and in the form of a charge to the­
orists: (1) get operational on what is known, on technologically 
aided deciding—swamp us in pre-living, set up your lab; and (2) 
observe. 
The prospects for achieving this are not too bad. In gaming— 
decision-process gaming in particular—there seems to be emerging 
the appropriate vehicle for meeting these two charges and setting 
up the matter for real-life execution. It must eventually be seen as 
a vital part of behavioral feedback; we are more and more in a re­
porting society, so the spirit of the task is certainly there. It may 
be more a matter of emphasis than of magnitude—concentrating 
Decision-Making 258 
on the ever changing relevancies and not on the remaining trivia. 
The emphasis is from the practitioner's viewpoint, though it is 
hoped that those in research and teaching will be responsive. 
All of this discussion may add to the previously mentioned sense 
of guilt or indecisiveness. But in the course of this discussion there 
is noted one insight that may be sustaining. That is, in difficult de­
cisions, such a3, "Should I really turn on the cold water now?", it 
is comforting to realize that the cost of more information is prob­
ably higher than the penalty from the worst decision. The only 
lingering hope must be that this is not the one time when such is 
not the case. Even so, there is the lingering cosmic thought that 
it is all part of a larger statistical pattern. Whether this is soaring 
insight or total indifference, it still can leave you whistling, some­
times. 
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Henry S. Br'mkers 
EPILOGUE 
Aside from the possibility that this collection of essays may provide 
material and insights that are immediately useful through its com­
prehensive and strategically spotty, in-depth character, the collec­
tion also raises questions that may be more interestingly significant 
than those that it may answer. Perhaps the most embracing ques­
tion raised concerns where further work on decision-making in com­
plex systems might lead and what curious, unsuspected turns it 
might take. 
One might ask, for example, whether the work on decision-mak­
ing will lead, as is often thought, toward being able to cope better 
with the onrush of apparent complexity, or whether the further de­
velopment of this work itself will elaborate and extend the very 
complexity for which means to cope are sought? Might there be 
achieved significant means for making better decisions and choices 
and a general relative relaxation of the anxiety over complexity? 
Or might the gap between high levels of complexity and the ability 
to cope with it continue to enlarge, aided and abetted by the very 
work undertaken to reduce it? Might newly developed decision-
aid systems require the proliferation of other new systems to con­
trol and monitor them along with the need for others to control 
and monitor them, and so on? 
One might also ask whether the work on how decisions are made 
in complex systems might lead to the design of electromechanical 
systems of great complexity [1, pp. 35-36] capable of assuming re­
sponsibility for many additional aspects of decision-making than 
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have been relegated to systems already? One might ask whether 
several—even very many—such systems might ultimately be highly 
interrelated with one another such that they form suprasysterns 
that are able to conduct the ongoing affairs of many aspects of 
societies in highly developed nations. In view of the immense com­
plexity involved and the speed with which decisions must be made, 
one mght come to realize that humans, unaided, could not perform 
such tasks by virtue of their limited information-processing capa­
bilities. Accordingly, whole societies may become highly dependent 
upon such systems to maintain them. On occasion one might 
wonder how well and how justly such systems are performing; and 
how people, particularly those responsible, can relate to such sys­
tems for the purpose of influencing and controlling them. One 
might wonder too, about one's own well-being and the general state 
of affairs if such systems were to become largely self-regulating and 
develop the capability of engaging in social decision-making among 
themselves with respect to their collective and individual best in­
terests. Might the limited information-processing capabilities of 
humans prove to be, ultimately, inadequate for controlling such 
systems? 
In the same vein, one might visualize that electromechanical sys­
tems would be—or would have to be, if nations became dependent 
upon them—extended to assume responsibilities for directing and 
carrying out operations of a wide variety of types so that they and 
the nations' population may be maintained. Such systems might 
be able to learn to serve people well through the very process of 
serving them, as well as learn to serve their own purposes. One 
might wonder what would be the basis for deciding whose needs 
and ends are to be served. One might think that a highly developed 
suprasystem would behave in a manner consistent with the self-
perpetuating behavior of any human organization, corporation, or 
bureaucracy, and wonder whether it, in view of its very extensive 
information-processing capabilities, would continue to reflect and 
serve the needs of people. 
At the same time, one might consider the possibility that electro­
mechanical-chemical systems would be designed, after the pattern 
of living systems, whose behavior and performance could serve well 
the needs and desires of people—with respect to their physical and 
nonphysical comfort, for example. Such systems, of necessity, 
would be highly coupled or related to the central nervous systems 
of human beings for the purpose of monitoring human responses to 
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the states they assume. Such systems could learn to serve humans 
well—to become capable of elaborating themselves to assume 
highly subtle states that relate well to the highly subtle demands 
that humans place on environment for comfort. They may also 
become capable of mediating the needs of many humans for a wide 
variety of subtle environmental states as well as for establishing 
gross states of the environment—such as amount, magnitude and 
characteristics—that well serve individuals, particular populations, 
and the whole society. 
One might wonder whether, ultimately, the work on decision-
making in complex systems—in the sense of system management 
[2] as the science of science—will emerge as tne crucial unifying 
discipline and provide an understanding of the issues involved and 
the means by which large, complex systems of all types are con­
trolled. Presumably, this work may ultimately provide an under­
standing of the means by which living systems, through interaction 
with electromechanical-chemical systems, may exert sufficient in­
fluence to maintain for themselves an acceptable and improved 
overall environment. In this sense, the work on decision-making 
in large, complex systems may hold not only the basis for the suit­
able management of most aspects of society and its environment 
but, also, how system management can appropriately manage itself. 
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